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“There is a radical opposition between the ancient philo-
sophical school, which addressed individuals in order to 
transform their entire personality, and the university, 
whose mission is to give out diplomas which correspond 
to a certain level of objectifiable knowledge” (Hadot 2002, 
260). I agree. And I object to what has happened. At the 
same time, we should not go back. Now is thankfully not 
then: who besides a control freak would assume that 
people ought ever to be totally grasped and completely 
transformed? The democratic assumption, true to every 
child, is that we come into the world with much that is 
powerful and right. It is not total transformation that 
we need, but humanity and, through it, capability. So we 
need something from ancient philosophy — learning that 
seeks to humanize and open up our whole being — but 
not its authoritarian residue. What is philosophy today if 
we take seriously what the ancient philosophical school 
got right?
At the end of his life, Pierre Hadot was a professor at 
the Collège de France — a “professor’s professor” — and 
he helped Michel Foucault, most famously, conceptual-
ize ethics. Hadot devoted his career to recovering the 
ancient conception of philosophy, according to which 
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the discourses of universities are but a fragment of what 
philosophy is. His engagement with this theme helped 
me understand and develop a personal counter-culture 
to my academic work in the period leading up to and 
directly following my tenure as a university profes-
sor. Today, I understand this counter-culture as a kind 
of original academics, that is, an academics truer to the 
idea of the philosophical school Plato first developed in 
his Ἀκαδήμεια. Ironically, it is tenure that is now protect-
ing me as I use it in the open.
Imagine the kind of philosophy book you might have 
wished for when you were growing up. Seeking a reader 
who would be patient and open-minded enough to live 
with her own questions and to walk around town with 
her thoughts, this book would not have a single thesis 
but would rather work through multiple problems and 
be an experience, born out of life experience. It would 
not be summarizable. It would be larger than the reader 
and open onto different kinds of readings. This is the 
kind of philosophy book that was at home in the nine-
teenth century.
In that brutal, colonial age, something amazing barely 
broke out — an unstructured chorus of the impulse 
inside Renaissance humanism: the power of people to 
“fashion the form that they prefer” (della Mirandola). The 
irony of history was considerable. The non-arbitrariness 
of people’s power came from the realization of the lay-
ers of significance that there are in the cosmos when we 
engage it with the ideals of justice, truth, and beauty —
things that concern every human being and about which 
one can object. While half the world was in shackles and 
most of the canonical, European thinkers were still rac-
ist and sexist, here was faith in the power of thought-
ful reasoning about what is good, and especially in the 
power of freedom to release human beings into their 
intelligence on many different levels. Moving between 
intuition and dreaming, cognition and bodily percep-
tion, experiences and fantasies, sense trickles inside our 
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shale and calcified pains; reaches to justice, truth, and 
beauty. And these values demand certain kinds of clarity 
in life by which we can live with dignity. And this dignity 
demands that we overturn subjection, counter-throwing 
the very discourse that educates us. 
On these grounds, to the extent that the nineteenth 
century exposed the range of consciousness involved in 
European subjectivity and intimated what would exceed it, 
it is a century that primed democratic academics today 
for a world that demands a more thorough decoloniza-
tion of people’s minds to respect the plurality of people’s 
intelligences. Hence, I take it to qualify Hadot’s concep-
tual archeology, as I fully believe Foucault did as well. 
One day, I hope, decolonization will qualify it again and 
more deeply — there are communal ways of knowing 
academic culture has barely grasped.
What culture should the academy have? Whereas Plato 
was in some ways one of the first egalitarians by merit 
(especially concerning women), he was also deeply clas-
sist in his categorization of intellectual potentials. He 
effectively thought some people were stupid by nature 
having no philosophical worth (Rancière 2004). Hence the 
Ἀκαδήμεια existed outside the city, in practice exclusive 
and somewhat sequestered. It took me a while to get this 
geography right — see how ambivalent it is about people. 
Plato was traumatized by failed democracy. Understand-
ably, but tragically, he overreacted. All of democracy was 
at fault, and people could not be trusted. They needed to 
be totally transformed and, when unable, to be kept in 
their place. We need only to follow out Rancière’s analy-
sis of political economy in Plato’s foundations of policy 
to see how the academy was founded on class division 
and exclusion — on the very notion of a class of people 
as opposed to people in general. It was founded on the 
inequality of intelligence.
That was trauma, and trauma is not the origin, but 
the negation. Hence, it is not accurate to call Plato’s 
idea of school “original academics.” Original academics 
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would be found if we looked at a non-traumatized rela-
tionship with democracy, an accurate picture of people’s 
power of intelligence. Hence the Renaissance — or as I 
have called it “nineteenth century” — qualification on 
academics, which I also think of as a priming inside the 
colonizing mind to decolonize the mind. Truly original 
academics begins with the power of people to find and 
make sense in the world out of freedom and a profound 
trust in our capabilities as human beings. It negates 
Plato’s Ἀκαδήμεια at the point of its negation — where 
trauma and a rejection of democracy, a distrust of people, 
occur. Instead, let us demand justly democratic schools 
and original academics born of the power of humanity 
to find and to make sense in the cosmos. Let this, naively, 
include everyone — because that is right. Let it, maturely, 
always be self-critical. Whatever is of worth in Plato’s 
academics must be saved within a thorough rejection of 
what is deeply distrustful of people and misunderstand-
ing about democracy in that same Ἀκαδήμεια. Whatever 
is right in democracy must still pass through a critique 
of the subjugation still in democratic society, including 
its school systems.
Plato’s vision of philosophy — at least as explained by 
Hadot — has the practical point of philosophy right, but 
this point needs to be rendered thoroughly democratic 
in the polyphony and multiple intelligences of people. 
Here is a point about method. Out of respect for people, 
Plato’s method — called “academics” — must relinquish 
its traumatic repetition of violence in the need to control 
people by grasping and transforming them completely. 
Making people slaves to reason is still making them 
slaves. It is unreasonable. Despite obvious disanalogies, 
Plato’s academic mentality coheres with the religious 
bondage of the Church and its Lord, the racist mentality 
of colonialism, and the insane pressures to perform that 
characterize capitalism today. 
We do not need to be remade to be intelligent. In the 
openness found in trust in our power of sense-finding 
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and sense-making, we might experience a philosophy 
that — among friends formed just by grappling together 
with the work of making sense of life — aims at wis-
dom in an egalitarian life. Doing so coheres with what 
Foucault was after in his application of Hadot. It is also 
what I am after. We should welcome what is good from 
foundational academics and make it democratic, that is, 
opposed to dumbing down, complete control, and the 
creation of intellectual classes. We should learn from 
the anti-colonial current of the nineteenth century and 
explode the range of intelligence. We should oppose the 
latent traumatic-Platonism of the disciplinary acad-
emy, while preserving the ethos of a life centered around 
wisdom-seeking. Original academics via the birth of 
poly-intelligent being. Let us deepen the conditions for 
equality.
Just so, in the spirit of poly-intelligence, this book 
before you contains six oddities: a family portrait, a 
parody essay, a time-capsule poem, an exploded essay, 
a poetic record of an act, and an aphorism journal for 
a year. Their inspirations come from my Eurocen-
tric educational system, where I found them formally 
unnerving: Epictetus’ notebooks, Tarkovski’s  Mirror, and 
Apollinaire’s roving “Zone.” Also experiments in ecol-
ogy — the study of home — the six originate in rifts that 
challenge us as growing people. They alternate between 
environmental problems and tensions within families, 
as if the fissures in love and in society wash back and 
forth between each other as we try to make a home in 
the world. Multiple times layer over each other like the 
sounds of a large, democratic city. The personal and the 
planetary intersect. The space before, and against, policy 
where politics arises as assertion opens up in glimpses, 
fragmenting the body and inertia of oppressive orders. 
Philosophy arises as a homely and idiosyncratic practice 
of multiple forms of intuition, reflection and intelli-
gence for muddling through life. In solitary communion 
with oneself or with community out in the world, and 
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in much loved lands, we can open up the contemporary 
and tragic forms of power that keep everything in its 
awful place hurtling toward something that makes no 
good sense. Painstaking exercises in being human are 
grounded in the places we have tarried with our lives in 
unconditional love and in truthfulness — in the desire 
to become. They arise through the body and within the 
day as assertions of voice born out of long silence within 
the landscapes of our intimate time. Summoning sense 
is what it means to have a conscience.
Art, practice-work, literature — these serve as frag-
ments of a larger whole, keeping life broad and open. 
They serve as resistances against the narrowing spe-
cialization and functionalization of mass economy, an 
economy that began by colonizing the labor and diverse 
minds of much of the world’s people and continues today 
by colonizing the atomic fragments of our lives — the 
production of our bodily organs, the nuances of our 
self-styling, even the currency of our dreams and visu-
alizations. This economy today over-determines the con-
tested and contradictory place called “the academy” and 
shackles intelligence. But like early childhood learning, 
the expressive arts I here employ are imaginative after 
having first been experimental and seek to unfetter by 
creating a human whole first, a relational — not simply 
theoretical or practical — space, or actually, time.
I wanted to throw into the spin of text and image my 
whole human being, incomplete and fragmented at the 
edges and in its midst, summoning a world of trust in 
ourselves, against one that began in violence, expropria-
tion, and competition.
*
One of France’s most erudite classicists and a transla-
tor of Plotinus, Hadot first came into the English speak-
ing world through the bibliographies in Michel Fou-
cault’s The History of Sexuality. In 1982, Hadot published 
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a volume on the history of ascetic practices in antiq-
uity — practices he called “spiritual exercises,” a kind of 
work on the self. Two years later in The Use of Pleasure, 
Foucault placed “practices of the self” in the foreground 
of his theoretical material. Though focused at first on 
ethical training, Foucault’s idea applies more broadly 
to self-development and the ways we fashion ourselves 
and modify our practices thoughtfully (Nichols 2014, 
ch. 6). If we looked at the United States of America, for 
instance — a limited example — we could find many 
instances and applications of what Foucault studied —
yoga, self-help, religious exercises, interest-based groups 
organized by social media and taking place offline for the 
purpose of self-realization, multiplayer virtual gaming, 
athleticism, various modes of art as practice, and many 
others. We would also find them in many ritual prac-
tices among the indigenous of the land. But ironically, 
the contemporary university has not been explicit about 
spiritual exercises. It relegates practice work to student 
life and cordons off theoretical discourses within the 
disciplines.
Why should it? Discernment depends on practices, and 
knowers must develop virtues. Professionals are lost 
without character rooted in having a strong sense of self, 
that is, the ability to own beliefs, desires, intentions, and 
feelings. All of these crucial things — discernment prac-
tices, intellectual virtues, personal character and a sense 
of self concerning what one thinks, wants, pursues, and 
experiences are developed by spiritual exercise. As Hadot 
emphasizes in What Is Ancient Philosophy? the original 
schools of philosophy did not think of learning as theo-
retical discourse, but as a way of life. Philosophy, the cen-
ter of learning, was as much practice as theory and was 
exemplified by a passionate love of truth and a restless 
attempt to be virtuous in one’s life. It is hard to see how 
such passion and restlessness, how excellence of mind 
and character, are not exactly what great science and 
professional leadership demand. So why such ignorance 
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in the structure of the university? Why so much technol-
ogy without soulful technique?
In a remarkable essay, “Philosophy and Philosophical 
Discourse” (2002, 172–233), Hadot underlined the con-
trast between ancient philosophy and the contemporary 
academy. For ancient philosophy, discourses of truth 
were but a mode of the overall philosophical life — the 
heart of which was living wisely. One could be a phi-
losopher without theoretical discourse, but never a phi-
losopher without trying to live wisely. Now we live in an 
inverted world. The academic today who thinks his aca-
demic work is to try to live wisely is considered imma-
ture. In original academics, the life of the philosopher 
was essential, the theories not. And this life was fash-
ioned through spiritual exercise — askesis — a concept 
that is at the heart of this book.
I love the tradition of irruptions in original academ-
ics, and Hadot marked them. They should be guides to 
our practice now. Petrarch and Erasmus wrote about the 
philosophical life. Montaigne practiced “the art of liv-
ing” (263). Each of Descartes’s Meditations is a spiritual 
exercise (264–65) — reducing one’s life to a lucid skep-
ticism through which one lives. Only an academy igno-
rant of Seneca does not see this. Kant — far from being 
the merely professional scholar he is often made out to 
be by the lovers and haters of theory — distinguished a 
philosopher from a mere “artist of reason” (i.e., a theo-
retician) (267). “ . . . Schopenhauer, Emerson, Thoreau, . . .
Marx, Nietzsche, William James, Bergson, Wittgenstein, 
Merleau-Ponty and still others . . . conceived of philoso-
phy not only as a concrete, practical activity but also as a 
transformation of our way of inhabiting and perceiving 
the world” (270). “There is an abyss between fine phrases 
and becoming genuinely aware of oneself, truly trans-
forming oneself” (279).1
1 Hadot believed that the way Christianity absorbed Greek and 
Roman philosophy neutralized its practical elements by conferring 
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The history of the academy has a counter-history, more 
vital to its humanity than the trumpets of theory admit. 
While Aquinas lectured in Paris, Bonaventure wrote 
poetically about the life of St. Francis — a discourse 
clearly intended for emulation and, so, a form of practice. 
Rousseau insisted that the Académies destroyed virtue, 
and he incited people to become Romantic. Kierkegaard 
spent every cent he owned to chastise his community 
for its hypocrisy. Frederick Douglass confronted people 
over and over again with a living fact. Woolf used litera-
ture to show the subjugation of women. Sartre suggested 
that any philosopher who only wrote about freedom was 
a fraud. And Freire developed thinking co-constructively 
with the rural and urban poor blighted by famine from 
a neo-colonial world of “structural adjustment.” The 
ancient conception of philosophy reappears whenever 
people realize that loving wisdom takes more than writ-
ing a theory, however true it may be. 
This counter-history is more vital to knowledge than 
the loudspeakers of technology admit. To train our-
selves to be objective demands a rigor of mind and of 
procedure. It demands that we accustom ourselves to 
fastidious searching. The ability to take in many differ-
ent viewpoints and penetrate them, or synthesize them, 
takes habituation. We have to grow up to be capacious, 
vulnerable and receptive while not being reactive. We 
the ethos onto the habitus of the monastery. Monastic practices, 
Christian in form, took over the practice-work of philosophy. Phil-
osophical practice was supplanted by the Christian way of life. This 
left philosophy with only theory. And as philosophical discourse 
was drawn into theological dispute, the monastery gave way to the 
Medieval university. Philosophy became Scholastic. And it was this 
scholastic, exclusively theoretical mode that provided a frame for 
the modern research university to adapt to theory-driven technol-
ogy applications in which work on oneself was irrelevant. Capital 
could easily colonize this, and it has. When knowledge is driven by 
the market and personality is converted into performance, original 
academics are left far behind. They become radical.
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must cultivate the independent space for truth and curi-
osity as ends in themselves to actually advance knowl-
edge. The situation is indirect, never merely direct as 
the instrumentalization of education would mythologize. 
There is simply no way around the need to develop your-
self. Even if all that goes into being human were the pro-
duction of knowledge, you would still need a sense of self. 
And of course there is way more to being human than 
simply being a big, cogitating mass. Technology means 
nothing without values that provide its ends. And these 
values are shams if they are not expressions of humanity. 
The counter-history of the contemporary university is 
necessary for anything resembling knowledge, let alone 
humanity. Spiritual exercises are necessary.
As old school style sometimes does to the new, Hadot’s 
work rejuvenates what academic practice is. In the early 
1990s, Hadot wrote a book on Marcus Aurelius’s Medita-
tions called The Inner Citadel (1998 in English). There, he 
painstakingly showed the ways Aurelius disciplined him-
self through his nightly writing of notes-to-self. These 
notes-to-self were the Meditations. They involved theo-
ries — often confusing ones — yet the Meditations was 
not primarily useful as a work in theory. Instead, it was 
beneficial as a practice. A journal based on the ideas of 
Epictetus’s Stoicism, the Meditations documented Aure-
lius’s self-transformation, accusing his faults with his 
conscience, focusing his emotions for the day ahead. It 
showed him owning what he thought, wanted, pursued, 
and experienced. Here was vivid work in habituation to 
uphold the public good. It was profoundly human and 
frequently brave.
I worry that the contemporary academy makes us 
cowards. If academics has lost its grounding in spiritual 
exercise, is it any wonder that it instrumentalizes stu-
dents as it instrumentalizes learning? Then what is out-
side the academy in actually human ecology is more vital 
to wisdom than the academy itself. Democratic spirit 
becomes the promise. What if philosophy were around 
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us in the homely intelligence of everyday people — that 
is to say, in democracy? What if the original impulse 
to philosophical practice were found whenever people 
search restlessly to live more wisely, more virtuously? 
Could we “define the philosopher not as a professor or 
writer . . . , but . . . as a person who leads a philosophical 
life?” (Hadot 2002, 274) Here is a critical thought that 
manages to make something useful of Plato’s Ἀκαδήμεια 
and its reactionary intellectualization. Bravery lives in 
the carved out spaces of freedom that keep us human —
and not in the exam.
Yes, I think so. Why distrust people’s minds? Why 
repeat the colonialism haunting our intellectual hier-
archies? Why shackle yourself to the scale or the curve? 
And this: without the elitism that Plato’s Ἀκαδήμεια inau-
gurated in the figure of a sage who conforms to the ideal, 
living a philosophical life as the equal of anyone else 
implies nothing more nor less than muddling through 
the difficulties of our social ecology as just one person 
among many, living with friends and with family, being 
with many — neighbors, fellow community-members, 
citizens, far off people on this planet, the riotous polyph-
ony of other forms of life — and hearing the voices of 
future generations, and past ones, as cardinal minds. 
This muddle involves poly-intelligent modes of explora-
tion, and it involves bravery — descendent spiritual exer-
cises fashioned in semi-successful and searching ways 
to carve out spaces of freedom. There, we begin to feel, 
desire, believe, act and be human. 
Please imagine me, zanni that I am, riding next to you 
on an above-ground metro line in Cleveland, New York, 
or in Paris — places I’ve lived or tarried, these minor and 
major nodes of the colonial world-economy across the 
last centuries. As you read, I’m standing, looking around 
at the city in the evening light. What cities are there 
inside you? What lives are here around us? Everything 




I used to walk to school in the early morning in Rouen, 
France. I was eighteen. It was Fall. I was studying as a 
Rotary Exchange Student at the Lycée Pierre Corneille. I 
had no real idea about the violent subjection that consti-
tuted, and still constitutes, the history of my world. As 
I walked from the LeFebure’s house out a side street to 
the busy avenues, the light would be deep blue-lavender 
between the buildings. 
This book attests to the consequences of early child-
hood environments on adult development and to the 
validity of democratic education. But, at first, a lot of 
it has to do with trying to approximate something I 
glimpsed when I was an exchange student in France 
and later a young member of the literary scene in col-
lege. What I think I understand better now is the politi-
cal dimension of what I glimpsed — especially as it 
applies to academic politics. By “academic politics,” I do 
not mean in-fighting within departments or university 
committees. Nor do I mean the international, polemical 
exchanges between professors with different research 
agendas. I mean the structural conditions of academia, in 
particular with regard to the equality of intelligence (Ran-
cière 1991) — the moral axiom of learning in a demo-
cratic manner. 
This strange axiom, so easy to misunderstand, holds 
that the point of learning is to discover and to construct 
the sense of the world, and that every single person — and 
other forms of life as entrusted to our interpretation —
have a role to play in that. None are ruled as incapable 
of having something to contribute to thought — which 
is shared and public. The “you can’t think” (“yet,” or 
“quite”), so typical to academia’s hierarchical subjection 
of intelligence by an illicit act of will, is ruled as the 
major moral violation of this philosophy. We need only 
read hooks (1994) or Douglass (1994) to see how this 
violation constituted colonialism — as well as Plato’s 
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political economy (Rancière 2004). Our world — aca-
demia especially — is drenched in it. Can’t we think yet?
I know I can — I always could, from the moment I cried 
for breath as a newborn, rending the space with need 
and awareness. 
Eighteen years later, I lived in Rouen, France for a 
year, fraternizing with both French friends and the Sec-
tion Norvégienne that was lodged at the Lycée Corneille. 
I immersed myself in a world of literary culture where 
people discussed philosophy in cafés as part of being a 
teen and where difficult writing was promoted institu-
tionally, taken as the lifeline it can be between people. 
The following year, I began college at Yale University 
and was lucky enough to fall into the newly revitalized 
scene of the Yale Literary Magazine, the oldest college lit-
erary magazine in the United States of America. This 
heterogenous community met nightly at a table in the 
Alternative Food Court of the Yale Commons. At the 
table, I found people who aspired to a literary culture 
similar to the one I had found in France. 
I wanted to find people who were both literary and 
philosophical, who engaged in the difficult communi-
cation of writing while searching for justice, truth, and 
beauty in this life. I could sense that some of my col-
leagues were roaming; yet the cynicism of the United 
States of America and the corrupt power of Yale stank 
up the air. The Yale Literary table risked corruption 
despite itself by aspiring to the status-conscious life of 
the aesthete. 
I had to find a way to use the literary mind to ground 
me in existential relations. Writing can be a lifeline. 
Right after I graduated from college, I met the philoso-
pher and painter, Megan Craig when she took the course, 
The Problem of Evil with Susan Neiman in 1994 (Craig’s 
first book oddly falsifies this date in its preface, covering 
over the wonderful, nineteen-year-old freshperson who 
walked into Connecticut Hall’s seminar room at Yale’s 
Department of Philosophy). For several years, Megan 
xxII PREFACE
and I wrote back and forth to each other in different 
media: letters, postcards, paintings, drawings, notebooks, 
sketches, photographs, subway poetry placards, pieces 
of daily life, leaves, and philosophy papers intended for 
our respective classes. Megan was working at and paint-
ing the life of a daycare center called Kid Space — it was 
lovely and reminded me of my own family’s environment 
when I was a child. The experience with Megan of philos-
ophy as a daily, interpersonal correspondence stretched 
my sense of what is possible and marked the outer edge 
of the literary mind that I’d internalized. I wanted some-
thing egalitarian and democratic that stretched through 
New York City and Chicago — the places I and my friends 
lived at the time. Not snobbery, populism. Not simplifica-
tion, people’s real complexity.
But this intense discovery made me feel dissociated 
from the University of Chicago, where I had gone to 
study due to its seemingly being the most rigorous and 
scholarly place to study philosophy in the United States 
of America at the time. The University of Chicago’s phi-
losophy department seemed more open minded than any 
other program without sacrificing objectivity. But its 
mind was open conditionally.
You can get a sense of this environment by reading 
an exchange I had with the chair of the program over 





Phone   216.368.3563
Fax   216.368.0814
www.case.edu/artsci/phil/bendikkeymer.html
Dear Professor Richardson Lear,
One of the things I learned while earning my Ph.D. in Philosophy from 
the University of Chicago was the importance of constructive criticism. 
After many years, it is clear to me that the Department of Philosophy of 
the University of Chicago in the period when I attended (1994-2002) 
deserves some constructive criticism. It took me many years to realize 
how degrading aspects of the experience there had been to me—many 
years, and much work. I write this note in the hope that your depart-
ment is different and is working to make a respectful and supportive 
environment for graduate students.
When I arrived at Chicago in 1994, the Anscombe Lounge had the 
following slogan on its door, “Possibility is the destruction of content-
ment.” What reigned in the department under that slogan was an 
idealization of harsh criticism as a mode of philosophical education. 
But given the hierarchy of the relationship between professors and 
students, given scarce opportunities beyond school in the market and 
in school with departmental fellowships and prizes, and given the 
hands-off attitude of much of the faculty, the ideal of harsh criticism 
easily became a rationalization for disrespectful behavior, lack of 
recognition, and the inevitably repeated hierarchies attempted by 
subordinates over each other, in this case, graduate students. The 
social environment of the department was judgmental, competitive, 
and fear-driven. It was frequently degrading, and one could not speak 
freely. We know these environments to be abusive ones. 
I wish to underline that I experienced a number of individual faculty 
members to be supportive. The problem was in the ethos.
As an alumnus of the program, it is my wish that the University of 
Chicago Department of Philosophy creates a warm and respectful envi-
ronment for everyone who works there. That I can anticipate a snicker 
at such an elementary human request suggests that my memory of the 
time there still has the capacity to trouble my faith in human relations.
More generally, the discipline of philosophy is beginning to wake up 
to its abusive mode of operation, the way it has historically normalized 
degrading conversational patterns and the ways in which its unexam-
ined life has adversely affected graduate students, minorities, women, 
and other “abnormals” (!). I sincerely hope that your department is tak-
ing a lead in changing the discipline. 
Respectfully,
Jeremy David Bendik-Keymer
Beamer-Schneider Professor in Ethics
Apr 4
Gabriel Richardson Lear <grlear@uchicago.edu>
to  bendik-keymer
Dear Professor Bendik-Keymer,
I’m sorry to hear that your time in graduate school was not a happy one. 
I have always found this to be an unusually supportive department and 
do hope—and believe—that it is a supportive environment for our grad-
uate students as well. But of course, ethos changes with the individuals 




Professor and Chair, The Department of Philosophy
The Committee on Social Thought
The University of Chicago
1115 E. 58th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
773-702-5078
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How often are we willing to be horrified about our own 
institutions? Of course, my time wasn’t simply unhappy 
in graduate school, nor was my point about personal 
happiness. Assuming that it was minimized and dis-
placed what I wrote. I wrote my note, because there were 
problems of basic decency between people camouflaged 
as licenses of intellectual rigor. These involved degrad-
ing conditions. 
My letter was also not about individuals. It was a call 
for clarification from an alumnus of the program about 
the institutional structures in place to protect graduate 
students — that is, the structures in place to protect the 
equality of intelligence (Rancière 1991). There could be 
many things said in reply to such a probe and piece of 
constructive criticism, but the Chair’s note said none of 
them.
More typically, the letter showed a lack of interper-
sonal wisdom. When you are dealing with someone who 
has been traumatized by an institutional failure, you 
should be careful not to minimize that experience acting 
as an authority figure of the institution in question. This 
risks what is called, “re-traumatization.” 
I believe that all three of these conditions — turning 
disrespect into a temperamental choice, pinning anxiety 
and depression on individuals rather than on subjugat-
ing structures, and lacking interpersonal wisdom — are 
common to what I am calling “academic politics,” espe-
cially in philosophy. In various ways, they each reinforce 
the in-equality of intelligence — camouflaging the abuses 
of will, hiding the inegalitarian axiom, and ignoring the 
human truth. 
Half a decade after I entered graduate school, however, 
I found a learning environment that cultivated commu-
nication that is both philosophical and artistic through 
a range of exploratory and expressive media. I consider 
this learning environment my first truly liberating school 
system. Interestingly, it reminded me of the early child-
hood environment my parents had made for me (and 
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for others in my mother’s Head Start school) and of the 
socialist school I attended in Ithaca in the early 1970s, 
the East Hill School. The places where education hap-
pens in my country are the places of early childhood.
The effect of meeting a liberating school while at the 
University of Chicago was amazing. True to the best in 
my country’s democratic culture, the Chicago Commons 
was a public school system in Chicago woven as family-
centers. I was fortunate to study it with two amazing 
researchers, a married couple who had made their life 
exploring learning among the underprivileged and the 
ostracized (Scheinfeld et al., 2008 — I helped co-construct 
some central chapters significantly). The family cen-
ters — adapting and developing what they had learned 
from the Reggio Emilia Municipal School System — saw 
children as centers of intelligent agency seeking to explore 
the world and become a part of it. They promoted inquiry 
through all our expressive modalities and believed in 
dialogues across many different media. They were also 
challenging, but as a way to share the world together —
what Rancière (1991) would call the necessary supposi-
tion of the object to create true equality.
Minds were absorbed here, emotions quiet, everyone 
with more space in their minds than any theory could 
contain. When I first entered the Chicago Commons 
Family Center across the Dan Ryan Expressway from 
the now-gone Stateway Gardens projects, I thought I 
had entered utopia. Here was understanding around the 
walls and in the hundreds of representations of different 
kinds making up the common and evolving mind of this 
school that joined children and their families with staff 
from the very community the center served. 
Time circles around our development like years 
around the sun, and the simplest, humane acts can cre-
ate the profoundest effects in a life. When I was a child, 
my mother and father created a kinesthetic and imagi-
native environment for me — something for which I will 
forever be grateful, especially to my mother who led the 
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way as, literally, a coal miner’s daughter from Southern 
Ohio. Looking back at my early environment, I have to 
ask: what are the consequences of growing up feeling 
that exploring human meaning, in whatever way works 
with one’s imagination, is every person’s right? 
The Chicago Commons, the Scheinfelds more gener-
ally, and the presence of Martha Nussbaum’s attention 
to capabilities and philosophy of education (a saving 
dignity in the University of Chicago) gave me the outside 
to the normal system which did not deserve to be norma-
tive. They reminded me of a decent upbringing made in an 
environment of human kindness.
*
There is a scene in ordinary life and a space in families 
and friendship circles where philosophy most properly 
lives. That the academy knows it from the books we read 
but hardly crafts it institutionally is both frustrating and 
at times tragic. Personal responsibility, clumsy human 
immaturity and humble human maturity; rolling with 
the ways friends and family can speak with each other 
and help each other see and feel — these are needed in a 
philosophical life. They are humane realities.
If this book works, I have thought, it will leave the 
reader turning to growth and truth in her or his own 
life. That is what it means to philosophize, as all ancients 
intended to, from oneself. I want to give the reader a 
chance to construct the conditions of a personal rela-
tion to philosophy — location of voice, then crafting of 
speech; affirmation of humanity, belief in a world where 
together we make sense. I want us to speak about diffi-
cult things in a loving way — something I will do in the 
first study of this book when I explore true kindness 
with my family. I sometimes feel that in our smooth, 
performance-subjected culture, people do not know how 
to go through difficult things anymore. 
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Against the kind of colonization of philosophy that 
extracts labor through subjection and makes human-
ity off limits in its form, I want you to feel that you can 
explore anything through reading and writing and in any 
imaginative way. I want you to see how philosophy can be 
an expressive and flexible medium, satisfying the great-
ness and breadth of life. At the same time, I don’t want 
to promote irresponsible avoidance of what matters in 
life — the tough objects, or rifts, that face us, and that 
provide us with the challenge by which we can truly grow. 
Everything, everything human comes down to communi-
cation — soulful, embodied, intelligent, objective, free.
Mostly, though, I want to talk with you. Because this 
book has been a collection of studies in a musical sense, 
of études, because it has been a sequence of “spiri-
tual exercises,” it has always involved my person, or 
as Charles Larmore (2010) would say, my “self.” It has 
acted as a book of becoming that deepened my life and my 
relationships. I am grateful for its power, the power of 
philosophizing in the ancient sense that I unknowingly 
practiced during my first years as an adult with a liter-
ary mind. 
We can create tragedy in our lives by stopping search-
ing, by no longer crafting the conditions for the lives we 
truly love. Committing ourselves to our feelings, beliefs, 
and intentions is the still turning point, the center, of 
accountability in each of us from which we can relate 
with, and be accountable to, each other (Larmore 2010, 
Hadot 2003, ch. 11). As we err, our commitment to self-
accountability and mutual understanding is comic. Even 
if we have not yet found the worlds we might idealize, 
we can still stumble toward a more humane reality. Here 









The walk from Alésia












Alésia is a metro station in Paris, on the purple line 4 out near 
Porte d’Orléans. I was walking in the direction of Parc Mont-
souris at night in late July 2006. The window, above, is from 
Porto. Reminds me of my Aunt Irene.
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What is kindness? When I was a child, I learned to read 
slowly. I was in the brontosaurus reading group. I spent 
all my time in wood shop or drawing. The way I drew 
was to take an elementary writing book with broad lines 
next to a blank page. I wrote either home or war on the 
right. Then I action-drew on the left, blank page. “Amer-
ica” was coming out of the Vietnam War. When my par-
ents separated for a year in the mid-70s, I remember a 
collage at the home of my mother’s friend: a charred, 
melted toy baby on a field of paint and scraps.
Bottom of Paris Rd., New Hartford, N.Y., 1978.
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Some common sense becomes radical when it extends 
through the details of life. The development of kindness 
takes us to support human rights and a form of bio-
centrism: attitudes, customs and policies that express 
respect for all living beings. The extension of kindness 
also modifies a range of institutions — e.g., education, 
science, business, the law, punishment, and politics. It 
makes us utopian out of common sense. It leads us to 
respect a being’s drive to live and to be free.
Graffiti in Porto against the war in Iraq taken 
weeks before the war between Israel and Hez-
bollah broke out, 2006.
6	 THE	IDEAS	START





Imagine me at thirty-seven. I live in the United Arab 
Emirates. I teach philosophy, learning it over and over 
with students like myself. Philosophy is an organic part 
of my life, and I am happiest when it is alive in me. 
I don’t think philosophy is first and foremost a theo-
retical subject or even a discipline. It is the part of us 
longing to create a better life in a world that makes 
more sense. 
Philosophy is my love for the often overlooked or 
bypassed order in the world. Figuring something out 
can change the world — and so can realizing what mat-
ters and why. Often I’ve disagreed with my academic 
discipline. I trust it to make me skeptical. What keeps 
me thoughtful is people who are insightful in daily life 
and the possibility of the world making more sense, 
especially when I work with a group of people who are 
creative. 
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Zlatan and Amir — two Bosnian friends who made it through 
a war, 2007.
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Kindness is my new idea — not mine as in “I own it”, but 
mine as in “I belong to it.” I’ve had two other ideas like 
this before. They probed the details of how war ends and 
home begins. As an undergraduate, I wrote on forgive-
ness, because I felt that the act founding human com-
munity is the act where we repair and move beyond a 
failure that hurt someone. Being forgiving became the 
virtue for interpersonal life and the heart. 
Later, in graduate school, I began to write on healthy 
imperfection. Someone who is healthily imperfect brings 
his imperfections to light and works with the imperfec-
tions of others. That establishes trust. “Healthy imper-
fectionism” became the name for my outlook.
Kindness fits people who are healthily imperfect, and 
there can be no kindness without being forgiving. Home 
is made of imperfections that work together, and war is 
made by refusing to give an inch.
These are ideas that could feel alien in the Middle East 
and looking back to the geopolitical strategy of my coun-
try that marked the world into which I was born. Yet 
without some version of them, I doubt society anywhere 
would be sustainable. Humane realities exist relatively 
incognito in the fabric of everyday life, even in authori-
tarian states. In my country, they ease the relentless-
ness of competition, the lock of perfect images; the long, 
grinding shadow of colonialism, and the sad undertow 
of distant explosions in a country perpetually at war. We 
seldom acknowledge them — the explosions, the shad-





My classrooms are usually in a semi-circle so that we 
can see each other’s faces and be people to each other. It 
depends on what the class wants. I rarely lecture. I’m just 
not suited to much besides conversation. I like comedy to 
be a part of the subtext, because we can connect around 
our imperfection. Teaching is a balance between relax-
ing the pressure of competition and refocusing interests 
once they pick up within the space of trust. People learn 
naturally, resisting only from distrust or tooling them-
selves in their own heads. Students come to class with 
insecurities and want to feel at home. What makes you 
feel at home?
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From my family and friends, I’ve seen the centrality of 
giving talk for any formative relationship. By “forma-
tive”, I mean what humanizes us, for we — as Kierkeg-
aard wrote — have to “form [our] heart[s].” Some rela-
tionships humanize us by forming our hearts, and while 
the most significant are intimate, there can be forma-
tive classroom relationships. Anywhere and everywhere 
we are, we are human, and it is possible to connect with 
most others in realness and fellowship. Giving talk (not 
“giving talk” or “giving talk” but “giving-talk” — talk that 
gives) is communication in its best sense. There is then a 
space between us, a ~ , as a friend of mine, Dan Schein-
feld, drew one night on the paper cover of a table at a 
restaurant in Chicago. 
Macaroon on the nose at Deira City Center, taking a break 
from preparing for departmental accreditation, 2007.
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* * * * * * * *
I want humane reality to be my principle of construction. As 
when a child builds a large structure on the floor, stretch-
ing from wall to wall and door to door on the strength of 
long, solid blocks — so I try to build my world in blocks 
of giving talk. I hope environments with giving talk form 
the societies of the future. 
* * * * * * * *
Window in San Francisco, December 2006. When I was fifteen, 
my father suggested a book I might like for my first research 
paper ever, a paper in Advanced Placement Western Civiliza-





I grew up with talk happening around the dinner table. 
Sometimes, there were meta-arguments on meta-
arguments or the fearsome, recurring volcano. Mostly, 
though, we had good talks. My mother endured a con-
dition that went unnamed. She would often get over-
whelmed and upset. My father did not know what to do 
and approached things intellectually. This wasn’t always 
the best way, but he was trying to be helpful. We lived in 
a world that did not understand, where we couldn’t be 
open without risking judgment. None of us knew what to 
do. The table anchored me.
It was round, white, modern, and had a single, round 
and thin, concave base. If my body tensed up, I could 
always look at the smooth and the round, touch the cool, 
white tininess. Ting. Ting. 
And then on most nights, we had such interesting talks 
at the table.
*        *        *
I return to words. The feelings are undeveloped, but they 
circulate to the side, spreading over the words as the 
words dip into them. Every “I” a “You” injects in a rotat-
ing void of mental space trying to come to terms with 
the feelings as they soak through and exceed words.
*
I could tap my feet at the edge of the white, metal base 




In my family, we cooked good food. So the table would 
fill with experiments and staples in cooking, there under 
the lamp suspended down from the ceiling. 
*
And the greeting cards would flutter in the windows of 
the winter storm, multi-layered with cutouts of Norman 
Rockwell sent from my paternal grandma, Miriam. 
*
In that circle of blizzarded light, we’d talk about the day, 
its meaning, politics, art, books, music, family, worries, 
ties, hopes, vents, schools, works, and more. I’d stake the 
search for meaning and truth — the coming to light of 
things. 
Sometimes, I’d be blue. Sometimes Mom would be, 
too. Outside, the streets were soft and impossible in the 
grace of death. 
*
What makes a “philosopher?” 
*
The streets filled up with barely a rut that could thread 
them. Cars drifted sideways at the corner and the mote 
of snow colled in. In me, praising my family in a pro-
tected fragment the other side of which was anxiety, did 
I idealize love because I found only fragments of sense? 
What good was idealizing? But I also felt a great deal of 
love. It was confusing.
*        *
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How have you found sense in your life? How have you 
loved? What words do you have for “wisdom”?
The conversations I had with my parents settled in my 
peculiar mind. They were complex. Usually about inter-
esting topics both intellectual and emotional, they could 
also become unstable and scary. As a result, I am hyper-
attuned and show elements of what I call “Attention Sur-
plus Condition” — ASC. 
For the most part, I am sunny and loving. But some-
times I have very little tolerance for things. When fear 
settles into the body, it lives there as unease. You forget 
it. Then some memory is stirred — and the anxiety swells 
up. But you don’t know why. 
When life is stable and I feel safe, I am intuitive, full of 
life, popping with connections, excited by the day. There 
is a calm center to my mind and things fall beautifully 
into place. Then I am somewhere — here, in fact.
*
*
I married my fear. I found a situation to break me. 
I overcame it when I had no self-respecting choice but 
to give up. My fear surfaced as shadow morality. 
Divorce.
*
As I’ve grown, I love with less immediacy and more 
understanding. I see what another can do, what I am 
capable of too. I disengage. 
Today, I want to be thoughtful and to take distance on 
what is chaotic, so that I can respond well and co-create 
humane reality through it. 
There are many voices. Listen. 
*        *        *
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Grandma Miriam used to say of my dad that he took a 
long time to grow up. Slowness runs in my family, the 
underside of the sparkling, quick surface. 
Words cycle until the feelings are freed through them.
* * * * * * * * *
 * * * * * * * * *
  * * * * * * * * *
   * * * * * * * * *
    * * * * * * * * *
     * * * * * * * * *
      * * * * * * * * *
Alé’s scarf, Douro River, Summer 2006.
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When I was little, my family lived in Aurora, New York. 
Aurora is a small town by Cayuga Lake. There are hills 
rolling down to the lake, a boat dock and glassy water. 
We lived in an old house renting half of the second 
floor. The house was named after its architect of some 
note. 
Mandel House had angles. Its stairwell was lit by one 
translucent white curtain of a window. The stairway was 
broad, dark wood with a square banister to hold onto. 
The apartment bent around in a C: first the living room; 
then a long, thin kitchen to the right, next my parents’ 
bedroom, a hallway to the right, and finally my room. 
In my room was a stump for banging nails, a balance 
beam six inches from the floor and a tire-swing hanging from 
the ceiling. Imagine the world.
The playground in my room was mostly the invention 
of my mom, who drew from her work in early childhood 
Mandel House in Aurora, New York, 2004 — the front, second 
floor windows lined our apartment in 1973.
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education to give me the best environment possible. That 
environment let me feel okay as the person I am when I 
am creating or experimenting. It let me try things out 
at my own pace. The troubles for me entered when I felt 
that I had to please people whom I sensed were either 
self-centered or bullies. I had trouble picking my battles. 
On my own, I was content. The environment was a block 
of kindness. 
Later when I studied early childhood education, I 
learned that you can’t overestimate the effect of early 
environments on children’s possibilities. We didn’t have 
much money when I was little, but my mom went to the 
lumberyard and asked for buckets of wood pieces that 
were waste from the production process. As a result, I 
had a vast collection of building blocks that I used to 
create cities on the floor of my room large and intricate 
enough that I could not leave my room except by jump-
ing from the bed to the nightstand to the door. I referred 
back to this experience of building cities when I wrote 
the introduction to my dissertation twenty-eight years 
later. 
I think we should build a society that accommodates 
our varying abilities and which gives us time, space and 
understanding to acknowledge our own vibrant reality. 
This would be humane: a space where each is allowed to 
be her own kind. Call that “kindness.” 
Today, children grow into a world that wants them to 
perform according to models that micro-manage each 
part of their productivity and success. Perfectionism 
becomes anathema to humanity. I am arguing for an 
imperfect space. 
Pascal wondered whether we are angels or beasts 
(leave to the side that beasts are never demonic). We 
have this sublime ability to love each other in deed and 
in creative form — to make institutions that are humane. 
Yet we have not created a society that accommodates 
uniqueness. 
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What was most important is that I was loved uncon-
ditionally as a child. Trauma is a source of philosophy, 
especially in Plato, but I believe the memory of love is 
more important. Without it, I would not be building this 
block structure along which you are running, trying with 
your eyes, hearing with your ears.
How will you use it?
&
My mom, Esther, came from a working class, Slovak fam-
ily. Isn’t her name like quiet rain? A family like that 
sticks together, can be both fiery and humble, and has 
strong religious and moral views — although not neces-
sarily reactionary ones. A family like that also does not 
have language for its darkness. There were generations 
of darkness in that family. I see it in my mother’s sisters 
My room in Paris — Summer 2006 — where I switched from 
the idea of conscience to the idea of kindness.
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with ripples I identify in my cousins as well. We never 
talk about it. The silence continues, but I have observed 
how everyone in the family has made choices throughout 
their lives to cycle free parts of their lives. We move in 
half steps. 
The Bendiks are a social, tight-knit family. There is 
a spark of independence throughout. Grandpa Bendik 
insisted that it is all right to dance in the Slovak meet-
ing hall with a partner other than your spouse: who are 
you to know what goes on in another’s mind? He also 
thought it was all right for my mom to go to New York 
City to sing and to act when this was seen as almost sac-
rilegious in their community.
Like her dad, my mom had music in her bones, and she 
was a singer before she went into early childhood educa-
tion. Highly intuitive, she can sense a person with fore-
sight that is remarkable, and she is known to light up 
rooms when she enters them on social occasions. Esther 
reflects her surroundings — like the crystal bowl of water 
in which she floated bougainvilleas for a time. 
They grew up on a farm in rural, southern Ohio — not 
far from West Virginia. Grandpa Bendik worked in the 
coal mines, having had to leave school before ninth 
grade to help support his siblings. They were all formally 
uneducated and relied on their Lutheran church to pro-
vide a framework. My mother was the first of anyone in 
her extended family to go to college. She won a scholar-
ship. When I imagine how far she had to walk to develop 
a sense of her inner landscape, I understand her better. 
The world emerges from half-light on green, lush hills 
with interiorly scored mountains. 
At a certain point, my mom left the theater. She wanted 
to have a child. She became involved in low-income 
early childhood education with African-Americans. She 
became aware of psychology and joined women’s con-
sciousness raising groups. She turned from expression 
to development, from pleasing others to trying to grow. 
How did motherhood help her?
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When my mom decided she wanted a child, she gave a 
great deal of thought to it. She wanted to create a world 
for me that unworked the constraints she had felt. If 
she’d had a language for her darkness, I believe that she 
would have unworked that as well. History isn’t an idea. 
It takes time, and only the perfect see time as an enemy. 
Often when I am teaching or writing, I try to relay the 
core realization that I felt through my parents’ care. 
That memory comes largely from the environment my 
parents provided for me and which was a central inten-
tion of my mother. We have dynamics within ourselves 
that can counteract dynamics outside ourselves.
Giving my mother a kiss on her hair at my parents’ 40th wed-
ding anniversary, 2004.
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Students from Sharjah — themselves from numerous coun-
tries — at the Harvard Model United Nations, February 2007. 
Caught at times between the material excess of the U.A.E. and 
traditions that deny their autonomy, I wanted them to have a 
life of possibility like the one my grandfather wanted for my 
mother and my mother for me.
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*
I have not told you about my father, Dave, whose name I 
carry as my middle name. 
Animals love him. Dogs quickly sense his body lan-
guage, non-threatening and relaxed. Cats decide that 
their independence can hang out with him. He used to 
send me letters marked with stickers of insects and had 
a tree frog tattooed on his upper arm when he was sixty-
five. Without his being an environmentalist of any kind, 
there is a kind of Earth ecology spreading out along his 
being as if he had never left the origin of species. A mid-
twentieth-century, Cleveland intellectual, this one.
He has often been my friend, going together to mov-
ies or to the bagel store before school, hanging out over 
coffee, taking a drive up to Gold Country in the Sierra 
Nevada Mountains to enjoy the day reading, talking, 
playing music and goofing off. I remember one time we 
had a great conversation by a lake with fresh, cool water 
far back in the mountains. The conversation was about 
all the people who deserved Nobel prizes in literature 
but never got them — our bad grammar.
*
When I was married, I helped raise a boy, Isaiah. Care-
ful not to confuse his relation with his dad, I loved him 
as “pop” — Isaiah’s name for me. My dad loved him too — 
my dad had also been a stepson. He wrote The Many 
Strange Adventures of Isaiah Egg and the Sockman detec-
tive stories for Isaiah — complete with scanned pictures 
of socks and videos of sock hand puppets. He led Isaiah 
through the complicated Master Detective’s license with 
Sockman that involved shadowing me around the house 
without my knowing it and learning code with a decoder 
ring from the 1950s. 
When I think about these things, I want to hug my dad. 
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Yes, him. 
I think of Isaiah, too, who thankfully has a loyal dad 
who loves him. Isaiah is a part of me that I keep pro-
tected and quiet. I rarely talk about him.
*
Before he shaved off his beard, after having finished his por-
trayal of Mr. Green in the play of the same name, Dad did “the 
mountain man,” 2007.
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Perhaps because my dad had to develop a strong will to 
interact with his single mother, he assumes that others 
will be as strong-willed as he is. His own father left when 
he was young. He turned to books. 
This self-protection contributed to the dynamics of 
my family growing up. I grew up with the feeling of a 
larger-than-life-size task that, if only I could conceptual-
ize and figure it out, would clarify the situation in which 
we lived and make everything well. 
I want to have a tattoo on my inside forearms where 
the skin lies gentle. On the left it will say, “It is there,” 
and on the right it will say, “but we lack understanding.”
^ ^ ^
My dad wants people to figure things out for themselves. 
This has good and bad sides. I developed an inner layer 
to my personality where fear settled, beneath which my 
personal dreams would circulate. I often felt that I was 
not really sharing who I am with people, because it was 
dangerous to do so. This was mostly in my head.
Yet one of the things that most mattered to me grow-
ing up is how my dad quietly, indirectly gave me support 
when I felt down — sending postcards about nothing, 
doing this every couple weeks when he knew I felt lost in 
my twenties, that identify-adrift time that also included 
grad school. The entrance of those messages into my 
hermetic world reminded me of the humanity outside 
myself.
My dad has been a straight shooter whenever I seek 
practical advice. I go to him and lay out the problem, and 
he helps me sort through it, honest about his limits and 
practical. 
What from my father is in my understanding of 
kindness?
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Being especially serious in an unguarded moment in Moscow ~ 
you know, it’s OK to be serious. This self-portrait is the picture 
of me to which I feel closest from my mid-30s. I think it shows 
what goes on underneath my social persona and the way I at 
bottom am registering some undercurrent of my world most 
of the time when I am awake. Maybe this is why sometimes 
I don’t fit in. Or maybe it is because I don’t fit in that I am 
this way underneath. I felt calm in this photo. Maybe what was 
surfacing was old — family-structural — searching. 2006.
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When I was in high school, my dad averaged close to a 
book a day — also finding time to cook after work while 
talking with us in the kitchen. Philosophy, arcane history, 
science fiction, detective stories (especially those), popu-
lar science books, natural history, fiction, poetry, plays…. 
The only major gaps I see in his reading are Kant and 
Hegel, whom he read but who didn’t grip him. Diderot, 
Erasmus and Guicciardini are more his style. 
I grew up wondering where my father was when he 
disappeared inside a book. What went on in his mind? 
How did he see the world? How did all these words con-
nect up in his world? How many layers did he think in?
At the same time, my mother went deep into questions. 
When she read, she read slowly and deliberately. While 
my father took in books at stretches and drew connec-
tions between them, my mother looked out windows. 
If my dad showed me intellectual texture, my mom 
revealed the depth. 
Here were people growing out of fairly uneducated 
families in the Great Depression. How did they live 
throughout the twentieth century and its cycles of dif-
ficult self-consciousness? 
What I’m trying to say is that philosophy comes from 
families, too. There is a tendency to view philosophy as 
the outgrowth of raw intelligence, or rebellion, or as a 
sublime art that some initiates have learned how to 
practice. But I want you to understand how philosophy 
comes from home. The ideas start in the kitchen.
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Ideas for living — the useful ones — are expressions 
of the facts that people are complex and that our com-
plexity can become beautiful if given time, space, and 
challenges. The book of becoming is not always quiet, 
but sometimes becoming is the quietest thing, and our 
complexity is the most mundane unfolding, as the sea 
absorbs the sky and the sky absorbs the sea in their lap-
ping, eddying movements.
In the kitchen, quiet, settled after school and long 
before night begins, with parents elsewhere and light 
coming in through the broad window by the side road, 
you might find yourself thinking unexpectedly, surprised 
by a sense of the world. This is the world’s childhood, 
Peaches in a Moscow apartment, 2006. I love Tarkovsky and 
Dostoevsky. Dad thinks Tarkovsky is painterly but boring. Ach. 
(He loves Last Year at Marienbad, however, however; he loves 
Last Year at Marienbad, at Marienbad; He loves . . . etc. [Last 
Year is one of those modern films that repeats itself endlessly, 
endlessly; it repeats itself . . . etc!])
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and it comes to you around the kitchen’s things, around 
the bowl of peaches, apples, and plums.
Here, it is complex — your family, some brokenness. 
Here, it is possible too: the mending out of the backdrop, 





Dad and I clowning around during my visit to their home in 
Modesto, California, summer 2007. This is probably why I 
clown around in class. I loved it myself as a kid and found it 
lightened me up. Mom took this photo.
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I want to end with some remarks about two near mem-
bers of my nuclear family — my mom’s cousin, Ruth, and 
my emotional brother, Steve. 
Aunt Ruth is kind and philosophical. Will people like her in the 
future support the drive of all living beings to live and to be 
free? Summer 2008.
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Aunt Ruth is what I call “relatively incognito.” An every-
day person in New York City, you wouldn’t normally find 
her in a tabloid — although in 2009, she made interna-
tional news when her wallet was found in Central Park 
inside a tree that they were cutting down. It had been 
stolen 27 years previous during the New York City mara-
thon she was cheering.
Without people like Ruth, the world would go to hell. 
She is a nurse, has a web of friends, and was active in 
her church. In 2001, when the airplanes became missiles 
fired into the World Trade Center, she was on a bus to go 
downtown to provide medical care. 
When I would visit, we walked — often through Central 
Park or out to a restaurant — and talked about every-
thing that mattered to us — just as I am doing with you 
now. 
Before it closed, Ruth’s and my favorite place to go eat 
was a Hungarian restaurant with waitresses that looked 
like they would either insult you or offer you timeless 
wisdom. Here was a dinner table in New York City where 
we could talk about anything.
The educational psychologist Lev Vgotsky called a 
region where you can grow without focusing on it a 
“zone of proximal development.” 
Visiting Ruth, I experienced the itinerary of people 
who seek independence.
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Ibn Arabi quote, twelfth century: “I follow love’s caravan wher-
ever it goes, because love is my religion and my faith.” Calligra-
phy by the Iraqi-French Hassan Massoudy. 2006. My one con-
cern with the quote is something Immanuel Kant located six 
hundred years later: if love is the guide for our will and if by 
“love” we mean a desire, then the caravan follower is amoral. 
However, if by “love” we mean a sense of moral duty, then the 
caravan follower is worthy of being religious. The problem is 
that people today, I suspect, pick up Massoudy’s postcard in 
France and think, “Great! I will follow my heart’s desire!” But 
is the heart best characterized as a site of desire, paradoxical 
as it may sound to question that? I think we are neither in 
desire nor in duty primarily, but in relationship. And that is 
why love involves duties and also desires.
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In summer 2006, there was a clearing in my life. I lived 
and walked around Paris and rode the above ground 
metro as Edmond Jabès had done. My friend, Steve, had 
introduced me to this poet of overlapping voices. 
As I walked and rode, shaking free years of graduate 
school and my first disciplinary job, I began to think 
about kindness. 
I turned over ideas, composed short statements and 
many book outlines. Mostly the city was loose around me, 
writing quiet. 
I no longer heard the judgmental voices of my disci-
pline telling me to shut up if I wasn’t producing knowl-
edge according to their schema. I trusted that people of 
independent mind will read a note written even on a 
napkin and see all the experience that goes into it. Relays 
are the building blocks of humanity.
I walked to hear voices around me. I had done this 
often. One of my favorite memories from college was of 
reading Derrida’s Limited Inc. — a book that I did not par-
ticularly enjoy — while walking around the old campus’s 
main quad where Derrida had taught and from where he 
had been fired. 
Walking made the book fun. The tedium of open aca-
demic warfare was released into the air by the sounds 
coming from dorm rooms and feet on the walkways. 
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Esther Bendik and her son, Jeremy. 1970, New Haven, 
Connecticut.
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Picasso’s sculpture as an old man. Jeremy walked into this 
museum in summer 2006 in Paris.
1986, New Hartford, New York. Jer-
emy at fifteen rebelling against a 
conservative town, also being a typi-
cal teenager. Since his family tended 
to work things out, philosophy made 
sense to him.
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One of the amazing things about us is that we can look at 
ourselves as another. I remember my dad explaining this 
to my class on Aristotle’s ethics at American University 
of Sharjah when he sat in sometime during the Spring 
of 2006. We can be just to ourselves. Aristotle didn’t say 
this exactly, but I agree. Looking at oneself allows one to 
try to be objective, and it also allows one to be more kind. 
Being kind to yourself is a condition on being indepen-
dent. When I was a graduate student, professors spoke as 
if kindness and independence conflicted, or they implied 
that independence was needed first. Typical to the stul-
tifying academic environment in which they uncon-
sciously lived, they denied the originality of kindness, its 
core role in an uncertain and stable human life. 
After all, it’s hard to be free without feeling it’s alright 
to be yourself, and I don’t think that such a feeling is 
possible without kindness to self. The place where inde-
pendence and kindness begin is in self-openness.
By being open with ourselves, we show kindness to our-
selves in trusting our personal intelligence as a strength. 
Just so, we are in that self-relation independent.
It is funny, I say this and think about the many people 
with whom I have worked who are thoughtful and pur-
poseful, disingenuous and aware. I think of each of us 
solitary in our worlds in a moment, creating the condi-
tions of accountability by being kind to ourselves — and 
being kind to ourselves by being accountable to ourselves.
Kindness is neither hard nor soft. Made with integrity, 
it is forthright. 
*        *        *
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So during one evening in July 2006, I walked home from 
the Alésia metro station to the Cité Universitaire. The 
sky was deep blue-lavender fading to dark. Rousseau 
showed that to become who we are, we should get out of 
the house, not sit sunken in a room like Descartes. Ideas 
mixed with cities are alive. Philosophy comes from the 
neighborhood — the sounds of kitchens coming across 
courtyards in the evening air.
I think of Steve, birdsongs in his tree-crown of an afro, 
coming around the block. When I was twenty-one, he 
was the first person to suggest the connotations of the 
word “togetherness” to me. Mixing what I think are two 
memories together, I remember one night saying good-
bye on the steps of his apartment and alluding to Emer-
son like we were mentioning someone nearby. 
When I was twenty-one, I gave Steve my kitchen table. 
He took off its base and for years used its top as a low 
round, covered with African cloth. We read Plato there; 
Edmond Jabès too. Steve drummed on it — ting ting ting. 
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Togetherness. Togetherness grows through conversa-
tion, provided that the conversation is open and that the 
people have loving integrity. Then the world in a certain 
light: the glow of sun-fall in the photo, not unlike Plato’s 
Good. 
Be within it and range freely.
Still in the talk, we discussed justice in a café, surrounded by 
pigeons, people and traffic. Summer 2007.
End of a walk in New York City, 82nd and Third, Summer 
2007.






Annotated monologue  
by a university professor / 
essay by a neighbor
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The air around me is light, moving through my hair and 
along the collar of my sweater even though it is zipped 
up tight. Cars far off accelerate, and brake. Finally their 
swell subsides. The moon makes pale patterns on the 
voids of earth in the deep blue grass. 
*
The textbooks sit silent back in my apartment, beaten at 
the tip of the spine. Grades and credit hours, the loan 
debt numbers of my students tighten my memory. Can 
philosophy be learned in the classroom?
I can breathe, here, now, but there is no security with 
what we’re doing. Big children shell inside genitals that 
work as pumps and motors. We’ve done this; we do this. 
I teach “virtue” without any of us growing. These aren’t 
score, I mean scare, quotes. They are something merely 
mentioned, seldom used. For the life of me, I am not 
singling people out. I accuse myself. The form of schools, 
of my classrooms — even the progressive ones arranged 
in a circle — are not virtue prone. They are misshapen 
verbs. If virtue is above all a habit, to teach virtue with-
out habituation is not to teach virtue. Plato’s Ἀκαδήμεια 
wasn’t this way. It, it was hylomorphic.
The personal and the professional peer at each other 
across the thin, black line of a contract. When do the sol-
diers leave the trench? In second grade, my stepson fills 
out bubbles, boxes and half-written lines. Under-surface 
your mind. Later, Sunday, he runs onto the diamond with 
my old, leather glove, the opportunity he fields. Sunlight 
is everywhere, kids colliding.
“Exercise” comes from the Greek askesis, the root of 
ascetic. Wiki will tell you that. What are professors for? 
It depends on whether we are only laborers of indus-
trial theory. Form delivers content, a game of sudden 
opportunities within lazy life. Run and run, until your 
shins are green and the glove bends away from you with 
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swollen weight. Lopsided, what’s consistent. The form of 
a credit hour learns the game. Old white man clicks the 
Powerpoint.
What is powerful? The Ἀκαδήμεια put the form of a way 
of life into practice: call it “hylomorphic.” Is there an 
orchard in the mind beneath the mind? And how do we 
walk in it?
You’re on board a corporation, schooled in the midst of 
commerce, professor to the test. BP wants PR; professors, 
orthodoxy. We need right belief, not BP’s appearance. 
But it is possible neither appearances nor propositions 
are the scene of learning — a strange and demanding 
thought. Suppose ethics were a groove in the body, before 
and beyond abstraction. Am I concerned with “ethics” or 
with ethics itself?
The moon makes pale patterns on the voids of earth in 
the deep blue grass.
Sometimes, I feel as deranged as a cubicle in industrial 
theory. I imagine hylomorphs running their backs along 
the underside of the floor, quieter than the city in an 
office high above the ground. I can’t tell what the uni-
versity is after. Only the universe we sense. Theory’s 
point becomes power. Where is truth in our limbs? If I 
were concerned only with propositions, I would be con-
tent with concepts. If appearances quieted me, I would 
hear voiceless words. In my body, the reason is so silently 
inscribed. When the couple danced on the dance-floor 
with her hair run down their arms, no proposition spoke 
the truth of it, though they danced as blue truth in the 
depths. Knowing how, not knowing. And so knowing. 
Words fly out the room.
The context, the city. The industry, the globe. To grow, 
I need to approach learning personally, in a way that 
allows me to be, or to become, a person. No soldier shout: 
ethics taken ethically, philosophy philosophically. The 
space of the person — it will be hollowed out. Can writ-
ing serve original academics?
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My point is that someone concerned ethically with 
virtue will be concerned with virtue itself. The point of 
virtue is to live excellently, or well, and, for a person 
concerned with being ethical, the point of investigat-
ing virtue is not to know virtue, but to become virtuous. 
That Aristotle took this as self-evident shows he took his 
investigation ethically. The point of learning is growing. 
The thing itself, philosophy, wisens. Erosion until curves. 
It’s more weather pattern than mastery. And I see no dif-
ference when it comes to love or to democracy. Braking 
even won’t do. Step out of the car. I want to study origi-
nal academics, just as musicians study music by playing 
it.
Forms of life are more important than any point in 
theory. Something is more important than this point. 
King, no clanking of concepts around personless space. 
Industrial theory
Now I am back in my apartment. I have to read my 
neighbor’s attempt at philosophy. What was he thinking?
Philosophy’s not the love, but the appropriation — the 
making personal — of wisdom (Schürmann 2003, 634–
35, n. 26). In its ancient form, the point was to wise up.1 
People wise up, not footnotes, not rabbits. Rabbits learn 
how to go through the fence, evade predation. Footnotes, 
we chisel them into shape! Neither develops the triangle 
of conscious thought, unconscious body, and the mixed 
zone of our longing. The question is whether theory, and 
in general the theoretical life, seek the same goal as phi-
losophy and the philosophical life? If they do, then the life 
of a theoretician seeks to become wise above all, and the 
practice of theory has in view wisdom in all instances. 
1 See Hadot (2002, 220–31, 42–50), where, for Socrates, wisdom 
appears as an unattainable ideal driving one onward.
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The conclusion is a simple consequence of the relation of 
means to their ends, the end being wisdom. 
Does the life of theory seek wisdom above all else? The 
answer to this question requires a definition of theory 
and a definition of wisdom. Theory seeks a comprehen-
sive concept of things, a grasp anticipating (and so not 
needing) fact, the mental handle that in fact organizes 
fact. By contrast, wisdom speaks to us entirely and in 
many voices: goodness (for deciding), truth (for believ-
ing), and beauty (often hard won and taking work in the 
most important things, our relationships). The different 
lights of action, knowledge, and connection. Listening 
for far off sounds in the grove where the traumatized 
and eccentric Plato tried to learn something different by 
talking with friends and exercising the body around that 
talk, should we understand attunement as beauty? Only 
if we are willing to de-aestheticize beauty, a noble goal 
(Harries 1998). Goodness. Truth. Beauty? Theory is at most 
a third of wisdom. A third of wisdom, theory-industry. At 
your best, you want to understand comprehensively and 
to seek truth. But wisdom.
I am deranged tonight. I am a fool. Once you realize 
the logical point of philosophy, it is obvious that a the-
oretical life needn’t be a wisdom-seeking one unless it 
is taken philosophically. Whereas wisdom implies an 
acknowledgement of theory’s place in the pursuit of a 
life well lived, one could pursue theory without pursuing 
wisdom. Welcome to the industrial university, certainly 
the desert of the ideal. The grove outside ancient Athens 
would be an oasis, today, a shimmering mirage (and my 
hand, mirage-writing). 
If you are a theorist trying to do philosophy, the ques-
tion to ask yourself is whether you aim to become wise. 
If you do, then you do philosophy. If not, then you do 
not. And this is a separate question from how students 
learn “philosophy” — that subject — in university. What 
classroom leads one to take theory philosophically? The 
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textbooks sit silent, beaten along the tip of the spine. 
(The hand that threw them) 
Weathered being
In the context of being ethical, my worry about indus-
trial theory is not that it’s useless, but that it’s pointless. 
Theory can certainly be useful. But theory seeks the true. 
Ethics, by contrast, seeks the good (then, in morality, the 
right). Theory concludes in truths (or realizations that 
truths are not forthcoming, a move in the space of the 
true). Ethics concludes in deeds. If I am trying to become 
ethical, to approach virtue merely theoretically is to 
make a category mistake, and — from an ethical stand-
point — it is to risk the vice of being abstract with one-
self, perhaps even self-deceived. Another way to put this 
concern is that if I want to do the right thing, it won’t be 
enough for me to think about my character. I should do 
the right thing, make it my way of life.
How do we study philosophy philosophically then? 
Think about what ethos itself is; it is a way of life, it is 
character. If ethos itself is X, then a discourse that does 
not develop X does not develop ethos. Let us say, then, that 
ethos itself is — among other things — a living form of 
responsiveness in the body. And let us include the mind 
as an expression of the body here, a way of thinking as a 
way of doing or being. Why not call this “habit” and not 
put down habit as if it were merely bourgeois or as if it 
were something rigid, thoughtless and fixed? Even schol-
ars of antiquity have come to understand that the habit 
that was implicit in classical philosophical conceptions 
of virtue is something improving, growing, as an artist 
grows in her craft (Annas 2011). Then a discourse that 
does not develop ethos as a living habit does not develop 
ethos, period. You’d have to develop virtue’s bodily groove 
to study virtue ethically. What kind of study is that? It 
would be more like a musical étude than a textbook.
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 Suppose that philosophy is a living habit just as eth-
ics is a groove within the body. Aristotle distinguished 
between two kinds of ways that thoughtfulness can 
become a living part of us. These ways could be idealistic, 
expressing an inclination weathered into us to become 
wiser. This weathered being was ethos. It consisted of vir-
tues of thought and virtues of character (Aristotle 1999, 
1103a5–11). The distinction corresponded to parts of the 
soul. Aristotle believed that a part of our psychology is 
purely intellectual, another part intellectual and part 
emotional. A failure to grasp logic due to a blunt mind is 
a different kind of failure than a tendency to erupt into 
angry outbursts. The outbursts are part of one’s charac-
ter, and Aristotle apparently thought that only matters 
of character are habits (1103a14–15).
This doesn’t give enough body to mind, though. Aristo-
tle was of the mind that only character requires habitu-
ation. Habit made quasi-rational emotions stay in place 
serving reason. Character needs a kind of behavioral 
reinforcement, whereas intellectual excellence is simply 
in the mind once learned (1103a14–15). Really? Aristo-
tle wrote that the emotions must learn to obey (1102b36). 
Habit? Habit is obedience for unruly hearts. But he 
thought that the mind does not need to obey reasons — it 
just needs to see them. Aristotle created this picture of 
humanity: truth belongs to intellect; but emotions must 
be weathered into us.2
Is this anticipatory industrial theory? Learning how 
to think requires habituation, just as learning how to be 
courageous does. It doesn’t take the arduous task of writ-
ing the Critique of Pure Reason to see this. Being objec-
tive — for instance, seeking criticism of one’s own posi-
tion — that is a habit of mind just as even-temperedness 
2 But notice how Aristotle himself throws the division between 
mind and heart into question at 1144a29–1144b1 and 1144b31–2. 
The virtue of intelligence as well as wise judgment both require 
habits of the heart.
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is a habit of heart. I discipline myself to analyze argu-
ments and consider objections using much the same kind 
of method — a practice — as I do when I discipline myself 
to stay level headed around disrespectful people. The 
practice results in habits: look for reasons; detach one-
self from the goad of impulsive reactions in one’s heart. 
On this one point, Aristotle’s picture of the intellect is 
too disembodied, too unemotional.3 Grooves of the body 
run all the way down beneath the mind. 
Suppose, then, that we say simply: We will take learn-
ing personally. Suppose that the learning that we seek 
forms the person.4 Then the learning that forms the 
person is personal. The way of relation would underlie 
truth. We’d change our way of being when we truly learn. 
We’d grow up.
Ancient philosophy had a tradition of writing that 
accomplished the complex, formal goals of philosophy 
suggested here. One school — the Stoics — called it “the 
examination of conscience” (Hadot 2002, 198–202). Like 
a shoot working toward the light, original academics —
originally spoken — took this form of writing, moving 
3 Consider Dewey (1916, 142) on this point, remembering Greek 
gymnastics: “It may seriously be asserted that a chief cause for the 
remarkable achievements of Greek education was that it was never 
misled by false notions into an attempted separation of mind and 
body.” Here, there is a gymnastic insight that a trained mind is 
habituated like a trained body, a point Thomas Jefferson also held.
4 Happily, many ancient philosophers shared these assump-
tions. Generally, ancient philosophical schools aimed to train the 
whole character of people. According to Pierre Hadot, the primary 
method was “ascetics”—exercises designed specifically to develop 
virtuous habits in someone (Hadot 2002, 189–90). Wisdom came in 
the form of these “spiritual” exercises, which ranged from gym to 
dialectical drills and had at their center such things as the exami-
nation of conscience (Hadot 2002, passim). The most famous writ-
ten examinations of conscience in the history of philosophy can 
be found in Seneca’s Letters and—interestingly—in Descartes’s 
Meditations (themselves modeled on Seneca’s Letters?) (Hadot 2002, 
264–65).
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from the grove of the Ἀκαδήμεια to the orchard beneath 
the mind. 
I am so upset this evening at the university and at 
myself! The hylomorphs are quiet in the night. I hold 
these papers in my hands, my neighbor’s thoughts 
washed out by moonlight and carried back under my 
lamp. Why? Why give them to me, the failed professor? I 
imagine that under the tree cover and between the slats 
of porches around the park across the street from my 
apartment, the hylomorph’s cold, green eyes blink. 
Hylomorph 
“I do not try to change much in the world. But you have 
to be a decent person if you want to live a decent life. 
So if I wrong someone, I change my plans and make 
things good. And I have had some bad habits; I’ve tried 
to change them. These reasons are why I think that I am 
basically responsible. 
“But I am confused. There have been times when 
I tried to do the right thing and had no idea what 
that is. Like ligament and bone, two things I thought 
I had to do pulled against each other. I’d want to pro-
tect my friend from pain but know I had to respect his 
freedom. These kinds of tensions are normal. Maybe 
some strain remains, but it fades after some weeks as 
we work through the consequences. This is not really 
confusion.
“Recently, I’ve encountered something different. I 
do not know what to do at all. I feel that something is 
wrong. My heart is bothered in the way that a series of 
hot nights build up slowly stripping away sleep, making 
me a little more, and then some more, irritable. I feel 
I have a mosquito buzzing around me, waking me up 
when I drift off. The mosquito is so small that while it 
keeps me dimly awake, it does not make me sit upright 
and deal with it. I feel edgy.
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“Today I decided to deal with this junk building up in 
my body and gradually scattering my mind. I have time. 
It’s the weekend, and my kids are gone for a funny dad 
day with my husband. (I’m the serious dad.) The church a 
few blocks away just sounded ten A.M. It’s early June. A 
fan keeps me cool. I am going to do something I learned 
from the Jesuits. I am going to write for discernment. 
The technique goes back to Seneca.
“I want to make some progress figuring out what I am 
supposed to do. I am going to try to quiet my mind in 
decision.
“I turned off my computer. My phone is set only to 
let through my husband. I do not need to fix something 
around the house that doesn’t need fixing. The run can 
wait. So can the Internet. I want to shift things in me 
now.”
• * *
“What bothers me came in flashes — not newsflashes, 
but antiseptic stories buried deep in the science sec-
tion. Like far off lightning hidden high up behind the 
clouds, I knew something was there but did not focus on 
it. Oddly, these stories lit up something in my chest and 
stomach momentarily and then overlaid each other until 
a residual feeling kept. I came across them trawling the 
Internet, scanning magazines lying around the office, or 
in snippets of talk before lunch arrives and between the 
weather and sports:  “hey, did you hear?” And I picked up 
one of my daughter’s course books when she was home 
for Spring break. The author — a professor at New York 
University — wrote:
Many biologists believe that the sixth major wave of extinc-
tion since life began is now occurring, and that this one, 
unlike the other five, is being caused by human action 
(Jamieson 2008, 6).
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“My mind has been on mass extinction. I feel that we 
are undermining our home. I don’t want to exaggerate. 
At the same time, I do not like to think of humans as 
ultimately destructive. Mass extinction seems to point 
to our basic destructiveness. This reminds me of origi-
nal sin all over again, but I left the church years ago in 
part because of the doctrine of sin. I believe that we can 
change the social world to protect our Earth inheritance.
“Over the last months, I did some amateur research 
and found that there is a range of estimates for the 
number of species that will go extinct during this cen-
tury. Neither end of the range leaves me comfortable. 
The worst estimates say the planet will become like Mars 
with only 200 million humans left on it. That is insane. 
In such a scenario, most of our inherited life on Earth 
will have been wiped out, mostly due to climate change. I 
don’t trust these predictions — not because our technol-
ogy couldn’t wipe us out, but because one thing I learned 
in my science classes was that there is a lot of uncer-
tainty when we get to the level of the planet. Science is 
neither certain nor unstable.
“A more moderate estimate by a celebrated biologist at 
my nation’s oldest and most renowned university sug-
gests 25% species loss over this century. Then there is a 
much-cited United Nations report from 2002 predict-
ing that 25% of the world’s mammals will be extinct by 
2032. And there are dire things to say about other kinds 
of species, too. One report discussed in National Geo-
graphic in 2004 put 1,000,000 kinds of land plants and 
animals extinct by 2050 due to global warming. Finally, 
on a more cautious note, I have heard of 20% of all spe-
cies at “increased risk” of extinction over this century if 
the planet warms as it has over the past 50 years. But 
these old figures are superceded and adjusted all the 
time, almost always for the cautious worse. 
“The general picture is clear, and it troubles me. 
There is a trend. Sometimes it grows less alarmist and 
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sometimes not, but its conclusions come through with 
increasing clarity. It goes like this: we as a species are 
pushing out of existence the species that came with us 
into our geological era, our inherited home. We have col-
onized the living world and squeezed out whatever we do 
not use in our system. We have off-loaded our waste, our 
unseen form of life, onto other lives — and we are killing 
as we do.
“The respected biologist thinks that we will lose at 
least a quarter of all life forms throughout this century. 
That is staggering. All I have to do is go outside or look 
through my window and imagine that out of every four 
varieties of plants, insects, birds, and the occasional 
mammal I see, one will no longer be found on Earth by 
the time the grandchildren of my grandchildren see the 
light of day. Certainly as I have read, many of the species 
that will go extinct include odd forms of life I never see: 
strange insects and remote salamanders — even things 
no human eye can see. But that doesn’t help. I find these 
beings fascinating and part of life. Who am I to play 
God and say that they are worthless? We all came out of 
this stuff; we are all in some — very — extenuated sense 
kin; we are all part of a process so vast and ancient as 
to exceed human imagination. The least I can do is be 
amazed. 
“I think about these things, looking at my hands 
paused over this paper, and the day becomes strange. 
A car rolls down the street, techno out its windows. My 
neighbor experiments with his electric clipper. Dogs 
bark. The lawn of my backyard is flat, green, and uni-
form to the eye, and I am erasing with my mind’s eye 
one out of every four species. 
“As I look into the thick, green texture of summer here 
in Central New York, instead of the four kinds of leaves 
I see, there might be only three found on this planet at 
century’s end. Which one goes? All of them are pleasing 
to the eye and fascinating to look at more closely. And 
they overlap each other on this lush, summer day. I want 
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my children to see them. We can study them together 
and make comparisons.
“Of course my subtraction doesn’t make sense. Species 
don’t disappear in strict proportion. I’ve learned that 
species loss occurs mostly in ‘biodiversity hot spots’ —
areas such as coral reefs or tropical rainforests where 
life-forms co-exist densely. Also, I’ve learned that mass 
extinction will not work as proportionally as I’ve imag-
ined due to the way that in mass extinctions, entire 
ecosystems disintegrate. Syracuse may not be affected 
so severely, whereas biodiversity hotspots around coral 
reefs already are. People at the United Nations talk 
about ‘uneven development.’ Ecologists should talk about 
‘uneven extinction.’ A sizable chunk of estimated extinc-
tion concerns insects, amphibians, and so forth — ‘ugly 
beings.’ I am showing my ignorance when I subtract spe-
cies from my backyard. My backyard is already species 
poor compared to a wetland. 
“As I did my research a little bit better, I found out 
that we cannot know for sure whether we are in a mass 
extinction. Even my favorite museum in New York State, 
the Museum of the Earth in Ithaca, got this wrong. The 
celebrated biologist at Harvard is an alarmist. Mass spe-
cies extinction developed with paleontology and was 
understood through evidence from the fossil beds of for-
mer seas and oceans. There, water creatures with shells 
hard enough to fossilize left their mark and then dis-
appeared from one thousand years to the next. To call 
something a ‘mass’ extinction implies a marked disap-
pearance of ‘durably skeletonized sea creatures’ well 
above the ‘background rate’ of normal extinction. But 
the alarm currently being sounded comes from other 
kinds of evidence. We haven’t had time to see a new fos-
sil record emerge! So we can’t know whether we are in a 
mass extinction.
“But this indeterminacy does not help. I am trying 
to imagine something unimaginable. Take the songs of 
birds I hear nearby. One of my favorites is the cooing of 
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wood doves. Will it go? Climate change throws off the 
hatching cycles of birds and insects, sometimes making 
it harder for birds to find the insects they need. Also, 
without birds and insects, much of life comes to a halt. 
Plants aren’t pollinated as readily. And on the back of 
plants, so much life rests. What will protect the dove, or 
any of these sounds that remind me I am part of the vast 
process of life and shouldn’t be self-absorbed? What will 
make me human by taking me out of the human? 
“Should it matter whether my favorite species are still 
around if we humans have been massively destructive? 
And is it fair to pin this issue on our species? Isn’t the 
problem my industrial civilization, my shortsighted, 
industrial economy? Why, too, think of these things as 
mine? Also, the fact that I have such ignorance about 
ecology — and that my society has even more — this 
bothers me. I am not representing things well. My sci-
ence is a jumble. It is like I do not know or care for my 
home.
“I think these things. But I am unclear about what I 
should do. I don’t hear the people on TV or around me 
at work talking about the unknowable risk of mass 
extinction–not beyond the brief blurb or casual remark 
by someone who picked up Kolbert’s book. Extinctions 
weren’t an item of politics in the 2008 or 2012 presiden-
tial election — and good luck for the 2016! There’s a dis-
connection. My society is off. There are only 10,000,000 
recorded species, but apparently countless more unre-
corded. One weekend naturalist I ran into at a dinner 
party told me recently he’d read that there are as many 
as ten times more. Even if we lead a quarter of the 
known species to extinction, that is over two million spe-
cies killed. I do not know how to think about this. I do 
not know my responsibilities here. I do not hear people 
discussing these problems in everyday life. 
“Life flows about me in a wave. I love being part of it. 
But I feel that I am in a dream. Is this life we’re living in 
the United States of America the anti-life?”
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• * *
“My hands are tired. I sat on the porch for a while. It’s 
afternoon. I realized that I am writing this for you, 
Amina and Rasaan. You are my kids. I love you.
“As I’ve read, the main causes of extinction come 
from our population growth, transportation, consump-
tion: mining and logging, fishing and monoculture, 
clear-cutting and real estate development. Then there 
is climate change, ocean acidification, nitrogen run off, 
increased UV radiation from depleted ozone. As we reach 
9,000,000,000 by mid-century and continue an industrial 
form of life in a poorly politicized capitalist economy, 
our effects spread into every nook and cranny, depth and 
shoal of planet Earth. 
“Yet a good portion of people hold life to be sacred, 
rare, respect-worthy, magnificent, or wonderful. We 
school our kids in it. For instance, Buddhists, Muslims, 
and Hindus all agree that non-human life is worthy of 
reverence. The indigenous nations of this state — the 
‘People of the Longhouse’ — are grounded in it. Reverence 
for life would appear to be justified to a large portion of 
humankind. So the duty to treat life decently is certainly 
known. What are we doing then?
“When I think about these things, I feel drained. My 
morality and my life do not connect. Am I just selfish? Is 
this how my society raised me?
“But I know that we do care, and I am not going to per-
sonalize the problem this way. People are roughly consci-
entious, and I take pains to do the right thing. So where 
does the problem lie? I am not wicked. But I am part of 
what’s wiping out so many processes of life.”
• * *
“When I look at the life-processes we call ‘species,’ I real-
ize that there is a moral split between species and indi-
vidual living beings. It’s like thought goes in different 
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directions. The individual life calls out for the attention 
that anything living deserves, while the species elicits 
something different — awe. Here is a process patterning 
over generations, slowly changing, then one day fading 
from time. 
“Suppose a living being crossed my path, a kind I’ve 
never seen. It has a strange set of traits. Its skin is as 
smooth as a worm, but it has legs. They are soft and mal-
leable, unlike an insect’s legs. In addition, it has a color-
ation unlike any worm or millipede I have ever seen. I 
am so surprised that I take a picture with my cell phone.
“At the same time, this thing is going to get smashed 
on the sidewalk. I am not the kind of person who leads 
an ant outside the house when I find it inside, and 
maybe it’s better for this weird thing if only those mem-
bers who don’t walk on sidewalks survive! But still. I 
think twice before going on my way. In this case, I don’t 
see why I shouldn’t usher it off the sidewalk. I don’t 
think it is the kind of thing evolution will help not walk 
across sidewalks. The sidewalks are our obstacle here. 
Too much thinking. I lead if off with a twig to which it 
attaches.
“I have a friend a few blocks away. He’s a weekend nat-
uralist who is also a philosophy professor. He moonlights 
in entomology and knows scientists. Imagine he showed 
the picture I took around to colleagues, and imagine it 
seems I saw a mutant, what people a thousand years 
ago called a monstrum — an individual without a spe-
cies. Does this mutant being species-less make it any less 
respect-worthy? 
“I do not think so. If anything, its uniqueness calls for 
more consideration. 
“As Spinoza said, every living being has its conatus, its 
drive to be. Why should I overlook the striving individual 
when the universal kind — the species — is abstract?
“Then what of species? The species is an abstraction. 
It’s even a biological convention. Species are rough place-
holders of an organizational process happening between 
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ecologies and individuals through genetic lineages over 
millions of years. 
“Could we say, then, that my concern for individuals 
involves justice — an attention to them — but my concern 
for species involves wisdom, an awareness of what mat-
ters? Take this geological process, ‘life.’ On our planet, 
it arose — seemingly singular of chemical events. Order 
constellated over millions of years — biochemical sys-
tems and evolving rules of life as my philosopher friend 
describes them. There were crashes in the system, mass 
extinctions a hundred million years apart for vari-
ous reasons, and then life redoubled in their wake. Life 
is fecund as our planet is. All human beings are just a 
moment in its time. Here is a moral feeling — why?
“I am bothered by two things. I am bothered by our 
unintentionally and thoughtlessly killing — our civiliza-
tion a ‘maelstrom of killing’ as this guy Rolston wrote. 
And then, I am bothered by the scale of extinction — an 
industrial scale even — by the way we have managed to 
jar the planet, interrupt its flow, shift geology itself. Yes, 
it is either alarmist or inaccurate to claim we are in a 
mass extinction, but we are doing massive things, things 
that on a smaller scale would concern me, but which on 
an industrial scale unnerve and trouble me.” 
• * *
“It is late afternoon, and I am just getting to the core. 
I have read arguments claiming widespread species 
extinction is bad because of what we might lose when 
losing species. Suppose a species provides the future 
cure to cancer, but we make it extinct now. Therefore, 
we should protect species from going extinct in order 
to protect potential but at present unknown benefits to 
humankind.
“But this argument’s reasoning can be used against 
it. Any species could be useful to us at a later point in 
time. Yet protecting a species might block the way for 
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new species to come into their own, and the new species 
might just as easily help us, even better than the ones we 
protect. 
“The deeper problem is that these kinds of debates do 
not grasp the gravity of a true mass extinction cascade. 
One scientist I talked with at the Smithsonian when I 
visited there last year said matter of factly that if a true 
mass extinction cascade begins, first, we won’t know 
it until it is too late, and second, the human species is 
almost certainly doomed. He wasn’t alarmist in tone. He 
said that the rules of life are so profoundly rearranged 
during periods of mass extinction that you cannot expect 
the ecological order on which species depend — espe-
cially dominant ones — to remain stable.
“Should we be debating our self-destruction?! But 
even if we are not yet in a mass extinction, not yet lost, 
I am concerned with how we are being, not just what we 
are causing. Saying extinction is bad because of what we 
might lose doesn’t get at what our actions say about us. 
Our obliviousness to what we cause, including our poten-
tial self-destruction, including our moral relations with 
species and living individuals — that obliviousness is also 
a problem! We should not be oblivious to abuse. After all, 
if species can be useful to us, it doesn’t matter whether 
we put them at risk or something else does. The risk is 
bad all the same. But there is a moral dimension to what 
we are doing that is different than the risk caused by 
mass extinction — from us or from a meteor strike.
 “I do think that if half of the world’s species go extinct, 
it will hurt us. I believe that it will destroy us over a 
long, slow death increased by wars over what is left. The 
United Nations Environmental Program predicted in 
2007 that by mid-century, we will see 150,000,000 people 
fleeing environmental problems in the world. These ref-
ugees will suffer, and the political and economic insta-
bility they are likely to cause will expand the circle of 
suffering beyond them. Where do you go when there’s 
no more livelihood or food? Whenever there is massive 
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species loss in the history of life, a point comes where 
food chains and then whole ecosystems collapse. This 
kind of collapse — what ecologists call ‘trophic level col-
lapse’ — is risky for us depending on how widespread it 
is. Think of our imminently deserted oceans. The UNEP 
report was focused on climate change — and so rising 
oceans and desertification — but you just have to iterate 
the problem out with a mass extinction cascade to imag-
ine how bad things could become.
“Yet even if these warnings end up being alarmist, 
even if we head off the worst that we could do to our-
selves, what bothers me is what we are doing to other 
forms of life, not just to ourselves. The beetles and bees, 
the microscropic lives in the sea, the many plants and 
birds — I am in awe of them whenever I stop to look 
closely.
“Friends have told me to stop being sentimental. They 
say it is ironically egocentric. They say that the nar-
rowing of life’s lushness now leaves room for future 
life, for life-blooms then. Just as we emerged out of the 
shadow of extinct dinosaurs, so a mass extinction would 
clear the way for future development, for new lushness! 
There will be new awesome beings in another ten million 
years. What we do to life on Earth is insignificant from 
the standpoint of geological time unless we destroy the 
Earth itself. Life keeps going! If form gives way to form, 
devastation shouldn’t bother me. I should get over it.
“Is it just that I am attached to this world, to my spe-
cies, to what has come to be? It seems arbitrary to hang 
the protection of species on what I happen to like, even 
deeply. Am I simply being selfish for the sake of my kids? 
Yet I am bothered by the scale of our destruction, and that 
destruction takes in countless species of which I do not 
even know, much less feel attachment.
“I am bothered by what all this says about us, about my 
society, and so about me as a part of it.”
• * *
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“A thought occurred to me while writing. My speaking 
of ‘us’ is problematic. Who is this ‘us’? Your dad is Afri-
can American, and I am Irish American. There are many 
indigenous people in this land — right here in Onon-
daga country — who do not deserve in any way to be part 
of this ‘us’ that is being cited as clueless in my writing 
today. Onondaga society is structured by a different kind 
of thinking that is mindful of future generations and has 
space in it to discuss mass extinction much more thor-
oughly than the United States of America, which colo-
nized — and still colonizes — the Onondaga Nation and 
its sacred lake. We see this lake, ringed by private prop-
erty, a mall, remnants of the industrial economy that 
polluted it. That’s ‘us.’
“Even your funny dad would have a different view-
point, because to be black in the United States of Amer-
ica is to see how domination’s disrespect for lives works. 
I need to get to the bottom of something bothering me 
in the mainstream culture of my society’s economy and 
politics.”
• * *
“I haven’t solved my problem, and I haven’t dissolved 
it either. I don’t have a clear conscience. When I try to 
turn to the species themselves and find a reason why 
they ought to be part of my reverence for life, counter-
examples muddy the stream of my reasoning and prove 
that I do not have a sound position for revering species 
just as they are over future ones. I feel that my instinct 
to protect them comes down to my attachment to them, 
and yet I also know that my conscience suggests that I am 
doing a moral wrong — not simply a denial of my pref-
erences — by participating in the cause of the increased 
rate of extinction on our planet. I feel groundless, and 
yet worry I am being unreal, misguided by abstract rea-
soning away from what any decent person would see 
looking at the scale of destruction we are slowly causing.
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“So I am going to forget dinner and push on. You kids 
and your dad are still out having fun. Maybe I can be a 
little lighter by the time you all get home.
“What would a decent person see looking at the civi-
lization I am in causing so much extinction around the 
planet? The speciation process is indistinguishable from 
the history of life. It is astonishing. Just there, on its sur-
face, it thus deserves some respect. What kind?
“Decent people do not destroy thoughtlessly. They are 
not what we would call ‘destructive’ people, even if they 
at times have to take or destroy for well thought-out 
reasons. I think decent people would approach the loss 
of species through the prism of a vast, inherited order 
bearing the work of countless past human lives and bun-
dled together through the ecological transformations of 
countless species that have evolved alongside us humans. 
I think this awareness of a vast, inherited order would 
allow decent people to grasp the gravity of species loss as 
it is currently happening. 
“Countless species and the work they have done to cre-
ate their environments form the historical and ecologi-
cal order of the world as we’ve inherited it, an inheri-
tance also inseparable from the vast amount of human 
labor it has taken to find a way to make a home on Earth, 
to develop agriculture, to figure out how to interact with 
the planet and its species. It’s not that everything we 
have inherited is perfect — or even good. Some things 
are awful —  and life is largely inhuman, often cruel, and 
certainly indifferent in countless ways. But we have a 
fairly stable and workable world, an environment we can 
call ‘home,’ because we have not destroyed it but have 
rather integrated it with our flourishing in imperfect but 
some powerfully good ways, too. It’s this order that my 
civilization is playing with, risking an ecological collapse 
through the loss of species. 
“I have an intuitive respect for order, unless good rea-
sons apply to change it. Not only is living order more 
complex than what our best science can yet fathom, 
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living order is an especially wonderful thing on the whole. 
I don’t know how to think of home or humankind with-
out some awareness and gratefulness for it, including the 
order of species that have co-evolved with us. It’s not just 
that this order is useful to us. It’s that humankind is bound 
up with it and has made a home in it. In this way, the 
species around us are more like our kin than our objects. 
But my civilization seems to treat them as objects to be 
used up or as things that can be disregarded, like gravel 
on the side of its road.
“Being of this vast order myself, I feel moved by it as 
one moved by distant kin. The mass extinction of spe-
cies is not simply a reduction of life as we know it. It is 
the destruction of our hard-won and hard-worked home. 
When we lose many forms of life, we lose their interrela-
tionships, which make up the order we’ve inherited and 
on which many forms of life depend. We lose the efforts 
of living history that have profoundly shaped who we 
are. We undermine our own ancestors’ having worked so 
hard to make a home in this world. In other words, we 
destroy the quality of life, not just its quantity. We are 
like descendants who dance on the graves of our parents 
by dancing on the graves of species.
“As I’ve said, there may be reasons to think that the 
species themselves that we render extinct might be bal-
anced in some sense by future species that will evolve, 
that a new kind of sound will coalesce millions of years 
from now. Yet we are not presently considering the loss 
and the intervening silence. We are not discussing the 
loss of history, losses in the macro-order of life. We risk 
dead seas, deserts, and silent Springs — a world that is 
so unstable it is hard to know how to consider it except 
with dread. A decent person would therefore see that we 
in the United States of America — and in the global econ-
omy more generally — are chaotic. It’s our thoughtless-
ness about all this that is most troubling. We thought-
lessly destroy an order we are lucky to have worked well 
to inhabit, and do so without a whimper.
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“What does it mean to be a destroyer? It has taken mil-
lions and millions of years for the world of life as we 
know it to evolve, and in the last tens of thousands of 
years humankind has worked unimaginably hard and 
long to fashion a home in the world, to pass on wisdom 
about how to do so mostly through practices and tech-
nology. The forms we have inherited — including our 
own — are survivors of chance, ‘momentary cosmic acci-
dents’ as Stephen J. Gould wrote. And we are also hard 
workers who have made the Earth together — not just us 
alone, but the order of life around us, with us, and within 
us, too. Even so, we hardly understand how this order of 
life fits together. We learn more about it every day, and 
we have more to remember about how our ancestors and 
fellow nations have learned about it, too. This vast order 
of life currently threatened by the risk of mass extinc-
tion is beyond anything we have ever created. We should 
show some reverence. 
Reverence is awareness of human limits. . . . You’re in 
the grip of something vaster than you are (Neiman 2008, 
232–35).
“I read that long ago — it was recommended in the New 
York Review of Books. It describes what strikes me as a 
decent attitude: awe and humility before the complex-
ity of life and the sheer effort it has taken for us to get 
here. That this order has come about both by chance and 
by unimaginable work is even more reverence-worthy. 
So at the least, hurtling thoughtlessly toward — even the 
risk of — the sixth mass extinction is wrong, because it is 
irreverent — of the life out there and of us.
“Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote that conscience is the 
love of order, understood by him as a kind of hard won 
harmony of practice. Irreverence is seen in how we unin-
tentionally tear apart, hard-won, fortunate order. It is 
shown in not really talking about and deciding together 
what we are doing, what should be changed, what can 
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be lost, and what should be kept, including kept off lim-
its. These omissions show a flawed, societal conscience. 



















“If a species led to the death of much human life, there 
would be a reason to render it extinct. If, collectively, we 
have good reasons to change our environment, we have 
good reasons — but are they good enough to respect 
our fellow humans on Earth? There is a big difference 
between this kind of justified, deliberate destruction and 
chaotic, thoughtless destruction. Our public sphere has 
almost no serious discussion of what we are doing, and 
there is very little awareness of the extent of the spread 
of extinction. My point is precise: thoughtless, without a 
thought.
“Especially since the industrial revolution began, 
in the space of only two hundred years, some societies 
have managed to set in motion a massive rending of our 
world’s fortunate order. They (we) have done this on the 
backs of other, colonized societies, and without regard 
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for what most of the world thinks. Even if I can’t argue 
that each living species today has a reason that it must 
be preserved, and even if chance will absorb our destruc-
tiveness in its branching proliferation of time, the way 
we in my nation are acting legitimately bothers me. It 
is shocking behavior, the kind I would never permit you 
or myself. Too much is at stake, we know too little about 
what we are doing, and we haven’t stopped to think 
together.
“The manner of our living, the way we are heading into 
the unknown area where even serious scientists start 
shouting ‘mass extinction!’ — that is the problem. The 
thoughtlessness of how we act displays obtuseness to 
something meaningful in so many ways. 
“Early this morning, I wrote that most people are con-
scientious and that most have reverence for life. Now 
I see how the problem goes deeper. We in the United 
States of America are acting chaotically. Our convictions 
and our behavior disconnect. But responsible people do 
not act this way. We shouldn’t believe one thing in our 
hearts, then contradict it.
“If the problem is a failure of responsibility itself, the 
problem is located behind conscience, before we ever lis-
ten to it or think that we do. We have, first, to be in the 
habit of stopping and thinking for conscience to guide 
us. We have to be in the habit of listening to conscience. 
Irresponsibility undercuts both habits. Irresponsible, 
we’re not in a position for having conscience. And when 
it comes to alarms about the sixth mass extinction —
or simply widespread, planetary extinction — we show 
that we’re in no such position. We have not stopped 
to think, not as a people, and nowhere in the capital-
ist global economy where I’ve lived. I am beginning to 
revise my view that we’re conscientious, because I don’t 
think we appear to be in a position to be conscientious. 
But that is an even worse kind of socially organized 
irresponsibility.
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“Where is the source of the chaos I’ve been feel-
ing these past weeks? I think the root disconnection is 
between effect and cause. Consequences matter when 
they convert our actions into something we don’t want 
them to be. The effect is widespread extinction, and we 
in this global economy are the cause, because we support 
this economy, because we support the business as usual of the 
United States of America and many other nations. But we are 
not owning up to the effect, taking it as our own, because 
the effect emerges from all of us in poorly organized soci-
ety. We are acting as if we were not acting. Though the 
rumors of our effects have been in major media sources 
now for over a decade, we do not hear them and then go 
to confirm or to disconfirm them. Practically speaking, 
they do not matter to us, for as a Russian philosopher 
wrote (your dad had a t-shirt with this on it when I met 
him):
Do not listen to what they say — look at what they do! 
—Vladimir Jankélevitch
“Alerted to the effects of our actions, until recently, I did 
not bother to find out if the rumors are true. I did not 
think I was causing anything, even by supporting some-
thing off. I did not have time. And politics is so difficult 
and so filled with corruption.
“But decent people resist. I’ve been mindlessly contrib-
uting to a society that destroys the vast order that our 
ancestors made into our home. This society shows little 
thought collectively, does not even attempt a deep dis-
cussion and qualified justification. Its idiots and moguls 
enter the elections, but we have to change this.”
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Aporia 
“What a good sleep follows the examination of one’s own 
self! How tranquil, deep, and free it is, when the mind has 
been praised or warned, and has become the observer and 
secret judge of its own morals!” 
—Seneca 1995; in Latin, III, 36, 1–3
Will I sleep tonight? I feel like a fraud. See: Non-
academics do think — while I’m complaining about stu-
dents who are legitimately scared. Should this come as 
a surprise, king? His exercise is not rhetoric, while mine 
often is. His goal is living itself. He is thinking about his 
kids.
I’m not thinking. But I should be: about the form of 
questioning. Hylomorphic, questioning that seeks know-
how and reconnection is different than questioning 
seeking only knowledge. The living person thinks, rather 
than simply the intellect. The living person thinks.5
I could put it this way: the important thing is not just 
to make a person think, but to make sure that the person 
thinks.6 
There is a world of difference between thinking about 
a detached intellectual problem that does not emanate 
from our hearts and an intellectual problem growing 
from disquiet deep in the chest, if I may put it like that.7 
5 Cf. “No longer are my intimate impressions ‘personal’ in the 
sense that they are ‘merely mine’ or ‘subjective only’: they are foot-
prints of hyperobjects, distorted as they always must by the entity 
in which they make their mark—that is, me” (Morton 2013, 5).
6 I remember here bell hooks (1994), whose story of how class-
rooms compartmentalize ourselves within ourselves struck me.
7 One might object that a neurotic theoretician can feel heart-
felt disquiet at a purely intellectual problem with no clear rela-
tion to wisdom. True, but I would say that he is approaching the 
problem philosophically, although making a mistake. He thinks his 
problem makes or breaks the world. Protecting the world is a good 
motive, but he is mistaken that his problem actually does that.
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My neighbor’s exercise came from — and seemed to 
orbit — heartfelt disquiet. That is its form of question-
ing. In so doing, his exercise made sure his reflection 
brought in his whole existence,8 rather than just some 
part of it that can easily be compartmentalized as an 
intellectual pursuit and forgotten. But by bringing in 
his whole existence, he was already seeking practical 
and relational wisdom, whereas my so-called “academic 
work” appealing just to our intellects does not imply 
seeking any kind of knowledge of how to live. Existential 
connection is then key.9
Theory can have a practical effect on a person. But it 
is another thing to take theory in such a way that is has 
a practical point and a personal connection. That is what 
taking theory ethically — thinking out of an existential 
connection — does. Sometimes it’s good to take things 
personally. If in philosophy the point of theory is living, 
taking theory personally is a requisite for using knowl-
edge to become more human. 
So the point of the exercise was in the writing, not in 
the reading. The ancients shared their spiritual exer-
cises to spur each other to do their own. Keep your own 
notebook, said Plutarch. A reader can take most any-
thing ethically, but in making the distinctions I have, I 
have focused on what the writing seems to do. It had a 
8 An existence that seeks some view of the good. See Aristotle 
(1999, 1095b15–17).
9 This is a point Kierkegaard understood well (1988, 1983), 
making his writing far more fitting for virtue ethics than most vir-
tue theory. He called his style “upbuilding”. See especially Either/
Or (1843), vol. 2, “A final ultimatum”, where the style was first 
attempted. Also, note especially his invocation of the heart’s dis-
quiet in his most mature and elegant work, esp. The Sickness unto 
Death (1848), preface. Kierkegaard learned to write either from dis-
quiet or from love. In either case, he wrote from conscience. What-
ever the merits of his theology, his understanding of the point of 
virtue ethics, like Nietzsche’s, is unparalleled today.
Again, see hooks (1994), too, on the role of personal emotions in 
the classroom space.
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transformative point. If the writing aims, then, at wis-
dom itself, it proves that aim in the form of question-
ing. Thus, these pages from my neighbor are a different 
kind of thing than, say, a science textbook taken ethically 
by a reader or that same textbook happening to have an 
unintended ethical effect on a reader. They are deliber-
ate work on his life in society.
Oh god, maybe I can go to sleep.






O   P   E   N
  THEN
Moth-eaten time capsule 










or third or fifth or seven thousand
arc coughing litany and void
wavelength of a storm in thunder
with hold
this process. In the dust room above the corner of 
53rd & Kimbark, 
it’s summer, sleeveless, wet.
[ . . . ] auma in a room of notes
Acanemic hylomorph, industrial arm
 At 19,
Herr Stern sketched while
a hunter in the sky with belts
sang cave-light symphony of the Holocene.
At 40, I held the letter they sent in my hands.
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*
Lars’ tape came in 1998,
four years before defense.
I had no way to include ’89
that fresh, open time
when the Norwegians mixed 
their three hundred year bent streets with gone, drunk 
legs 
at Big Benneth’s clock & barre.
Gothic polyp of dyed black hair
& Max Von Sydow’s intelligent dying lit Julie Delpie at a 
distance.
Tarry & Traum, they gesticulated mildly
and fretted
Tarkovsky the ceiling round
the wavelength of a storm,
later alight over the bridge I crossed daily on clouded 
water.




Earth thought 66 of 365: “All one needs is a system. Once a 
day to do some small thing: fill a glass of water from the 
tap. Flush it down the toilet, only that. The world would 
have to change.” 
*
Earth thought 27 of 365: I need a voice that isn’t philo-
sophical and isn’t poetic. Which isn’t religion. Which is 
experiment. At the pace of Earth time, with the part of 
us that isn’t destructive or blind.
*
I need to tell you why I writ this thing.
A pall — in air — strained, we carried
branch and bronze.
Years of frost.
The first things are fresh weather.
Slowly heard and cavernous –
their history scratches out chalk,




Open-end the cry & never ever-
stop.
I stood on the floor, the rain of Europe behind me.
Who
wept as you walked through Paris?
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Only Beckett heard
your sky–zinc slouch, the reflections along the bar in a 
room of sweating men.
I was nineteen; you were Folio,
a pocket-book bought on the ark of dying animals.
Cloud tasting souls of cinder. 
Ash in the stones along the shore.
With St. Sebastian, we cracked the spine. Was
that his name? I sat near the spire, silent near noon and 
waves of air flowed from the clock. Street, knock,
 Nick
Cadavrous:
Pigeon dripped from vine.
His dirty beard soaked in time.
With that bum I red — a stranger thing. I lift your hands 
and sing
together. We loved the elements
or tossed hair, 
sunlight in busses, the forgetful café
with plastic seats. 
A car gear-shafted patiently, &
you poured out, and
out, you poured 
wholely out




Three days past tenure, I 
started hearing drone. The
main was bad shoegaze
from the globalized nineties.
Lars sent 
phylogeny as high art was Nan Goldin.
Mine energy was spentlet
me tell youlet
announcements fade.
O there is nothing like dozing in a mystical city.
6 A.M.
On mixed tapes from my last four years to defense,
I’d often place the song near
The End. Farther,
blue room and clouded time.
historia. My
[ . . . ]
*
Earth thought 3 of 365: We have a right. But this morning 
like last night, I have no idea where to turn to find the 
world beside me as it should be. Or it should be of each 
and every one of us.
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*
Only industry has grown and human population.
Or Earth’s tense coil, the why that doesn’t
drift aimlessly for those who sense it.
Of course,   no,       I can’t be right.     “Transcendence,”
floats.      Behind all signs,       life declines.
My room was narrow, heat-knicked, and long.
Almost nothing in the fridge. Iced coffee in a 
condiment jar.
and summer again.
Endlessly footnotes        mote
on waves of       sound
beat box cars shaft gear so patiently, say:
Small peas
made from sugar bees
             nursery tease
of my last memory.
*
Earth thought 65: Individualism in the 70s made the 
world inside the rage, while around us all, industry 








Child of the ’70s
Feathered hair and flesh on hand,
’77 was hot. I was a kid, but
you could sift evaporated
care.
Corvettes swooned a teen-age back
unconscious in the sheets. If
troops sinned, weather-
men underground. Way
gay love on the side.
All blocks, tall cities
popped corn to Skywalker drops.
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groove in buckets crude
from oily trips.
Our hips feverish in her
neon pants.
Untethered worlds are lies.
I cannot believe that sweet
infinity made linguistic
tapestry




Earth thought 126 of 365: I sat on the floor with students 
last night, revising their semester-long work. Har-
ried and laughing, once near tears, they tumbled out of 
industry with barely time to lose. And we post-students 
are like them with our home improvements and loan 
accruement, our tasks, competition, dinners. We tumble 
out of time with barely life to lose. 
*
1945, ’50s
A star of death invaded France
and engraved the Russian front.
History’s in ruins. Civilization
cries — on you, on all that I
love, on all the old memories.
Fond, long bitterness–
my necrophilic bile.
The bureaucratic crime has just begun while
we were bleeding in
the streets of Normandy.
Coldness will set in. The winter of
our silent killing 
beneath a planetary hush,
dying ocean.
And the water of the lapping shores
sends soft messages to overseas lovers.
We’re concussed within our new-made homes,
appliances a whirl of light and humming.
My temples are drumming in
this new-made life. I
am so busy, I do not 
see that I have spent intention.
My husband almost died while
 my father lost his job and
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my children will be full with
food and images:
a new made T.V. set.
There is money to be made in our appeasements.
There is money to be made in advertisements.
I know, Tom
told me, if
he made it home from work.
Things take off.
Big times win.
And all that we’ve wanted I’ve
forgot.
*
Earth thought 114 of 365: Moral heroism needs new things. 
Organizational decision puts the future incrementally 
at risk. Don’t stop a bullet with your body. Unlock the 
patterns!
*
Rachel Carson, early ’60s
The housewives were the first to freak.
Birds died everywhere —
a carcinogenic binge.
War II’s crew of industry all-
for-profit in 
the chemical dawn. We
didn’t know. The silent foe invades our bodies
as we slept. It was there
in dewy sunrise, calculated on the flowers and
the stacks of dying wasps.
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Rachel’d had enough. Her breasts undone
as they metastasized, she
wrote clear messages in The New York Times.
Spelled “pesticide”:
“cry.”
Dust the nightstand at a chosen time, and
make the lawn a green and uniform expanse – 
Then your family.
At sunset at dinner, Tom!
In mailrooms in noon, Senator!
We’d never have thought that man has all
the means to wreck our order. Once,
from blow or chains or hunger it
came. A soldier with a bright and steel-hard cask,
a nationalist. Or unhinged man alone
along the cold, wet streets at night, a
threat. But
how things change. They
slighten in the waning century,
are infinitesimal addition born
by Tom and Mary, the Senator, the shopper. 
*
Earth thought 52 of 365: City of homes. Life passes 
through like utopia. And this city is real, a billion years 
of strength. The doorway, the species. The species: evo-
lution’s stream of life. Phylogenetic tapestry. Portal of 
time.
But we throw the wavelengths off. Doorways shut. And 
we close down the city for many million years.
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*
Paleo-geography, 14,000 years ago
It is windswept, 
the forests all a roar of air like oceans
as mega-fauna falter 
spear by axe and
hands eat the mastadons,
letting the carcasses fade to ground
half-done.
Atlatls are points of time. 
They, they are future.
Shaken rod stuck deep in bone, it
bled there
in the ice-chilled moon
*
Dubai, 2008
I AM HAPPY though I didn’t know
that beach and sand are served
as caviar in a tray that’s
couched along a bay of ice
and bubbled by champagne brunches
made accessible to the hoi polloi. 
            Or
those from England, France, and Spain —
(while India’s mostly off limits) and the Philippines
send thin-boned, gentle faces
to take our orders and our shirts.
Sri Lanka’s there! China, too! Bangladesh!
And high Nepal.
The workers live together all in six foot rooms, a trunk
beneath them 
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with burners for cheap lentils.
“HISTORY RISING” said a sign stretched
far across the sea.
But time begins to shrink infinitesimally.
There’s a loop in
this scene and others.
I feel frenzied at
noon beneath the shade of three tall buildings.
Nightly, soft service girls pull men far out all along the 
line.





Earth thought 163 of 365: Recently, the Alaotra grebe 
of Madagascar went extinct — another bird kind, an 
increasing number. The causes are clear — we took their 
home, moved in new species. Alaotra had nowhere to go, 
couldn’t cope.





                   3.
I was in
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the [ . . .] then.
The macro-perspectives of geological time and of plan-
etary ecology make it hard to keep in view, simultane-
ously, the human. I look at a book bag I bought alongside 
my father from Strand Books. On it, profiles of all differ-
ent sorts of people. The warmth of that memory which 
goes back to when I was young. Every one of those faces 
holds different stories. 
From within each of our worlds, our loves are so 




Broadway began on 92nd nearby Symphony Space.
The buildings were a shadow in the street.
We paused
along the median waiting for the sign to blink.
Charred coffee burns 
inside paper cups.
The homeless sift through ashcans seeking 
stubs and stuff.
Above, the sky was cloudless, blue, and inside March.
We weren’t yet overrun.
Do you understand? 
Windows glowed when the sunlight died.
Families fit together on the street.
~
1983. I felt the Rothkos in the room.
Museums are not busy at 3 in the afternoon.
Outside, Utica was cold with winter.
Time to go to church and sing.
There is more to life than what goes on
beyond the richest family on the block. 
Like this space and song, 
an intimation of people, think.




Then, Chicago in the 90s. A blue line at sundown.
Hold yourself to grain where
light begins to crack apart. A 
wracked, repainted wall, an
apartment with old heating. I do 
not believe in cheating and the
market never was.
Everything was inside, nothing to show for it.
The sounds of marimbas mixed with backbeat
as ghettoized selves rolled to red octagons.
O — O
there is nothing like living in a genuine city.
The incognito life is lost on houseplants.
You steam cylinders with exhibit.
Innocence is realness with no news flash,
nor repayment in cash.
No eternity ever was soundbit.
But the people, the people are everywhere.
I once crawled down an apartment closely
owned by a soul.
She was searching for her way to give.
In the cold, we went to eat in a rusty bar.
Locals collected on Saturday and ate vegetarian soup!
O truth be told, I remember you
and November. 
*
What I first thought
when I saw you off —
the taxi said goodbye.
I rode on.




Your hold in pink-red fabric
a dress with roses




your natal glow a mood
I could not cast off.
That is why you kept me
inside this memory of silence.
Seldom do I know
how to map existence. 
Here is a corner in New York 
where young lovers we once were
on the grass of the Munstitute.
You walk out of my life
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ away.
*
14th Earth thought of 365: The look on my parents’ faces 
that night before their 45th wedding anniversary. 
Money makes little difference beyond modest means.
Status likewise is a joke. 
There isn’t even pride in contentment. Quiet is the 
need. 
You’d think we’d approach our planet, indeed, through 
the Significant.
*
And then there was the translation, looking back.
Somewhere still in summer, I rang an old friend on the 
line.
Cell-less, boothed inside a phone,
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the sun was old, yellow, alone, the city anticipating
night.
Not a thing.
Outside, the street, pavement, quiet.
It doesn’t matter.
I was in the open then.
*
A wedding, 2009




child-washing,           tolls
news,    links
sprawled          long       halls
photos               Mom     Dad
bright colored toys, dark          basket of
cries. 
[adapted from a poem on May 18, 2009 
for Chris’ and Mary’s wedding]
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Pink Angels (Willem de Kooning)
Pieced, lean, inaccurate,
events derailed time.
Work is not an engine; know
that the shape of pink is home.
Willem stoved a studio
as sex and Elaine slept.
Rose and turned when images stay
aligned in your mind, you wake.
It took ten years to make
the psyche shatter slowly.
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I, no, you . . . am there.
Beneath us, the senses unfound,
stalked on splinters, we allied broken with light.
Say what you want — it wasn’t confessional.
The mean and stuff of bodies seldom is.
———— whether they are souls or limbs ————
*
Earth thought 1: We are individualistic. We have missed it.
*
Earth thought: The child’s face in light.
*
Aurora
The lake open in the afternoon light.
Tufts of wild down seeded wind-side into air,
while grass wears a gauze of fine off-white.
We were becoming-cloud without anger and evolved.
Water see-says the shore between lapped elements 
as scales silver bowl beneath green waves upturned.
Do you see the graduates, long thighs along the dock?
A boat stops near them, chats or calls. A shell
catters softly beyond their point. Then
the wake comes inward and the rocks splash black and wet. 
How could we be without animal order?
Our shift beyond our border which the Buddists try 





Wind lives as movement, 
sidles unsuspecting into ours.
Once
I lay here at the landing’s edge and heard the story of 
the drowned. 
I was struck soundly by the sad, sure truth.
How could some one in such a pure, lost water




The summer day says we should become a festival.
Children splash wild shallows all a ring while spent flies 
flick their legs on 
tables. 
Cool the clouds 
blue wavelength of
a storm in wondrous
hunger. 
Now there are voices!







Earth thought 131: See the strata where I once lived, 
underwater, ocean, & strange. Overlays compel in ways 
advertisements do not. Shells don’t seduce. They are 
coolish fact. 
*
The impossible cities party
Center and non-center. And similarly in
ecological life. 
How we maintain 
stable vision 
is that we bend sense to fit. 
In our world, 
and beside it, 
then in yours, 
above.
We should outlive, but we die inside these tasks.
Dexterities bound our funneled work,
round and round in Earth. 
Across the dusty galaxy, fists




Dirt-street and florescent shop
phone-card, plates of rice. 
Sympathetic ears save silence.




Suppose the sixth mass extinction were caused by us. A 
species is like a poem, but we erase genres. We pile up 
the library to the auto-de-fé.
*
Then in a dream, I climb 
a stairway behind
a friend 
whom I used 
to love. 
We






Time, voice & life 
were one. 
How









Earth thought 146 of 365: A million year form of life. [ . . . ] 
how it has weathered and been weathered.
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*
(untitled: texto poem to friends)
I often wonder if or when
the newspapers will stop
—will they ever stop?
The busses outside roar past
a cold, November day.
Coffee on in the kitchen,
words on the steps,
the courtyard.
All time in this city
explains no thought.
[May 15, 2006, Paris]
*
I used to feel the sky’s vastness unaffected by us. A 
slow moving glacier of light. Now things are differ-




Like a nineteen year old with crammed feet, we
cast off caution and made our daily rounds. Impossible 
to find the air nearer, it’s 
cold,
pale yellow on the old brick walls. Some say
the day like any others, the heat came through
the ventilated shutters. We watched a lecture on scrape. 
Song was exhausting, the otherworld quiet.
My students scrambled. Where is the
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box? I must find the box.
came to a street. She told me about the
cars swept by. I
’ve lost my sense of
emptiness. That should be good. Damn
equilibrated touch when
she walks through the door.
The porch screen slams. Echo night along the block.
Come to me in our room. Light from the hallway
made your body a burning shade. You
smell of soap and your hair is
cooler than outside. Arms
on backs this is
the warm corridor of silence
The bus’s hydraulics squeaked. We
descend.
I have as many small things within my mind
as an overcrowded table, a desk whose stacks of once-
live memos
became a folded range. Why
don’t you make our dinner? I have to go and clean
the backyard deck. What
night are we asking the neighbors out to eat?
That six o’clock news speaks on
small manners of new found things — like 
travel to the islands and 
how to make quiche. Then
I remember how it was when
Carson felt little. He’d watch carrots
fall to thin, neat piles beneath the life.
*
Another Earth thought: Between character and conse-
quence, decent people breathe in the gap. Thunder rolls 




This Tasmanian wolf, or tiger, he died inside a cage. 
1936 was 3 years after he was filmed, last known mem-
ber of his kind.
If he died in April, then he did the month my father —
Dave — was born.
Ten tens of thousands years have ended
when a studious man began. 
Which individual’s aware of wide disorder? As I 
write now or live
the summer and the year, some form sluffs off,
a disheveled skeleton there in leaves against thick rocks.
Not even a naturalist would know, or sense,
the canopy in silence.
These are things that I do not own. 
Benjamin ranged around these lands, haunches ribbed 
from time’s design.
His tail bent hard to tell a tale sent back. 
What was like your almost night? Dry
of leaves, the hollow where you slept, your Eucalyptis 
forest,
tides of wind and hunger . . .
How was the riotous smell of everything? 
1936. 
Hitler’d come to power. All eyes focused on his front.
The world economy spun and grandpa Bendik jumped a 
truck
of elbows every dawn.
 Able-bodied men did some such thing. 
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They dug, and the Thylacine knew
nothing.
Into Earth ran
its Holocene memory of cells.
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moth eaten cast of unknown ch[ . . . ]acters 
53rd St. In the 1990s, an integrated street in the Hyde 
Park neighborhood of the South Side of Chicago 
where the University of Chicago is. Malik Usef, on 
Common’s One Day It’ll All Make Sense (1997): cars 
“rolled to red octogons.” 
5.31. Walk Whitman’s birthday, when he came out of the 
cradle, endlessly rocking.
Guillaume Apollinaire. From the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, a French-Polish poet. “Zone” is his 
long ramble through Paris while processing histori-
cal and personal time (“Sur toi sur celle que j’aime 
sur tout ce qui t’a épouvnanté”). It’s also a work of 
compassion (“Tu regardes les yeux pleins de larmes 
ces pauvres emigrants / Ils croient en Dieu ils prient 
les femmes allaitent des enfants / Ils emplissent de 
leur odeur le hall de la gare Saint-Lazare / Ils ont foi 
dans leur étoile comme les rois-mages / Ils espèrent 
gagner de l’argent dans l’Argentine / Et revenir dans 
leur pays après avoir fait fortune / Une famille trans-
porte un édredon rouge comme vous transportez 
votre cœur. / Cet édredon et nos rêves sont aussi 
iréels.”) Samuel Beckett wrote the only good trans-
lation of “Zone” yet. I wrote an axe de lecture (close 
reading exercise) on Apollinaire’s “Autumne Malade” 
(ill Autumn) as a Rotary exchange student in France, 
1988–89. 
Marcus Aurelius. A Roman emperor and Stoic philosopher 
who wrote spiritual exercises designed to do inner 
work that would change outer life indirectly. Resig-
nation to our mortality was one of his themes.
Aurora. A village in Central New York. It borders Lake 
Cayuga and has the small Wells College in it.
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Auto-de-fé. Death by inquisition, in a bonfire.
Benjamin. The last known living Thylacine or Tasmanian 
wolf (or Tasmanian tiger), a now extinct marsupial 
which used to range in Australia and New Guinea. 
He looked like a strange, striped dog, and died inside 
Hobart Zoo, Tasmania on September 7, 1936. 
There is also the German literary theorist, Walter Benja-
min, who used literature to do social philosophy and 
to criticize the oppressive contradictions of our capi-
talistic world.
The Blue Line. One of Chicago’s elevated train/subway 
lines. 
Buddhism & anger. Buddhism proposes that (1) we should 
acknowledge anger, that (2) we shouldn’t act from 
anger, but from compassion, and that (3) ideally, we 
should come to feel only compassionate, not angry 
about injustices.
Rachel Carson. A science writer woke the U.S. up from 
its chemical slumber by decrying the misuse of 
pesticides.
Nick Cave. P-punk-raconteur / who got his start in / an 
Australian combo. The Birthday Party. Ritz thru them 
owt cuz Cave thru amplifiers in the pit. (A Birthday 
Party song → “Blast off!”) 
Ceremony of the Dead. A Buddhist practice of chanting and 
meditating in compassion with the dead.
Coffee in New York. Is often served inside paper cups with 
an ancient Greek theme on them. 
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The Cold War. Mid-1940s to the end of the 1980s. Rise of 
the slow moving, silent bureaucracy with long-range 
effect.
Corvette. A long car in the ’70s, a swooning hood.
Willem De Kooning. An abstract expressionist painter of 
the New York School, mid-twentieth century. His 
painting was in layers, hard-etched, scrubbed, weath-
ered and alcoholic.
Defense. The closing rite of a Ph.D. — the defense of one’s 
thesis or dissertation before a committee of scholars, 
open to the public.
Julie Delpie. Starlet from the ’80s and ’90s, seen outside 
France in Krystoff Kieslowski’s film, White (Three Col-
ors series).
Dubai. City of extreme consumption whose logo is a sail-
shaped building called the Burj al Arab. Workers 
from all over the world built Dubai, often on small 
wages in poor living conditions, but often better 
than those found back home.
Earth thoughts. Begun on December 24, 2009, numbered 
1 then. 
Folio. Inexpensive French brand of paperbacks. In kid 
knapsacks.
Andrew Forrest. Served in W.W. II. Deceased now. He 
taught regular and honors English at New Hartford 
High School near Utica, N.Y. for thirty+ years. Would 
read and teach a poem per day unless the work was 
long. The Waste Land was a month’s analysis (April 
1988). Even the reading took the hour. You could 
hear the silence when sound and sense left off.
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Michel Foucault. Poster-child of post-structuralism, saint 
of Gay Liberation.
Anna Freud. Daughter of Sigmund, she shaped American 
self-psychology.
Grace Avenue. Does not exist in Utica, N.Y., although Grace 
Church does. There was an old men & boy’s choir in 
it. I sang there.
Lars Helge Strand. A member of Lycée Corneille’s section 
norwegienne (Norwegian section). The section norw-
egienne was established in the nineteenth century to 
honor Normandy’s ties to Norway. Each year, sixteen 
Norwegian guys begin their sophomore year of high 
school in pension (dormitory) (the gals are boarded at 
a school in Bayeux where the tapestry of the inva-
sion resides). Lars liked comics, loud beer, music, 
punk communes, and the environment. 
The Lycée Corneille is a high school in Rouen 
named after playwright Pierre Corneille –whose 
statue has bird shit on it in the main courtyard. Ste-
phane Mallarmé taught there. The L.C. dates back to 
Napoléon. 
Rouen, a larger, French provincial city about 80 
minutes from Paris by train. Monet painted its 
cathedral at different times of the day. Maligned 
by Gustav Flaubert who lived there. Rouen’s where 
Jeanne d’Arc was burned at the stake. The “ville de 
cent clôches” (city of a hundred spires): filled with 
gothic churches. A downtown of cobble streets. A 
central clock. She overhangs the street, a Medieval 
arch. Next to that clock in the ’80s: a brasserie (beer 
bar) named “Big Ben.”
High Art. A film of the late 1990s whose central char-
acter — a drug addicted, lesbian photographer —
shoots photos similar to Nan Goldin’s.
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Hitler. The leader of the National Socialists in Germany 
(the Nazis) who rose to power during what, in the 
United States, was called “the Great Depression.” 
Most people knew who he was for many centuries 
until the mass extinction made his evil appear anach-
ronistic. His was pure evil for most of the twenti-
eth century while they mostly ignored the invisible 
war.
I stood on the shore, the ruins of Europe in back of me. The 
opening line of Heiner Müller’s Hamletmaschine 
which I first saw at the Yale Drama School in Fall 
1989.
Impossible cities party. Going away and 38th birthday 
party in Dubai, May 2008. Each invitee brought an 
impossible flower, a story of an impossible city, or a 
memory of utopia in the frustrations of urban life. 
Many people performed while Zlatan showed videos 
on the wall.
Janus. “An ancient [Roman] deity, guardian of doorways 
and gates and protector of the state in time of war. 
He is usually represented with two faces, so that he 
looks both forward and backward.” (Oxford American 
Dictionary, Apple Version, 2005–07) I learned how to 
time-travel through him.
Lex. Lexington Avenue in Manhattan, New York City. The 
E train stops there at 51st.
The market. The job market for academic jobs — notori-
ous among graduate students.
Munstitute. The nickname of the Munson-Williams-
Proctor Institute, a museum in Utica, N. Y.
Never stop. The name of a song by the band Deerhunter.
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Rap. In the 1990s, a predominantly African-American 
musical and poetic form from ghettos with roots in 
African oral traditions.
Robin. A common bird, rust-breasted, in central New 
York.
Rococo. “Extravagantly or excessively ornate, esp. (of 
music or literature) highly ornamented and florid.” 
(Oxford American Dictionary, Apple Version, 2005–07)
Mark Rothko. Known as a “color-field” painter of the New 
York School. He said he painted “color objects.” 
Second nature. Associated with Aristotle and his idea that 
habits, which are not instinctual, become second 
nature as if they were instinctual.
Shoegaze. A kind of post-punk, sometimes electronic 
music (My Bloody Valentine or sometimes Sonic Youth —
post-punk shoegaze; Scala — the electronica variety). 
Scala was on Lars’s tape in ’98 (the album Compass 
Heart).
The sixth mass extinction. An alarmist worry, but you knew 
it was not impossible. It was caused by us humans. 
Alarmists thought it would be as deep as the deepest-
cutting two mass extinctions in the history of life —
the end Paleozoic extinction (250,000,000 B.C.), and 
the end Mezozoic one (65,000,000 B.C.). They were 
almost right.
Luke Skywalker. Character in the 1977 blockbuster Star 
Wars. Blew up the Death Star.
Slovak. My mother’s heritage. Andy Bendik was my 
grandfather who worked a pick-up labor crew during 
the 1930s in the Great Depression in Southern Ohio.
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Patti Smith. ’70s feminist rocker — braless, bush armpits, 
“Rock N Roll Nigger.”
Herr Stern. “Mr. Star” in German; an intensive German 
teacher at Yale College circa 1990. 
Stop signs. In the United States of America, they are 
octagonal, red and with white letters, “STOP.”
Strand Books. If you walked down University Street in 
New York City, you would have seen the sign: “18 
miles of books.”
Symphony Space. A world music concert space in the 
1990s on Broadway in New York on the West Side. 
World music is music from non-Western traditions 
played in the West, or Western music mixed with 
non-Western music. These were old, colonialist 
categories.
Andrei Tarkovski. & 12 miles of moving painting. Offret 
(The Sacrifice) was filmed in Sweden while he was in 
exile from the U.S.S.R. Edited in Paris on his death-
bed, it was dedicated to his son. I saw it in Rouen in 
1989.
Tenure. Old school practice reminiscent of Medieval guild 
apprenticeship. A university procedure whereby an 
assistant professor earns a life-long job, barring ille-
gal behavior. Time to tenure after college: usually 
fourteen years. Odds against it. 
The word comes from the French tenir from the 
Latin, meaning “to hold.”
Tom. A generic 1950s man. Mary is his wife. You don’t 
know him? In 2010, their son was Carson.
Tragedy of the commons. Biologist Garrett Hardin cre-
ated this concept to explain common resources 
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unregulated well by custom or by law. With such 
resources, it is rational for some people to take 
more than is sustainable for the whole community, 
since taking more will in the short term pay off for 
these opportunists, leaving others in the future to 
deal with the increasing scarcity. The planet’s atmo-
sphere is an unregulated commons whose resource is 
its ability to trap pollution. Our grandkids dealt with 
our pollution, but too late for the mass extinction.
Victoria’s Secret. A mass-market lingerie shop begun in 
the 1980s. 
Max Von Sydow. A Swedish actor, known for work in 
Ingmar Bergman films of the 1960s, Von Sydow 
appeared at the Nordic Film Festival of Rouen in 
March–April 1989, where Offret was screened. Under 
T.V. lights, he was inside a glass atrium visible from 
the street.
Wasteland. A long, overly-complicated poem influenced by 
French symbolist poetry — e.g., Stéphane Mallarmé, 
Guillaume Apollinaire, Gérard de Nerval (a proto-
symbolist). The poem was about cultural extinction, 
among other things.
Weathermen Underground. A Maoist terrorist organization 
of the ’70s. Militant against U.S. military interven-
tion abroad, they destroyed government property. 
Once, a faction tried to kill policemen and their 
dates at a New York City dance. They blew them-
selves up by mistake.
W.B. Yeats. An Irish poet who bridged the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. His “Sailing to Byzantium” says 






























“My heart was a storm in me as I went.”
—Homer
In Kierkegaard and in the Enlightenment
I want to talk to you about freedom, freedom through 
self-reflection, and through this topic, I want to talk 
to you about what would be called “idealism” if it were 
not more simply imperfect, committed love. The way I 
want to approach this constellation of topics is through 
the morose, mentally ill writer and philosopher, Søren 
Kierkegaard, who hardly survived — and then only until 
middle age — the abuse of his father and the genetics of 
his mind. He seems a strange choice. Since Isaiah Berlin 
(1997), Kierkegaard has been categorized as a counter-
Enlightenment figure. But I want to ask a transforma-
tive question about him: What if Kierkegaard were 
instead an enlightenment writer who had surpassed the 
anti-authoritarianism of the Enlightenment and was 
instead interested in human deepening and maturity? 
This is not the way I want to talk about Søren Kierkeg-
aard, whom I never knew, but who somehow managed —
through his writing and the effort I put into reading 
it — to be a good teacher. As all good teachers, he did 
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what anyone given momentary authority in another’s 
mind should do: he erased it, gave it up, did whatever 
he could to become irrelevant once the lesson became 
self-seen, self-taught. In fact, he took no credit at all: 
it was grace, it was me; no, not me; it was “life” — it was 
the reality of what I’d just seen as an intimate part of my 
life. I would like to talk about people like this as distant 
family, not as objects of academic inquiry. 
A question about a historical moment and its rela-
tion to a cultural tradition may seem a dry question to 
ask, while the questions of love, self-reflection and free-
dom are real and interesting. Nevertheless, in this talk, I 
want to propose an interpretation of Kierkegaard’s work 
under which he continues the Enlightenment, rather 
than discontinuing it, and in so doing, I want to explain 
how his version of Enlightenment self-reflection com-
plicates the maturity involved in exercising one’s own 
understanding. Kierkegaard complicated and developed 
one of the most central aspects of enlightenment, at 
least as Kant and the subsequent tradition has defined 
it. Kierkegaard was an enlightenment thinker (lower 
case “e”!). And therefore it is misleading to see him as 
opposed to the heart of the Enlightenment (upper case 
“E”). It is strange to think that he would be concerned 
with any of these historical distinctions. He seemed to 
want to meet people as people and to work their rela-
tionship out slowly with them. When I think of the way 
he deflected his lost marriage into an impossible inti-
macy he projected through his writing, I feel sad for 
him. His was a strange life. It reminds me too much of 
myself.
The Enlightenment — capital “E” — was a histori-
cal period. In it, so-called Aufklärers challenged people 
to become responsible authorities in their own lives, 
especially concerning matters ethical, political and reli-
gious. The key to this internalization of responsibil-
ity was considered to be the advancement of one’s own 
understanding. People had to become connected to their 
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own capacity to know. According to Kant, this move-
ment from accepting external authorities to using our 
own understanding was enlightenment — lower case 
“e.” The imperative beginning Kant’s essay “What Is 
Enlightenment?” (1996, 58) reads: “Have the courage to 
use our own understanding!” This is an elegant restate-
ment of the central message of Rousseau’s “Profession 
of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar” in Émile (1978). Seen in 
this light, the tradition of enlightenment — lower case 
“e” — began as a tradition of self-determination exer-
cised through our capacity to understand independently 
enough to own what we each believe, that is, to assert 
oneself.
This tradition was fundamental to our democratic 
culture, whether in the form of declarations of indepen-
dence or in proclamations of human rights. The notion 
of asserting oneself is basic to democracy, because only 
in it do we each have a separate voice. On the reading 
of Foucault two centuries later, what the Enlightenment 
promoted philosophically was a self-culture found pre-
cisely where we displace convention’s authority enough 
to assess what we each believe ourselves. This was an 
ethos, a style of living. Foucault thought that the practice 
of enlightenment — lower case “e” — expressed an anti-
authoritarian ethos by seeking to test the limits of what 
was considered possible in being normal. Foucault’s his-
torical analysis of the normal was a way of showing us 
heteronomy. Here was a commitment to open up the 
world to a plurality of voices and of intelligences and to 
expose the fact that norms always depend on consent —
that much that is normal is not normative. I went into 
the academy to create with people and to understand. I 
think Kierkegaard preserved the personal and buffered 
me from the academic market’s competition. He made 
me long for relationships. And I also started to wonder: 
could something other than theory be at the core of aca-
demic knowing? What was philosophy, most humanly? 
Was it really just theory?
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Foucault’s insight was to show time and again how 
systems of authority people take to be self-evident are 
normalizations of what could be otherwise. He showed 
how anti-authoritarian resistance could be joined with 
thinking the present as a set of historically contin-
gent conditions on our self-conception — the limits 
of our possibility. And so Foucault (1996a) called “cri-
tique” the movement of authority to the side of what 
we take to be normal in the interest of pulverizing the 
norms that oppressed the real trajectory of bodies and 
sentiments between people when people are trying 
to grow up and to be free. Critique was an exercise of 
distancing oneself from the compulsions of the histori-
cal conditions that make us accept our self-conception 
automatically. Critique carved out a space where we 
could take distance on the automatic intimidation of 
norms. The brilliant move on Foucault’s part was to 
see critical attitude as room around our practices by vir-
tue of first beginning to see their contingency. Could 
they be otherwise? Here was the ironist’s art. Think-
ing about Foucault and about Kierkegaard makes 
me think about my marriage. The process of realizing 
that I could not keep the oath I’d taken involved see-
ing the contingency of marriage norms and demanded 
that I be intimate with myself in a way I never had been 
before.
Foucault’s picture underlined a point tacit in Kant and 
in especially the Rousseau of the Second Discourse. The 
standard textbook picture of the Enlightenment casts it 
as a critique of external authority — religion and monar-
chy — but may neglect to emphasize the purpose of this 
critique: to move the locus of authority to how we make 
sense of the world. We, you, I, he, she can ask: 
Does this [claim, situation, relationship, practice, social 
form, even system of authority] make sense to me or to us? 
Does it work for me or for us? Does the “me” or “us” that we 
find ourselves stuck with work for us and make sense to us?
120	 I 	WANT	TO	MEET	YOU
This is so very much like a relationship. We have to get 
space around our practices, first by seeing the contin-
gency of their norms. Systems of authority, by virtue of 
appealing to authority, always have a space around them 
by which they can be questioned. The problem is often, 
historically, that there is fear or shame in doing so. They 
are always open to question, but a shadow morality guards 
them in our emotions. This fear lives in the body, the site 
of our most personal memories. It lives in fear-voice. In 
our emotions, our self-conception — the very “I” that 
questions authority — is likely to be positioned by norms 
we have not interrogated historically. What we ulti-
mately fear in questioning authority isn’t just its repri-
sals or control, but also the loss of our selves we mis-
takenly think will occur by being abnormal. The normal 
resists being interrogated by being self-evident, if I may 
put it like that.
What is it to exercise your own understanding, when 
you have taken space on “yourself” — and you feel those 
scare-quotes? What is it to have something agree with 
your understanding when you can’t trust your emotions? 
Also — and this question is very hard to wrap one’s mind 
around — is there a space on yourself that isn’t simply 
itself an automatic construction of the historical prob-
lem of the Enlightenment, a problem where authority 
is in crisis and our minds cannot be trusted at first?1 Is 
there a leave-taking of authority that is life-affirming 
and free? 
The interesting possibility, I think, is to consider some-
thing Foucault did not address. What space can move our 
inherited authorities, not recreating them, but unset-
tling them once they have come into view in half light, 
now crossed by the shadow of a doubt? Where does the 
unsettling of history arise? This is tantamount to asking, 
1 See Linda Trinkhaus Zagrebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of 
Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief (2012). She begins with the 
crisis of authority in the Enlightenment.
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what unsettles norms and gives us the impulse to recon-
sider reasons? It is not enough to see that they are con-
tingent. They must also be unfulfilling — they must jar 
with the sense of what is possible in a fulfilling human 
life. It hurts to think about it.
But then we will reconsider sense itself, the condition 
of our home. When fulfillment has been determined by 
the normal, abnormality seems anathema. To reject the 
normal out of un-fulfillment with it is to threaten our 
sense of life itself. That very sense of what is possible in 
a fulfilling human life is split in two and acts against our 
inherited sense of propriety. The threat is felt as a col-
lapse of our world just as much as of a loss of self. We 
have to learn to lose to leave an authority.
In a dream, you came to me, although we have not 
talked in a decade. You asked me if I knew that, despite 
everything that happened, our time together was impor-
tant to you, that you had loved me, and that I had been 
a part of your life. I do not have enough dreams like 
this.
I find Kierkegaard helpful here, because of the trace 
of body in his sense of virtue. Especially as the ques-
tions I’ve been asking become emotional, they blur the 
boundaries between the Enlightenment and its so-called 
opposition in Romanticism. And if we focus on the pur-
pose of critique, we emerge with a view of the core of 
the Enlightenment that is, technically speaking, no dif-
ferent than what Husserl inaugurated when he claimed 
phenomenology as a rigorous science brackets claims to 
authority that have not been shown to make sense to our 
minds.2 We emerge with a view that places Kierkegaard 
within the Enlightenment tradition. Here, then, would 
be a tradition running from the Enlightenment through 
2 See Edmund Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science (1965), 
and Cartesian Meditations (1988), meditation 1 on the époché and 
the idea of “genuine science.” See also Jean-Luc Marion, Réduction 
et donation (1989) on the “reduction” to “givenness.”
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Romanticism into twentieth century phenomenology.3 In 
it, we would attend to the body as an expressive space. 
The emotional body would hold open a way of becoming 
that could act out against norms in a refusal that allows 
one to re-orient ourselves to them. The body as intelli-
gent flesh could throw off the constructing mind. Fear 
could give way to freedom. This would not be to separate 
body from mind, but to see them as modes of one, uni-
fied consciousness that exists dynamically, and it would 
be to look for an emotional location within the body that 
counteracts fear and anxiety about being abnormal.
What would such an emotional location be? Kierkeg-
aard was aware of the body-memory of freedom, which 
he understood through the experience of love. Love 
involves a particular emotional nexus that can best be 
described as the rich and multi-dimensional experi-
ence of arriving home, in a true home. Love in this way 
is eco-locational. Its memory lodges within the body as a 
3 What of psychoanalysis in the early twentieth century? The 
standard picture would make it the opposition to an Enlighten-
ment legacy through its construction of the concept of the uncon-
scious and the unconscious’s subversion of our claim to authority. 
So the story goes, our unconscious acts like the authority, whether 
we recognize it or not.
But this story is confused, on multiple grounds. First, the 
unconscious does not present itself as any authority. Rather, it 
throws the category of authority into question by suggesting we 
act on the basis of experiences that are so buried as to not even be 
considerations, let alone reasons. Still, this correction would only 
strengthen the anti-Enlightenment story, once revised. But, sec-
ond, what psychoanalysis classically understood does is to surface 
the unconscious as a cast of mind that, when one sees how it has 
set in, actually does have reasons. The surfacing not only brings 
these reasons out so that they first become reasons to us for the 
first time, but it also allows us to evaluate them. Seeing the rea-
sons we’ve acted on without previously taking them as reasons, we 
can now come to terms with our irrationality or have sympathy 
for the way we were being, in a strange way, rational. But such a 
process develops authority over our actual, not idealized, lives. So 
it only deepens the Enlightenment aim.
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counter-action against anxiety and fear that at the same 
time involves freedom without the pressure of confor-
mity. It is too rich for conformity; feeling loved loos-
ens the pressure of conformity as growth loosens past 
fixations. The issue is no longer about being normal or 
abnormal, but about being a person — and this gives one 
space to think and to be, to decide on norms that make 
sense. It is hard to break out of the adolescent cycle of 
the Enlightenment — one in which Foucault largely 
remained — but it can be done. Enlightenment — lower 
case “e” — is after all about growing up. It seeks a kind of 
maturity we have only anticipated.
Here, Kierkegaard surpassed current conceptions 
of body memory as a kind of practical capacity. Aca-
demics has for too long been focused on the relation 
between theory and practice, without considering the 
relation between person and person. The relation between 
people is neither merely theoretical nor merely practi-
cal, nor merely both. It isn’t enough to know lots about 
you or to know how to manipulate you to be your friend 
or even simply your fellow human being! The interper-
sonal space is neither objectifying nor calculative. And the 
question is how to understand this. Kierkegaard had a 
way. For him, more than anything, the body’s memory 
is a kind of relational, not simply practical, capacity. The 
body is interpersonal. In us is memory of me before or 
beside the authorized me, of you, before and beside the 
authorized you, of us, before and beside the authorized 
us, of unique persons. The pre-personal impulse to relate 
clears the way to reformulating relationships. He called 
this love’s ground. It was an original source to humane 
life. The body-memory of love challenges any norms held 
between us as to whether they rest in intimate atten-
tion to our uniqueness and support us in growth and in 
fulfillment. 
How can philosophical writing locate such an emo-
tional center in people — that is, help us locate ourselves 
outside norms in a space of personal consideration? 
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Perhaps we can simply say that Kierkegaard provoked. 
But what is provocation? Is it simply offense or debate 
as eighteenth century Aufklärers — even sometimes Rous-
seau — seemed to believe? Is that how we speak with each 
other? No: provocation is a mode of interpersonal address. 
It is something other than debate. That the Enlighten-
ment — capital “E” — did not understand this was its 
adolescent stance, and it is a stance that still grips intel-
lectual culture to such an extent that we cannot effec-
tively say we have left adolescent reactivity with it. I 
think of my graduate school, and I shudder.
Provocation employs what Jean-Louis Chrétien (1990) 
calls “the bare voice.” Writing from a position of inter-
personal address, Kierkegaard provoked his readers to 
relate to themselves as real people who matter, who have 
lives of their own and who deserve love. He located the 
clumsy vulnerability in seeking to relate — not to theo-
rize, not to manipulate the world to achieve our ends, 
but to find a home with others. The vulnerability was 
grounded in the body’s way of moving us beyond our 
consciousness through attachment to the people out-
side us who, though shaped normatively, are more real 
than norms and are centers of freedom who decide on 
norms. Here was a space introduced into history relation-
ally by way of making authority lose its sting and become 
responsible to humane reality.4 Humane reality is a rela-
tionship. I think of the times when all I wanted was 
for us to speak. There was no way to, however. Battles 
circulated everywhere in the space of your mind, and I 
could not address them without you feeling rejected by 
reasoning. The shame inside you was so intense. The 
emotions were trapped there, large and terrifying. Then 
you would flee or lash out, or try to fuse with someone —
approximating the memory of home, a home that you 
never had as an abused child. 
4 Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (1991).
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And here was I, afraid of conflict from my own child-
hood, and, in the beginning, too easily re-traumatized 
myself, wanting to fix everything, losing myself in the 
mess and then being frustrated and mad.
I believe Kierkegaard’s work of voicing expresses —
and indirectly indicates — a bodily intelligence that is 
thoroughly interpersonal. His doing so isn’t simply an 
attempt to bring emotion into thought, as a hackneyed 
Romantic interpretation would have it. It’s an attempt to 
show how the body is already interpersonal and in that 
relatedness, free. 
Landscape of you, of me before and beside me, of us, 
beside the authorized or scripted us, of the vibrant ten-
drils of the day in blue and water. There is a garden. It 
is outside history. Dust erodes the edges, the edges of 
categories blown into it. It isn’t heard or seen. Right 
now, it is soft as grass.
Trauma in a room of notes.
Growing up by using your own understanding 
It is worth circling back to what Kant wrote about 
enlightenment — lower case “e” — in order to see how 
Kierkegaard improved on it. Kant defines enlightenment 
as the exit from “self-incurred immaturity” (1996, 58). 
What is maturity, and how do Kierkegaard’s invocations 
continue and deepen it?5 
The thesis I am interested in is that maturity is a per-
sonal and interpersonal deepening. In other words, it is 
guided by relational reason more so than by theoretical 
5 On the overall emphasis of Kant’s work as work in growing up, 
see Susan Neiman, The Unity of Reason, Rereading Kant (1994, 5.v) 
and Why Grow Up? (2014). Neiman, who was a Rawls and Cavell stu-
dent, has understood well the personal dimension of both a sense 
of justice and the claim of reason. See especially her Moral Clarity: A 
Guide for Grown-up Idealists (2008).
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or practical reason, which fall in behind our personal 
growth. In other words, to become mature is to become 
more of a person, and in that a subject of beliefs and an 
agent of intentions all guided by personal understand-
ing. If this thesis is right, then it suggests that:
The primary area of enlightenment is actually in relation-
ships between people and in our self-relationships by which 
we collect ourselves around being a person. Thus, love — not 
objectifying or object-pursuing reason — is the center of 
human reason. 
These conclusions would align the Enlightenment virtue 
of humanity with love and relationship. Kierkegaard, I 
think, understood these points very well.
But did Kant? To answer this question, we’d need 
to begin by imagining what “self-incurred immatu-
rity” could be. Kant’s metaphor of being a “machine” 
helps (1996, 64). Kant contrasts maturity with the self-
incurred immaturity of people who let themselves be 
treated or seen as “machines.” It is an odd image, per-
haps characteristic of the mechanism of the age that saw 
the universe as a giant clock and animals as machines 
that make noise. What is at stake in claiming that we are 
more than machines? 
A machine is a tool that is constructed so as to carry 
out tasks for others. Mindless, it receives its program 
from without. It carries out the will of its user within the 
parameters of its capacity. For Kant, humans are more 
than machines, because we can judge for ourselves what 
we should do. To suppress this capacity when we have it 
is immature.
The body isn’t a machine. Machines dream of body-
machines, self-organizing, nano-technological complexi-
ties evolving as bodies do. Norms are machinic in so far 
as they limit the impulse of bodies. Bodies are impulses, 
machines are expulsions of swerve, anti-querian. Of 
course a machine could continue the impulse of bodies, 
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but then it would not be a machine. In the metaphor 
Kant used, we are already industrial. Our bodies allergic 
without knowing it, sifting to the side like sand, sprout-
ing as grass. 
To me, when you acted out of your abuse, you were 
never a machine. You were a weapon sent by your father 
and now focused through you in a repetition of a habit 
so traumatic you could not see that it was supplanting 
the possibility of home with the traumatized familiarity 
of a volatile space.
I repetitively responded, repeating my own familiar-
ity with a volatilized and traumatic environment. In 
Tarkovski’s Nostalghia, the poet/biographer tells a story 
while standing soaked & drunk in the ruin of the church 
of angels half submerged in water: 
“A man goes by another man who is stuck in the 
swamp, seemingly sinking. 
“He pulls the man out.
“‘You idiot!,’ cries the man. ‘I live there!’”
So Kant is underlining agency grounded in subjec-
tivity, the power to determine ourselves by what we 
believe without accepting a program from without. You 
can see how Foucault was developing just this thought. 
The entire critique of the normal is intended to open a 
space for subjectivity-grounded agency in this Kantian 
sense. But I think that Kant — and so Foucault — did 
not go far enough with the implications of rejecting 
a mechanical view of people. After all, the main way a 
person is not a machine is that a machine cannot love. 
And if what we called a machine did love, it would no 
longer be merely a machine — it would become a per-
sona. Machines qua machines and not persons lack the 
freedom of withholding themselves and the commit-
ment to grow together outside of what any program or use 
could expect. The heart of love is that it is not a program 
and is not a tool. Any relationship that is a program or 
merely a tool eventually breaks — as so many marriages 
do. Relationships require that we give ourselves to each 
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other and grow together, without a program and with-
out using the other person. These qualities are found 
in the body, even in the hug, the embrace and the body 
language that frees us up to be together and makes us 
feel that we have the space and even the impulse to be 
who we are and to risk growing. The minute a machine 
could show affection of this sort, it would become a 
persona.
The way I would like to put this, then, is that “imma-
turity” is a pattern of world adopted without it being per-
sonal to you, without it being loving and part of your love. 
Immaturity is not living in or seeking a true home. What you 
say you think and believe does not really make sense to 
you. What you feel does not feel loving to you. You walk 
about in a world of mysterious norms. You feel imper-
sonal or depersonalized. The norms program you and 
you basically just go along for the ride or submit. You 
are a machine. You are homeless inside yourself. Matu-
rity, by contrast, is fundamentally nostos6— seeking to 
make a home whenever we are alienated from one. I 
have felt this way — alienated from home — so often as 
an academic in conferences like this one where people 
are pushed through a compressed time and an anony-
mous space to listen to bits of theory and to consider 
some practical applications while relating to each other 
calculatively. Only my friends at conferences have kept 
the personal alive. It is weird how, after you & me, I see 
abuse everywhere now in our most normal institutions.
The point I am making is that maturity is deeply per-
sonal. This is the consequence of rejecting a mechanis-
tic view of each other. Being personal, maturity depends 
on the solitary and the social — in relations to oneself 
that collect one as a person and in interpersonal rela-
tionships that we have with each other and which, in 
6 The first part of nostalgia, which means literally the pain of 
home-seeking. Nostos is the home-seeking itself. Cf. Sarah Gridley, 
“Nostos poetics as eco-poetics” (2016).
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assuming a life of their own, give us the space to be 
and to grow. I call this a “home.” Kierkegaard would 
seem to be a leading enlightenment figure at this 
point.
There is more, though. Kant puts the cause of self-
incurred immaturity in “laziness or cowardice” — in lack 
of guts (1996, 58). This leads me to wonder, what kind of 
courage is called for when we become persons? What is 
the courage proper to loving? A piece of driftwood set-
tles out along the lake not far from the garden split by a 
cloud and ruffling in cold light. I hold it in your hands 
and know that everything is clinging to it. My tremor is 
gone when you run your palm over smoothness. 
It is with this question that I turn to Kierkegaard. I 
think Kierkegaard understood what it is to be called 
to responsibility by being addressed as a person. He 
understood that the kind of courage required by love 
is the courage to show yourself and to give yourself. Both 
of which are really hard if you have been abused. Fifty-
nine years after Kant wrote “What is enlightenment?,” 
Kierkegaard’s first pseudonymous work ended with the 
following:
Ask yourself and keep on asking until you find the answer. 
For you may have known something many times, acknowl-
edged it; may have willed something many times, attempted 
it — still. Only the deep inner motion, only your heart’s 
indescribable emotion, only that will show you that some-
thing actually makes sense to you. Then no force can take 
that from you. Only the truth that grows with you is truth 
to you.7
This famous passage assumes a wide space around an 
unsettled understanding, a missing authority, the deci-
sion to find it oneself. Addressing the reader’s body, 
7  Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, (1988, v. 2, 354). Modification of 
the translation mine. 
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the passage validates that what moves emotionally up 
through the reader’s chest is where her understanding 
begins. In so doing, the passage assumes the lineaments 
of Kantian enlightenment: it underlines our own capac-
ity for sense-finding — our “own authority” — in leaving 
sway an emotional movement traversing the charged 
fear and anxiety of “cowardliness.” The body-mind is 
responsible, and the body-mind helps the reader claim 
the authority of her own coming-to-find-sense. So she 
claims her capacity to grow. 
But even more so, this passage shows intra-personally 
what is needed for growing inter-personally. Kierkeg-
aard’s summons addresses a reader and asks her to be 
open with herself about what she is feeling and to give 
herself the chance to be a person who has feelings and a 
view of her own. It is a credibly generous passage in this 
way — it gives the reader her own credence. The cour-
age it thereby summons is the courage to be yourself by 
acknowledging your own personal outlook on life and the 
relationships in which you find yourself. It intuitively 
sidesteps the conformity of the normal to ask the reader 
to have the heart — even more than the guts — to feel for 
herself what makes her exist in a space where growth 
occurs, a home. Kierkegaard has shifted the discourse 
of the will — of guts — to the discourse of relationship —
of the heart. And so the courage he invokes is the cour-
age to give yourself as a whole person to a process both 
with yourself and, presumably, in your interpersonal life 
with others. It’s hard. This seems obviously more mature 
than the connotations to what Kant suggested, which 
were adolescent. Yet it doesn’t reject them — it deepens 
and develops them. Adulthood doesn’t repress adoles-
cence — it gives it consistency and care.
Sometimes I feel as an academic that no one talks 
with me in my university or at this conference in air-
plane hanger style rooms of personless rows and dreary 
lights. We rush around with our work, focused in indus-
trial theory. Can we think of ourselves as persons here? 
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My heart shrivels when I enter this place, it turns into a 




Why did I lose you so many years ago? Why have I 
always been off track in relationships? The fog of my 
metaphors mirrors my depersonalization. I wasn’t look-
ing for a person, or seeing if I were addressed as one. 
There is a strange way in which I haven’t been showing 
myself, foremost to myself. This fear, it lives in the body 
like the echo off a metal table. Ting
You see, what I think is important in Kierkegaard’s 
address is its imaginative indication of an interpersonal 
address. This address does the work of awakening. It 
summons openness, prompts courage. Its effusiveness 
is giving — sentimental, yes, but also giving. It reminds 
us of a kind of intimacy that solicits our surfacing and 
showing our face. Kierkegaard’s authorial voice figures 
a scene in which someone is speaking directly to you, 
meeting you as a person. This formal dimension of the 
rhetoric is actually the crucial philosophical point. To 
use our own understanding, we must be awake to it, and 
to be awake to it, we must feel that we are persons, and 
to feel that we are persons depends on others speaking 
to us as persons, wanting us to be. Kant did not grasp this 
relational condition of enlightenment, I would say, the 
way enlightenment depends on community by way of its 
dependence on loving relationships, that is, a situation 
in which we are at home.
But before Kierkegaard, Rousseau almost did. One 
thing that is distinctive about Kierkegaard’s work is 
the way the body is always already interpersonal, or 
more technically, open to relational reasons. Rousseau 
glimpsed this point in his concept of compassion, but the 
interpersonal dimension of it is not focused except in the 
way Rousseau thinks of the voice of conscience. Because 
conscience is both a form of consciousness grounded in 
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the address and primarily bodily and emotive, Rousseau 
is very close to Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s interpersonal 
body-mind seems prefigured in the understanding of 
conscience developed in Rousseau’s Émile in the Profes-
sion of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar.8 Reason, the Vicar says, 
knows the good; only conscience loves it (Rousseau 1978, 
290). Conscience is “the voice” and “the instinct” of the 
soul (286). Its acts “are not judgments but sentiments” 
(290). What these sentiments do is to express the place 
where, addressing oneself, the soul cares, where our 
being is at stake to us, despite how norms might claim us 
otherwise. Conscience calls us to decide on norms them-
selves, decide on decision, so to speak. In this way, it is 
personalizing. Even more, though, conscience speaks in 
a way that is loving. And it is this point that Kierkegaard 
develops. Kant, by contrast, picked up on the subjectiv-
ity inside Rousseauian conscience. But that subjectivity 
is weirdly impersonal without the loving voice.
What is interesting, too, is that Rousseau was inter-
preting ancient Stoic οἰκείωσις: every living being’s dis-
position to care for itself.9 Our being is shot through 
with care for our being, despite the pressure to be nor-
mal. Yet what is human being when we care for ourselves 
truly and deeply? It is becoming and being a person. As 
Theodore Zeldin (1994) has shown, humanity’s history is 
increasingly intimate. Accordingky, οἰκείωσις in the case 
of humans should be understood through the logic of 
being a person, and that means through interpersonal 
relationships. 
In this way, we might say that being a person is prior 
to being normal, even though norms construct the way 
8 It is an interesting coincidence that the minister who writes 
the “closing words” of Either/Or examined here was said to be a 
religious man from an isolated country place—just as the vicar is 
said to be.
9 See Jeremy Bendik-Keymer, Conscience and Humanity (2002), 
chapter 2, “Rousseauian Conscience”, 44. 
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of life of people. The personal space around norms keeps 
them human. Foucault’s “critical attitude” might better be 
described as a loving one, something Lynne Huffer has 
suggested.10 By addressing his readers, Kierkegaard was 
using interpersonal connection to awaken the distinctly 
human οἰκείωσις of people. By stirring the person in each 
of us, he was throwing a wrench into the machine. 
στέρνον, a storm in wondrous hunger
I have pointed to the body of Kierkegaard’s text already —
the way its form of writing manifests and works his 
point, summoning in the form of its address the enlight-
enment — lower case “e” — he understands personally. I 
think it is interesting how focused this formal dimen-
sion of Kierkegaard’s writing is. It actually points to — or 
reaches towards — a location in the human body, where 
relational emotions — including anxiety — are commonly 
felt. It is important to me to state that this dimension of 
Kierkegaard’s writing is not as conceptually focused as 
other parts — I can imagine human beings who empiri-
cally differ from the descriptions Kierkegaard suggests. 
Yet for all that, there appears to be widespread shared 
experiences of what Kierkegaard does suggest about 
bodily experience. Sorting out these matters would take 
a different study.
For the relational matters Kierkegaard addresses, where 
does his writing point in the body? Kierkegaard says 
10 Lynne Huffer, Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of 
Queer Theory (2010). Huffer’s emphasis, however, is on eros. Eros is 
too ambiguous relationally, however. It was conceptualized often in 
the tradition as a part of practical reason—of seeking some desir-
able. Relationships, however, do not admit of such objectification. 
They are interpersonal. Huffer has issues with the notion of the 
person, but I do not think she has been working with a relational 
understanding of the person. In fact, her lovely book, written so 
personally, suggests that she would value it.
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that the “heart” is the place in the body where the rela-
tional logic he espouses resides. His is a metaphor, but it 
is also localized. We thump the chest, and in particular, 
the sternum to symbolize the heart with a gesture. Com-
monly, the biological heart quickens or breath increases 
or constricts as we near an avowal or a confession — the 
most personal matters. It is common to tell that some-
one matters in an especially personal way by the feeling 
the person leaves in one’s chest, not of fear or of agita-
tion, but of excitement and longing. And this place in the 
body is felt cross-culturally to be significant. The psycho-
analyst and phenomenologist Luce Irigaray also noticed 
this in her own work on relationships.11 There appears to 
be something in the human nervous system where the 
anxiety of connection tarries in the chest, or sternum. In 
what follows, I will claim that localizing this embodied 
center of connection — let us call it, of “relational rea-
son” — helps one locate normative and relational drift. 
“Drift” is the name I give to the garden. 
A long time ago, I used to walk in Chicago for most 
of the day, setting out from the Loop and going in any 
direction that felt right into the North Side, turning 
down smaller streets I hadn’t seen before, sitting for a 
cup of coffee in the light, almost anonymous, sometimes 
writing notes as I went, walking down the long diagonal 
streets while the sun reflected off the windows of shops I 
could not afford, seeing women who were attractive and 
imagining what it would have been to have a normal 
life where I worked a job and we were married and one 
day would have kids, thinking how my twenties were so 
strange as a graduate student (whereas people I’d known 
in college who went on into business were looking like 
adults), eating a sandwich, thinking too much about 
some corner of an idea in Rousseau, or action theory, 
11 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You: Sketch of a Possible Felicity in History 
(1995), esp. ch. 1. Cf. for instance in South Asia, the sternum is one 
of the seven chakras. 
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or phenomenology, walking more; finally, slowing down, 
I was too tired, took a train back, tucked into 53rd & 
Kimbark & collapsed into sleep later.
What interests me about Kierkegaard’s address to the 
heart is the way the address helps move the reader actu-
ally to engage with the emotional content of her life. 
Which content? Her discontent with being a person. I 
call this discontent “drift” — for its phenomenological 
and conceptual connotations regarding the problematic 
of enlightenment — lower case “e” — I have been explor-
ing. Drifting is the main quality of this relational cen-
ter pulsating in anxiety, excitement or longing to throw 
the normal into disarray in my mind, displacing me to 
regroup around what I feel makes sense to me as a per-
son — as if, in the moment, I am coalescing as a person 
for the first time. Drifting leads me to begin to sense the 
conditions of my senselessness, that is, the senselessness of 
the normal here at this moment in this place and time. I 
didn’t think of it this way at the time; the academy was 
so impersonal. It normalized my alienation from myself. 
But then it was not set up to help me see trauma. When 
you grow up with trauma, trauma seems normal. Then 
so much else that should make us profoundly discon-
tented and which we should want to reject personally 
becomes something we simply put up with unreflectively. 
I could not feel my fear and how much I hated being 
afraid for much of my adult life. In everyday language, 
drifting shows me that I am not at home in such a pro-
found sense that I feel that I am dispersed or lost as a 
person, at times even that I haven’t yet been a person or 
feel that I cannot be a person under the conditions from 
which I’ve drifted. So — and this is the crucial point —
drifting’s emotional content actually involves personal 
dignity as an experience, an experience in which we 
want to collect ourselves in our own person or show up 
as a person with others. As I’ve said, the heart is about 
openness, and the way to openness is errant and abnor-
mal in its quality.
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What I like about this area in Kierkegaard’s work is 
the way he links a conceptually necessary thing with a 
phenomenal experience that he actually tries to help his 
reader experience. Think about it. There needs to be a 
name for the emotional and personal zone that pre-
cedes collecting oneself personally. In this zone, we lose 
being gripped automatically by norms that can come 
under question but which at the same time structure our 
sense of what is possible. This zone is no longer unre-
flectively conformist, but it is not yet personal. It is pre-
personal, eerie, unsettled, strangely exciting, expectant 
but unknowing, and many other blended emotions that 
circle around not being at home with oneself. This zone 
might appear suddenly or slowly. It might erupt in an 
anxiety attack or manifest itself over days of building 
aimlessness. It may appear in an elated feeling that you 
are not yourself, or perhaps even in wonder. There are 
many different ways for drift to appear. What matters is 
that we see it as a logical zone between conformity and 
collecting oneself personally.
Moreover, this zone has to be opened up for us to see 
how it is there. When we go about our normal lives, we 
don’t consider that we could be lost as persons. To do so 
would be to risk losing oneself. Yet without experiencing 
such a loss as a possibility, we cannot be free to decide 
on what we think is truly fulfilling. We stay lodged in the 
normal, perhaps fearing or pushing away the extent to 
which we — or important things in our life — are abnor-
mal, unfulfilling, unloving.
Drift comes only from a relational capacity in which 
our entire person is at stake as it really only is in love. 
This was Kierkegaard’s insight. The embodied expres-
sion of its zone is a kind of storm-field in the chest. What 
builds in the sternum is the need to communicate or to 
relate. The key to the personal is being inscribed within 




I’ve done everything I can, and I can’t do more. I am 
listening to my body. The minute I said I could keep 
working on it, anxiety ran through me like a nova. I 
slept on it. I hoped it would go away. But it got stronger 
and stronger, until my limbs were filled with electric-
ity, pouring out into the air around me in my apartment 
and my mind would not rest. My body told me. My body 
remembered.
A car flipping over and over on a bare and blinding 
road miraculously lands in a swamp on all four wheels.
I torn free of the rule
 spoken with, as a person ,ضمير
Kierkegaard’s summoning thereby goes beyond a focus 
on courage in Kant’s sense. Kant is still too focused on 
will, but the key to having a mind of one’s own is being 
free as a person. Accordingly, the relational needs to be 
addressed, not the practical. To be one’s own person 
is not simply — or even really — a matter of guts. It is 
rather a matter of being free to be oneself with others 
and with oneself. This is the basic experience and condi-
tion of love. Kierkegaard does not upbraid or cheer on 
his readers; he addresses them, and his way of speaking 
shows that he imagines himself caring for his reader 
as a person who deserves love and in so being seen is 
respected at the most basic point as a human being with 
dignity.12 I am interested in this address, especially as 
it clears our drift and, having been experienced in our 
bodies, clears into a realization about our becoming and 
12 See the Latin provocare: to challenge forth by way of a call.
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being a person. I am interested in what it is for us to 
actually talk with each other as adults.
The address comes from the possibility of home, from 
whatever habit or hope of free and genuine community 
we have inside us. I am thinking of Tarkovski’s Зеркало, 
of the mother running down to fix the imagined, mis-
taken word during her time in the printing press under 
Stalin. Rain is everywhere, emotions colliding. She did 
not have a community until her friends heard her word. 
But trauma interrupted even that. 
The way I want to approach this topic is through the 
perhaps odd — in this context — topic of conscience. It 
strikes me that, even more than in the case of heroic 
anti-authoritarian Enlightenment subjectivity, con-
science matters in the quiet, interpersonal realms of 
daily life when we are mature enough to actually speak 
with each other as people. What draws on our con-
sciences — our responsibility for who we are?13 Isn’t it 
being addressed as a full human being, as a person? I 
am speaking of the form here, regardless of what calls us 
out (call that the “content”). The form has the structure 
of a voice speaking with us as a person.14 My thesis at 
this point is that Kierkegaard’s formal innovations try to 
express, and so invoke, the adult scene between two peo-
ple where they actually speak with each other as whole 
13 It is common for people who have struggled with conscience 
to report how when they side with their consciences and commit 
to what makes sense to them, personally, they feel a great release, a 
calm, and a renewed clarity. They feel at home in the world. These 
feelings, moreover, coincide with a sense of enlightenment. In 
the calm following conscience, we are empowered to use our own 
understanding. After all, we just have, and in a kind of crisis. So 
the activation of conscience is the crucial scene of enlightenment, 
and to be an Aufklärer is to be conscientiously abnormal. We can 
search for home by using our own understanding. But the process 
begins in drift. Cf. David Shulman, “Non-saintly integrity in the 
South Hebron hills” (2014).
14 Cf. Jean-Louis Chretien, L’appel et la reponse (1992); Jean-Luc 
Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness (2002, 287). 
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human beings, that is, as persons. And the result is that, 
in being addressed as a person, we open our consciences 
to being stirred.
Here is a typical invocation to the reader at the begin-
ning of Kierkegaard’s most conscientious texts:
[My book’s] finally met that singular one . . . my reader. . . . It 
stretches out its arms. . . . 15
Of course, this is funny. But in the form of this address, 
there is a memory of grown-up speech. Giving-talk, you 
might say. Kierkegaard is modeling the form of relation-
ship. Kierkegaard reminds his readers of a form of life 
in which they are at home, because the elementary rela-
tionship in it is loving. To people keeping anxiety down 
in a depersonalized existence, he holds out the possibil-
ity of becoming again more of a person. 
Buber called this the “primary word.”16 He was talking 
about enlightenment — lower case “e” — very much in 
the Kantian sense. We might also call it plainly talking 
as adults with each other. It demands that you use your 
own understanding as you are necessarily exposed to 
another in your seeking to connect, your response to the 
call of a personal relationship with your own life as you 
become open to the presence of a person. That presence 
is intimated, or carried, in the bare form of the address. 
Address, which causes drift, works because it carries the 
15 Søren Kierkegaard, “Preface” to “Two Upbuilding Discourses” 
(1990). Translation modified.
16 Martin Buber, I and Thou (1999, 15ff). It is also interesting to 
note that Buber, who was steeped in the neo-Kantianism of the 
Marburg School, came up with this way of speaking of a word while 
his contemporary Mikael Bakhtin did too. Bakhtin’s most brilliant 
essay is called “The Word in Dostoevsky” (I have lost my photocopy, 
but I believe that it was a translation of Mikhail Bahktin, “Dis-
course in Dostoevsky” [1984], and Dostoevsky’s “word” functions 
very much like a primary dialogical relationship. Bakhtin was also 
schooled in a similar neo-Kantianism during the same period.
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primary word in its form — even more than speaking, we 
might say the address voices. 
The point here is that we can help each other be our-
selves as people by speaking personally to each other, 
that is, by talking with each other. This is an elementary, 
interpersonal form of “con-science” — “knowledge-with.” 
Or we can learn to listen to our personal consciences, 
which carries this form over in our lives, erupting 
through the moments where, built up, we have lost touch 
with ourselves as persons and come to a limit where 
what we thought made sense no longer does or where if 
we do not focus ourselves as persons, we will commit to 
something that compromises us.
Obviously, this hangs a lot of work on the form of com-
munication. But the Arabic word for conscience helps in 
addition to the Latin root that I have already mentioned. 
Arabic speakers have a name for communication from 
chest to chest: ضمير. It is translated as conscience. The Ara-
bic word is relational — it indicates a relation between 
one person and another, between oneself and God, or 
between oneself as struggling and oneself at home. And 
yes, this word is embodied in the sternum — from ster-
num to sternum. ضمير is often said with great earnest-
ness, which befits the sense of personal responsibility in 
it. It does not communicate anything of content except 
what its form displays: you are a person to me — be a per-
son. You count, and I do too. We are people, whole human 
beings. ضمير communicates the bare power of subjectiv-
ity, the “I can think” and does so through feeling, the “I 
can be.”17 The irony is that this is not egotistical. Quite 
the contrary: it opens up the space of a relationship in 
life, a sense of what could even make universal sense as 
a starting point.18
17 Cf. Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in 
Intellectual Emancipation (1991).
18 As in Kant’s categorical imperative. I do not have the space 
here to explain how this Kierkegaardian reading extends Kant’s 
point about sense from The Groundwork and The Critique of Judgment.
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Kierkegaard’s voice in the passage just read is not to be 
understood based on qualities it has — loud, soft, elegant, 
trite, cute, sharp, relevant, etc. Obviously, it is comically 
sentimental, too. Still, it’s the kind of voice it is because 
of what it does: it addresses the “single individual” 
(redundant as that expression is). That is its function 
or use. That’s its kind. Such a kind needn’t be said; it is 
always, however, shown. The most provocative signal of 
Kierkegaard’s voice is not in the said but in the saying —
in the repetitions, gaps, emphases, and silences.19 In the 
body language, the gesture, of the writing. In a kind of 
action that conveys the work of address. That work is not 
sentimental — it is basically moral and plainly humane.
What I have been trying to show you today is how this 
role of embodied, interpersonal address is just as much 
enlightenment — lower case “e” — as what Kant advo-
cated. Perhaps it is more. It is certainly more mature, 
having surpassed some of the adolescence that Kant felt 
he had to address and which Foucault refined two cen-
turies later. Communicating — the voicing of address —
is the kind of saying where one tries to connect with 
another, seeking the vibrant openness in her in which 
she comes alive as a person. In terms of this talk, it is a 
saying where the sayer tries to connect with the point in 
19 Consider the morally beautiful writing, under pseudonym, in 
Training/Practice in Christianity. This work stages a moral-religious 
drama through the precise repetitions of expressions, the escala-
tion of care in sudden “cuts” and in many other ways. Moreover, as 
Poole has shown in Kierkegaard, the Indirect Communication (1993), 
Training/Practice in Christianity is literally built with the architec-
ture of his Copenhagen readers’ main Lutheran church in mind. 
The work is both heart-breaking and love-provoking because of the 
extreme “materiality” of the writing. Truly reading it with one’s 
own search for a world beyond evil, the text manages to carry one’s 
conscience through a process that reawakens one’s idealism and 
illuminates renewed possibility for moral relationship.
Post-structuralists have learned from Kierkegaard on this 
writerly point as well—Derrida more than most, and also Jean-Luc 
Nancy, although sometimes to excess. See the latter’s The Birth to 
Presence (1993).
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the other where her engaged responsibility for her loca-
tion in the space of norms will emerge — where called, 
she will emerge out of the shadow of the normal and 
move out from drift by collecting herself in talk together 
or in conscience alone. This means that we must use 
emotional intelligence to feel out where the emotional 
field of the other is, and so too with ourselves. We have 
to mind the body’s surprisingly clear language of feeling.
Body language 
Perhaps we are not even talking about voicing or address 
anymore. Perhaps we’re rolling with body language. The 
entire body is the voice. Body’s vocal (χορός).
What I have been calling “voicing” refers to the inter-
personal dimension of a text that engages — hooks 
onto — the response of the reader in his ضمير. With ضمير, 
responsibility for the norms of my existence crystallizes 
around my speech. ضمير is the locus of care in speech —
the place where conscience emerges as a voice in our 
voices. Kierkegaard’s authorship (a) is a work in voicing 
and (b) is intended to locate ضمير in the reader. I think 
of this location as eco-locational, seeking the storm of 
vibrant space in another’s sternum that produces drift 
and nostos — the seach for home.
Voice has gotten a bad rap in the last half century. Influ-
enced by Derrida’s reading of Rousseau in Of Grammatol-
ogy (1976), some might want to explain Kierkegaard’s 
fascination and use of the spoken word — even indirectly 
in his pseudonyms’ theatrics — as neurotic nostalgia for 
self-presence that attempts to repress existence’s contin-
gency and our constitutional inability to be completely 
self-transparent. This interpretation would stress, for 
instance, how Kierkegaard repeatedly urged his readers 
to read aloud so that they might hear their own voices. 
The idea would be that hearing your own voice activates 
original presence, which itself serves to make up for the 
AS	A	PERSON	 143
contingency of meaning in speech. Voice then supple-
ments the diffusion or scattering of meaning. φωνή “sup-
plements” χορός.20 Even though one might not under-
stand what one reads completely and might not gather 
the intention of the author, one still auto-stimulates21 
oneself as a giver and receiver of meaning. According 
to this line of criticism, the problem is that such auto-
stimulated meaning — much like Rousseau’s famous 
“supplement”2 2— is empty. It’s the mere form of subjec-
tivity without object. And hence it isn’t even subjectiv-
ity. And hence Kierkegaardian voicing cannot work to 
obtain meaning at all. Meaning is not obtained. In fact, 
Kierkegaardian voicing covers over the mystery of mean-
ing. We mean things only with others and only by being 
subjected to the grace or tragedy of meaning in our con-
tingent existences. 
But when one reads aloud, one does not read to hear 
oneself read. One reads to capture the gesture or act of 
the reading. This act helps locate one in reflection, just 
as both seeing and hearing the words do. There are two 
processing systems working together. They help one tri-
angulate the content of the writing — not fix it with cer-
tainty. Better located, one is slowed down to think more 
carefully, opened up to the context that comes with act-
ing an imagined role (the “script,” so to speak, of this 
other), and one is better able to stop and go at the speed 
and ability of one’s own understanding. In short, read-
ing aloud is part of the act of understanding. And as a 
means to that end, it is a form of response — not an auto-
stimulation. Its goal is not certainty or “self-presence,” 
20 “Phonos” is ancient Greek for “voice” and “logos” is Greek 
for “reason”, “understanding” or “speech”. Derrida makes much of 
Rousseau’s use of the word “supplement.”
21 See Michel Henry, Phénoménologie matérielle (1990).
22 Derrida explores Rousseau’s famous onanism as supplement: 
the suggestion is that Rousseau’s text itself is plagued by a con-
stitutional ideological onanism. But why is masturbation empty? 
Derrida is oddly conservative here—and disembodied.
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but engagement with the “outside” which is most sim-
ply expressed in my dealing with a text that was writ-
ten by another: me (the object, not the subject!). There is 
body language in reading out loud, a body language that 
reminds us that we are not alone in the world, not even 
with ourselves.
On the other hand, what is true about the Derridian-
inspired criticism is that speaking out loud does activate 
oneself as a being in time who cares and has a presence. 
Doing so is an extremely basic way of feeling what Rous-
seau called “the sentiment of one’s own existence.”23 But 
it is precisely such a sentiment enabling conscience to 
speak: the circuit of simple responding to the text helps 
build up emotion through body language, i.e., the sim-
ple body language of speaking out loud, of hearing the 
words as they pass through one’s mouth. This is the 
most basic affection of words — the trace of a human 
community of bodies, not of propositions. In this pull 
of words that are embodied again, one carries over the 
body memory of words spoken between people. Reading 
aloud therefore drifts toward — not self-presence but —
reaching out into the space in common where care lives 
between people by virtue of the common being held open 
at all.24 Voicing therefore embodies you in the space of 
care — this vibrant spacing that emerges from the chest 
just as the voice actually does. Yes, this is purely formal, 
23 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of the Solitary Walker 
(1998, 5th walk).
24 See Rousseau, Emile (1978, 291) for a hint. The full argu-
ment would take too long to work out here. It goes like this: con-
science speaks for amour de soi-meme most basically (an amour de soi 
expanded with pitié). The sentiment of existence is a first expres-
sion and condition of a truly functioning amour de soi. Conscience 
therefore speaks out of the sentiment of existence, “the silence of 
the passions”—this being echoed in the entire phenomenology 
of conscience on 291 and also in the Second Discourse discussion 
of “the voice of nature.” See also Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative 
Community (1991), especially “L’amour en éclats” (“shattered love; 
bursts of love”).
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but it is extremely important to a view of humanity that 
includes persons in the space of norms — singularities 
who organize our communication not semantically but 
in primary words, that is, in relationships where norms 
become human rather than abstract to people’s real lives 
and where everyone has the power to understand in her 
own way.25 
So voicing is none other than a kind of body language. 
Here, I am shaking off an overly disembodied view of 
voice, namely, one that sees (not hears) voice as part of 
a narcissistic circuit bound up in a metaphysical pathol-
ogy, as Derrida did in reading certain moments in the 
philosophical tradition to bring out their narcissism. But 
body is significant and significance is embodied. So, too 
with voice. 
Voicing is an extremely basic form of responsibility for 
the human kind of life lived in the space of what is mean-
ingful to us personally and together. It is an activation of 
conscience within a context of communication. And this 
activation of conscience is tantamount to entering into 
one’s own process of maturing, as we have previously 
seen. Kierkegaardian selves become only with others.26 
That is the deep and mature enlightenment point —
lower case “e.” To the very stuff of the often abstract 
and always anti-authoritarian debates that the late eigh-
teenth century considered Enlightenment — upper case 
25 See Haagi Kenaan, The Present Personal: Philosophy and the Hid-
den Face of Language (2005). Also consider Emmanuel Levinas, Oth-
erwise than Being or Beyond Essance (1997). Reading the prospectus 
of Kenaan’s book really “clicked” with this point about persons 
for me. As his commentator Karsten Harries writes, “Of course we 
experience persons. But the seeming obviousness of this fact loses 
sight of a problem that has shadowed our all too often inhumane 
age. Kenaan succeeds in showing how such blindness is tied to a 
widely accepted understanding of language and reality.” See the 
book’s dust jacket back cover.
26 Anne-Christine Habbard (2002, 165–87). See also Michael 
Holquist (1990).
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“E-” it adds a register of personal intimacy and genuine, 
interpersonal relationships. What others do for us in 
plainly addressing us is to stir our own coming to terms 
with ourselves. 
The Kierkegaardian idea is that your enlighten-
ment — lower case “e” — begins when and only when 
your responsibility for the norms of your existence crys-
tallizes around your affection in the vibrant space of an 
anxiety provoked — or remembered — through the bare 
form of community. In this philosophy, you become a 
person out of love which, unsentimentally and not-at-all 
romantically, is perhaps best found in plain talk with each 
other. 
Plain talk 
So I conclude. This is a conference on Kierkegaard’s 
journals, his way of marking time. The question I just 
touched on about how a solitary voice relates to itself is 
therefore redoubled. Yet Kierkegaard wrote his journals 
aware that they could be read by others. What place did 
Kierkegaard’s journals have in his everyday life? 
It is possible that the journals manifested a form of 
what Foucault calls “the self’s relation to itself,” a form 
of “writing the self” that allowed Kierkegaard the human 
being to embody his words enough to be at home within 
his conscience. Being thus a person, he would strengthen 
his capacity to be in relationships with others. 
Yet encouraged by Roger Poole’s (1991) study of 
Kierkegaard, I think it isn’t irrelevant also to imag-
ine a man of flesh and blood,27 Søren Kierkegaard, who 
wrote at night ascetically, who wrote each manuscript 
three times and then spoke it out loud, each time, as he 
went — word by word — who spent a significant portion 
27 See Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and 
Nations (1978, chapter 1).
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of his days out in the streets walking and talking with 
the many people whom he knew. He was many-sided: 
loafer, neurotic, judgmental jerk, comic, sad — even des-
perate — man hidden behind philosophy and genteel 
manners, devout soul; brilliant wit, writer, and thinker; 
well-meaning person, hetero-normative male inflected 
by patriarchy, good friend, loving family member by all 
reports, rebel vis-à-vis the Danish State Lutheran Church.
Well, this man also kept a journal. There are bodily 
and soulful practices for someone dealing with trauma 
as well as for someone living a philosophical life. There 
are everyday and plain forms of enlightenment — lower 
case “e” — that continue the wish of the Enlightenment —
upper case “E.” Far from being mainly a technique du soi 
in the service of critique, to echo Foucault,28 journaling 
was daily work in becoming a person. It was a prolegom-
ena for a more humane reality. People grow up by learn-
ing to speak to themselves and by learning to speak with 
each other. 
28 See Foucault (1996a, 1996b, 2012). See also Charles Larmore 
Les Pratiques du Moi (2004), winner of the Grand Prix de l’Academie 
Francaise for philosophy, 2004. These studies could provide a very 
useful starting point for a comparison between S.K.’s journaling 
and ancient philosophical practices of memory and “self-writing.” 
Such a comparison would allow one to further develop the “ace-
tic” moment in Kierkegaard: the forms of training by which he 
“subjected” himself to the demands of enlightenment and the com-






















in bed with wooden posts




      &
       their shadow
a door, the hall, it closed, lines
            of light
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There was a long hedgerow by the road.
In summer, I would crawl inside
especially when the shadows were long.




There is an orchard in the mind
      beneath the mind!
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I grew up in Aurora, Ithaca, and New Hartford, New York. 
Every school day, my dad and I walked down Cascadilla 
Gorge trail. I went to school in the basement of the stone 
church at the bottom of the hill. Before arriving, water 
flowed over green algae and burst into white off ledges. 
(The sound of the water was everywhere!)
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 Within most forests breathe forgotten things.
Formless and transparent, filled with restlessness,
they flood surrounding static with their song,
 then are gone. 
   Even the loudest justice
quivers beneath the sound that shakes its instance.
 In the still undercurrent,   luminos ity
Breaks in to  frag ments    of     mul tic olored      g las s
the animals, even, shiver with longing.
If the deep rock caverns,
the sunfall,
the algae covered light
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Often, later, I remembered what she’d told him,
like the secrets grown inside their hands
or the days begun without a word but fingers crossed.
In the night air, when stillness tells the world there’s 
still life 
inside the quiet, we hear the city coming together
like the bar I went to last weekend, singing,
or the stadium shouting out the match, 
and the families, even, more beautiful than loneliness.
If I occlude the hour, shift sideways, 
or smile instead of words,
it’s only that a subway moving underground










and how do I
become a person
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Sometimes, at daybreak, the light tunnels were endless.
Reaching through the courtyard, true, they woke
large starlings in the upper reaches of his dream.
These populated wells along old interstates and spoke
a thousand languages ancient pathways broach.
At night, I would undo the marks the evening’s walk-
ways make.
Like a sand-erased shore, a firmament, I talked
aloud in my sleep to the emptiness. Never
ever it was there without me, the open life.
And inside the forgetful hours, new substance broke
up far along the stone-blocked lake
where people rode bicycles and ate cold ice cream in the 
dark.
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 I stepped from the curb into moonlight
and heard suddenly the streets awake
of white winged moths.
like you they flew 




Busses outside roar past
this cold, November day.
Antoine’s coffee on the stove steams.
I heard words on
the steps, then in the courtyard.
I feel the time
in the city.
We become a silver sky.
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The riots broke out while I was there.
You never know when you are in a plane.
Abu Dhabi is beautiful, because it is calm,
different passengers think.
Typical to modernity, nothing fits.
A steward in the bathroom lost his wits.
Some are praying. Others passing time.
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a dress of roses
when we talked
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the world is made of maggots,
Aurelius.
Through air, clouds and time:
I walked.
sudden glare 
yellow slope  brick walls
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I was climbing up a hall that went in turns, wide 
and ample,
toward the hillside’s plateau, 
halls like galleries slung from Russian Ark, 
but in some cathedral
with spots of rain soaking through 
in stains along
the ceiling and faded carpet stretched within
     the ascending stone.
   And only one woman praying at the top,
    an upper balcony, the church seen in
     fragments below.
 Then another woman, more solitary, far, also
   deep in consolation,
    “God” both with her and away.
The first showed me the direction to depart 
the church atop the Heights,
and 
I did. It was
grey outside, typical French weather in Normandy. 
The outer plaza was abandoned 
and rose in waves of stone-made hills.
I walked among them and awoke.
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Sometime later, I wondered where 
my thoughts had gone. It was early morning,
with the dog beside me leaning on my leg and pressed
into the arm of the upholstered chair. I felt 
that there was too much time and
there were too many broken things. I felt 
that I had wasted out.
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The porch was made of splintered talk.
Like age, it had become a place for people to 
remember
the event that is the sprawling finitude of our lives and 
even
of the truths, words, systems we 
take to be everything that is and couldn’t
be!
We sat there for a while in the sun.
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Take me to a time that has become unreal.
Late adolescence will do when in my 20s
I imagined I was near adulthood
and all my closest friendships carried the glow of 
completeness.
It was like this to be alive and free
enjoying the outer skin of intimacy, 
but we were not even brothers to ourselves 
at least in talking,
where our conversations were so limited
 in terms of our sense of our fears
and of our needs.
I want to place these chapters inside a book. 
A book about becoming unlike
so many that pass for philosophy 




When “great philosophies” are first perceived, 
their systems (or un-systems) are like clouds,
apprehended in the air momentarily as aesthetics. 
And that begins to mean
as perceptions only, while their joints of bodies 
and of acts go largely
underthought. People
everywhere underplay
the seriousness of the everyday 
 when a festival comes to town
  in every bookstore.
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My creed, of course, is that the ordinary is not a fantasy. 
Common sense with luck.
When the broad scale’s laid out, we find eddies 
of agreement in scars,
also pulsing, distant stars. A map that dissolves 
makes our hands involve other people’s 
memories of times
we’ve never touched or nowhere go.
People are there in the absence. What we call 
“language,” “society,” “self”
is upsurging, slowly collecting vomit and squirt of 
stuff — all meta-
physical
gestures called “names” which do not name 
or mark or tell, 
but
daily meditation. Open a space within the well.




And then the solidity sways. 
We come back into the worn comfort.
Say, “I love.” “You.” “Come
home.”
These freed from Philosophies capital “P” are zones of 
reference. Are
humilities,
ironies that put all concepts off. The way of the plain
tethers which moral sense is close to it, 
       quivering. 
The bend of things is made of leaning.
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But we are also aching and most as we go along. We 
come upon it after the fact.
Our bodies do fool up and throughout. 
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This time, it was an auditorium inside a club for faculty 
and graduate students.
Part athletic center, concert hall, every space was near 
blacked out.
People moved through the dark around 
what few lamps there were —
emergent, — or emergency? — lights . . .
One of my old advisors was there talking vociferously 
about how to manage a charitable board
in transit with a British colleague with whom 
he — cheerfully — disagreed.
At stake was a philosophy of philanthropy. 
Should I have told him 
that we are headed toward the “post-human”?
I went through corridors with shifting students, adult, 
pressed in that half-made mode
we call “bright tutelage.” It was
a veritable sampling of the books to come. 
The lockers
sweating with steam and the dormers half asleep  
in the hall with a toothbrush.
I climbed toward an auditorium again high up 
inside a balcony.
More people were there this time but still the stage was 
dark.
It was a carnival inside, a very mellow party of  
subdued talk, but you
could feel the anarchic excitement  
in low, focused tones.
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Time is on my side, and so I dig my own grave.
This is the kind of view that can get you loaded.
But the question is
with what? My poetry
is no alcohol, zone
of my flesh.
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Later, we talked about marriage in the fading, winter 
noon.
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The final time, I was in a synagogue, largest in the city,
full-up with people who talked in different groups 
among many levels of seats,
the balconies staggered, shuffled, pillars blocking views, 
but multitudes of possibilities
presented themselves each in side- 
conversation.
 
I lost my friends as we found our places. I suppose 
that happens
when we all grow up. But there were others  
in the rows next over curious about 
my leanings. And I remember feeling nervous  
that I would be found to be
unchosen.
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The shifting weight of self is unforgiving when  
understanding is needed of
a sort.
It swings effortlessly from the limbs of mind, 
but there beneath the intellect, the orchard  
inside the roots and in the soils, 
shifting life. I shush in the dark, between lights.
My mouth is underliving. It dismembers things  
before I think them.
Saltines or Somerset, Cadavar, or colospecnic. 
I’ve been reading journals —
the odd quarterly touted for its sound and sense.
City made of scrape.
But the day is mild in seven-o’clock sun. 
       It’s
better to be unmade by the lime-green hush of the 
forest.
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The climb was made not knowing  
that the divine is clown.
No, I am not better. 
 
In Syracuse, New York, the literary mind 
is wounds not
tops on cherries sinking lower into cream.
176	 I 	CARRIED	MY	TEETH
Finite mercy loves the dark. 
& I run uphill in a memory along a street
nothing more than youth and nowhere the either side  
of which is heaven.
 
Where’s comfort?
This place that’s ever moving — a shifting mark.
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I was sitting on our couch at 616 DeMong. 
An early hour.









a bare and blinded road by
headless sun
 . . .       steerless, he   swerve d        & 
the swamp’s smell sifted through the chassis







There was a valley beneath the emptiness.
It lay round and cool as night fell in purple time.
Neighboring houses had clapboard sides
when she froze. The golf range hadn’t been built. 
There 1800 feet compacted inside green paint
while outside, a big tree.
The wind, whine of appliance
HE







Forty years hence, her head still struck concrete.
In the evening,
she’d tense each day at that time.
                 *  *





I love the atmosphere higher than the lights of the city.
It’s warm with the sound of rain
straining the universe to consider
the gamma rays of iniquity.
What small portion of the problem
can we consider in our rooms? But
the warm, red memory of the origin
pulses inside my mind
and fills my body with time —
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When I let go of the bad,
it is good.
When I remember the winter,
it is slight.
Tell me where the cars are sliding past values,
and I will think about how we can listen.
There is not much to be said about categories;
they keep us from what is unique,
but they protect the unconditioned.
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Forest person, wood-lined in the cabin of your 
thoughts,
do you remember the body you used to share?
High along the altitudes where the ice caps break
small fissures design figures of a coming life.
You anchor your teeth in night,
sing flat melodies in a soothing voice,
child of age, 
finite circle,
strife’s disappearance from the stars.
& “we” was well invented, we 
were faded mosses along the rocks & lichened shores, 
wave-ended, froth begun.
Please do not tell me that in a certain “our” inside the 
hourless space of dark
you don’t reach upward and inward at once
like an arborescent shell beneath the canopies of pines.
The tedium we carry in our daily habit of rest
evaporates like birds that seek new climes —
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Monday, January 11, 2010 
Earth thought 1 of 365: I am enmeshed, although I act 
like I am not. I live in a context.
2: My actions are inconsequential while their patterns 
are not. 
3: Holocene Earth gave me a chance. Do I deserve it? This 
sounds harsh. But I have a job. I earn it.
4: I used to see the sky, a vast silver glacier of light not 
unlike a heaven. Now it has changed in my mind: it con-
tinues us, is in part our effect. Vast, slow moving, long 
lasting. 
5: We well-meaning people and our horrible conse-
quences. There’s a gap.
6: I read about Palestine (Abunimah 2009), that gross 
injustice. I pattern it out to a much more insecure world. 
Why do we build walls? I have to stop the sea-level rise in 
my anxiety.
7: It’s foul out. But even foul weather is livable. It’s foul 
inside me. I become disillusioned.
8: In academic philosophy, “Who am I?” has been asked 
for thousands of years without starting from our ecology.
9: She tattooed Argus Pheasant displaying (Attenborough 
1979) along and across her back.
10: Holocene Earth says goodbye.
11: To identify with Earth life is not to understand it.
12: To wish is not to know.
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13: They streamed over the border like a flash flood. Run-
away climate change. 
14: The look on my parents’ faces the night before their 
45th: they are serene together. They made it. 
15: I turn to justice. But its most significant theory in the 
last century, A Theory of Justice, does not consider ecology 
(Rawls 1971). Yet Earth is the biggest “overlapping con-
sensus.” Everyone with a “life plan” needs it. 
16: “I heard kids playing today on a concrete yard next 
to traffic: ‘One skip, two skip, three skips warm. All our 
towns are under storms. Oceans up, oceans down, oceans 




17: When the economy is milked by managers who crash 
it and are then bailed out and given bonuses, managers 
who next become leaders of bail out organizations by the 
government’s choice, how can we count on foresight? 
Reckless with impunity, this society of organized irre-
sponsibility (Jackall 2009).
18: I turn to population dynamics. Maybe a world with 
fewer people? My students talk about not reproducing. 
There is no imperative to, but the problem is an uneco-
logical economy and massive gaps for exploitation of the 
many by the few. 
19: Not just this species or that. Loss of families. Loss of 
genera. A species is like a poem. We lose genres. Burn sec-
tions in nature’s library. 
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Earth thought 20 of 365: Beyond the ego, the universe. 
Beautiful anonymity. I am in pain. 
21: We say that pre-modern man was dirty (Sterling 2007; 
Elias 1978). But modern man is too. There! He lives in 
his pollution. It floats through the air unseen.
22: Following the earthquake in Haiti, I remembered 
how the environment exceeds us and how we are tested 
to show common humanity when it does. 
23: “Next to [the] living are the dead. Covered in blan-
kets, their ash-covered limbs poke from beneath make-
shift shrouds” (Davis 2010). I do not live in a beautiful 
world.
24: The paradox of cities is that they are the most sus-
tainable while inside them the Earth is invisible. 
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25: There were knife fights in Haiti over food and water. 
Wound as I am these days around the climate, I thought 
of Darfur and desertification around Lake Chad. How 
will climate change strike the world system? That some 
guy like me, somewhere even now, will think he has to 
defend his family with a gun.
26: The best way to focus ourselves on the future and 
on goodness is to cultivate love for specific people 
now. Looking into the face of someone you love erases 
thoughtlessness better than terror.
Hold plausible risks in your mind.
27: I need a literature that speaks to me and makes me 
feel at home on Earth — neither philosophy arguing, 
nor poetry wishing, nor religion preaching. A voice like 
a family member’s, reflective at the pace of Earth time, 
arising with the part of us that isn’t destructive or blind. 
Friday, January 29, 2010
Earth thought 28 of 365: “In what sorts of places do they 
sleep?” (Williams 2003, 24). Out in the open, with blan-
kets as shrouds. And a thousand miles away in an air 
conditioned room, a designer bed from Room & Board. 
Hello, it is morning.
29: Boy/girl — s/he sees mom and dad’s disordered world, 
thinks, “Why?”
S/he lives on the internet, eats local, patches her recy-
cled clothes. She adopts-a-species, vote-drives against 
compromised politicians. S/he demands legal change as 
decade-long work. 
This is new. This is old. S/he’s both inside and outside 
the order.
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30: The body is a river infused with fresh water and 
debris, runoff, oilfilm, rain, and cleansing marshes. Do 
we want purity in it so that we can keep something clean? 
Is purity possible?
What is upstream from my body? 
Carl Schurz Park, July 2016.
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31: In Haiti, most people are peaceful while aid agencies 
are fearful (Price 2010). The knife has a long shadow. 
Anxiety the distorter.
32: Patterns are hard to remember. Turning off the 
lights, shutting off water, not idling or gunning the car. 
Do these matter? — Only in a thousand iterations in a 
million lives. But they also matter for my integrity.
Mahall’s, Lakewood, Ohio, January 2016.
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33: New patterns open up the future.
34: “I heard the ocean on the shore. The ruins of Europe 
in back of me” (Müller 2001).
35: Patience in the crisis.
36: Ocean, lake, or pool. I float in my original element.
37: We built this pattern. Drinking from the tap, I tasted 
clear.
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Earth thought 38 of 365: “What if everyone did that?” 
(Kant 1988) leaps from an average U.S. life to climate 
change — then to adaptation.
39: What fossil do we sink into the future? Or will the 
roots absorb the corpse? — Hurling the absence.
40: A clear face in fresh water, Lake Ontario. She’s hap-
pier than I’ve ever seen her. Don’t say the elements have 
nothing to do with this. Don’t stop my identity at my 
body’s edge. The lake swells as Elaine in it, and clouds 
drift inside me as the sun.
41: Kant (1965) says this is an article of rational faith: vir-
tue will one day bring about happiness — and vice, 
unhappiness. But presentists don’t mind future genera-
tions. Presentists will die before the grief and outrage.
42: I take my map, my internal map, with me. It’s 
outdated.
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43: On cold nights, I worry about the homeless. It is 
an indignity to me that there are people unwillingly 
exposed to the elements.
44: Would I be more in touch with our planet if I were 
less enveloped by machines that smooth life? 
45: “My heart was a storm in me as I went” (Homer, The 
Odyssey, IV, 572).
46: Open a void for words.
47: “Everything is backwards now. The true life is out 
there, while in here is the dream” (Cameron 2009).
48: The surface. Undertow. 
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Earth thought 49 of 365: The Ignatian approach to error 
asks the self-examiner to confront missed opportuni-
ties. Holocene ecology is the opportunity that makes our 
opportunities.
50: How do we think a thousand years ahead? Cathedral 
thought.
51: My end is another’s beginning.
52: A city of open houses. Life passes through, like utopia. 
Yet this city is real, over a billion years old. The door-
way is the species. A species is evolution’s doorway for 
the ongoing stream of life. It is where evolution happens, 
what lets evolution through. When we make species 
extinct, we slam doors shut. Mass extinction closes most 
of the city for millions of years.
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53: When we feel loved, we stop chasing after gratifica-
tion and turn our minds to those who outlast us.
54: Today, I remember my grandmother, Miriam, who 
died nine years ago and whom I loved very much. Only 
the pure things stand out today like branches in winter.
55: The not-so-distant explosions of that region, and 
the indignity of my countrymen and women fighting an 
unjust war. So we miss the battle against intertia and 
time, the battle to adapt.
56: Did you see the environmental devastation caused by 
“Shock and Awe”? Destroy and degrade.
Monday, February 22, 2010
Earth thought 57 of 365: “Managers think in the short 
run[,] because they are evaluated by both their superiors 
and peers on their short term results” (Jackall 2009, 89).
58: Look onto the future that pessimistically, sad man 
(McCarthy, The Road, 2006).
59: “Industry is just as much a part of nature.” What is 
its time-scale? But, yes, it’s in the history of our nature.
60: How will conserving life serve us? How is goodness 
beneficial? I give up.
61: The Winter Asymmetry (in memoriam Miriam 
Keymer): “I won’t sacrifice someone else; I will make rea-
soned sacrifices.” 
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Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Earth thought 62 of 365: Youth is overflowing. It gives. 
But near middle age, different thoughts scramble 
through the night like bones. What good will I have done 
by being alive?
63: “What if the world is sick, mama? I don’t want the 
world to be sick.” — A four, almost five, year old.
Let’s not worry in front of them but give them reason 
to hope by our creativity, courage. It’s rough right now, 
but this is what we can do.
64: What is more important to learn in school — how to 
make a living or how to change a law?
65: Individualism in the ’70s made the world inside the 
rage. Around us all, industrial production spewed junk 
into the sky.
66: “All one needs is a system. Once a day, to do some 
small thing. Fill a glass of water from the tap. Flush it 
down the toilet — only that. The world would have to 
change” (Tarkovsky, The Sacrifice, 1986).
67: “What we achieve inwardly will change outer reality” 
(Plutarch 1992).
68: Aphorisms, a glass of rain poured down a storm 
drain daily.
69: When youth protects intrinsic value and old age sees 
beyond itself, they see each other. 
198	 WE	ARE	A	STORM
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Earth thought 70 of 365: The activist parent and the con-
formist. Both sacrifice their children.
71: This kid needs a home. 
72: After being plunged into the river by the psychotic 
John the Baptist (Mark 1:9–13), Jesus lost his mind. He 
lived for “forty days” with “the wild beasts” — finally 
calmed by “angels.” 
Rhythms of animals
Wind patterns and stillness in the sand and rugged 
trees among the rocks
73: “The mountain mind / from invisible time” (Broad-
cast 2000).
74: When I was a teenager hanging out in the May air 
with nothing major to do, I enjoyed the sound of trees. 
I didn’t realize that we were wrecking the environment. 
75: I’m setting the thermostat at 62 degrees Fahrenheit. 
But it’s wasted energy to think about one individual’s 
wasted energy? 
76: A virus wrecks the ecosystem called “my body.”
77: “I like it when I’m simple” — we’re watching ice break 
off the shore of Lake Ontario.
78: Philosophy books like kids with toys but thinking 
that they toy with nothing. So un-kid-like. Thus: childish. 
The kid more adult than the book. Life a morning in 
the sun. Through shutters, it rests on the wall in solidar-
ity, playing slowly. Isaiah plays.
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Saturday, March 20, 2010
Earth thought 79 of 365: “The message sent / was of dis-
content, / from incline to incline” (Broadcast 2000).
80: Living in Syracuse and teaching at LeMoyne College, 
I am absorbing this Jesuit school with my atheist mind. 
What are atheist “discernment exercises”?
81: In the seventeenth century, physics mechanized 
physis. In the twenty-first century, physis returns as we 
acknowledge ecology’s complexity (Gorke 2003). 
82: Political ecologies are complex. 
How does communism’s ownership of the common dis-
tort the Winter Asymmetry? I cannot force the common. 
And capitalism’s revolution of desire? There is nothing 
lasting to my whims. 
I’m in search of free commitment to the human 
community.
83: The legions of the lost in the mechanized bureau-
cracy of the present. This was true in totalitarianism, 
now in capitalism concerning the future.
84: Be fruitful and multiply: biblical capitalism. What is 
fruitful?
85: The long, gray winter. — Now a day of sun! No longer 
think or write. What is fruitful?
86: It’s ironic how I always have an excuse to ride an 
airplane.
87: A conceivable human future is not one in which we 
see Earth recover from a sixth mass extinction. The last 
recovery took tens of millions of years. Our recorded his-
tory is ten thousand years. 
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Sunday, March 28, 2010
Earth thought 88 of 365: The Holocene mind is echoed 
in time. Atom of Adam, are we powerless not to grieve it?
89: In the United States of America, we’ve given each 
other health care but not yet environmental health.
90: People say that they have to think of their children, 
but they ignore their children when thinking that their 
children do not want parents who are fair to the future.
91: Is vice this symmetry: holding others to what I should 
demand only of myself? 
But without law, environmental problems won’t be 
solved. The evolutionary record is clear. Humans have a 
tendency to wipe out species around them and to over-
use resources for present interests (Ridley 1998). Laws 
correct this tendency and introduce foresight. 
Fully human only if anthroponomic. So vice is a kind of 
asymmetry. 
92: Law needn’t be what the State calls “law.” In ancient 
Greek, nomos included custom. Anthroponomy — accus-
toming humankind to collective responsiblity.
93: For at least ten thousand years — some say fifty — we 
have eradicated species with our technology. Technol-
ogy + population = dead species. 
But I am trying this. Democracy  + nomos = anthro- 
ponomy.
We don’t live in a true democracy.
94: Nothing misanthropic in being truthful.
95: I sit inside myself and worry. It is fruitless. Then I 
talk with George, my neighbor. I reconnect.
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Monday, April 5, 2010
Earth thought 96 of 365: Cyclical time seemed endless. 
Blue season came and went — gold, rust, wool and green. 
Species became dry skeletons inside trees. 
97: Absent wood doves when feral cats cry in heat, a red 
maple surrounded by grub-brown grass.
98: The rain ticks as the radiators click. Small streams 
trickle across pavement.
99: Romantic environmentalism coincided with the 
industrial revolution.
It overlay colonialism — made “wilderness” out of 
long-labored, indigenous environments!
Queensboro (Ed Koch) Bridge, New York City, July 2016.
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100: Yesterday, I saw the bees in dozens around a circular 
patch of yellow and purple crocuses.
101: James Lovelock (2007) tells us to enjoy ourselves, 
because we cannot save the Holocene Earth. With him, 
moral thinking is as obtuse as the “science” of a climate 
change denier.
102: Surely, the best thing about us is not that we can 
calculate, but that we can relate.
103: I am beginning to look at the current world of life 
as a strangely empty version of what was here before 
we bloomed voraciously in population and power — first 
colonialist, then industrialist.
A few large animals live wild in New York State now —
ghosts of the life here thousands of years ago once the 
glaciers receded.
Monday, April 12, 2010
Earth thought 104 of 365: Ecological flows make plan-
etary citizens.
105: We can’t keep a home in free-floating anxiety.
106: How did I become a here and now self, rather than a 
“we” that becomes a “humanity” across generations? 
107: I want clear, practical advice concerning the envi-
ronment. Sometimes, it is hard to find due to ignorance 
and oppression.
108: Environmental faults are brute facts.
A pragmatic attitude pulls us out of dreams.
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109: I drove back to Central New York, my childhood 
home. Country starts to fit like broken-in jeans. 
110: Powering down
Friday, April 23, 2010
Earth thought 111 of 365: The shakes run and tumble, 
roped and rooted as rough nature. Dream-states spread, 
dissolve in time. Weather in my head clears. Character 
smoothes over decades as rocks rolled in water.
112: Being on the side of the powerless a thousand years 
from now isn’t powerless.
113: Worms helped me become myself — a natural his-
tory of ego.
114: I want new categories of moral heroism. We do not 
need to stop a bullet with our bodies. We need to dissolve 
the patterns degrading our world. How? By (re-)design-
ing institutions and engaging in the complex practicality 
of politics. 
These things are not romantic. They take time, com-
promise, and lunch with people you oppose. 
115: Small houses live in big ones.
Take the room upon the room, 
washed bowls airing nightly on the rack. 
Outside, the soil is made of histories, 
speechless and unending for all of human time. 
116: Now by the lake. Unassumingly, it reflects my head 
in the clouds.
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117: I’m turned inside out, doubled over from running, 
my back filled with sky.
118: Headaches — the clogged marsh mind with a skein 
of plastic bag in the reeds.
119: A loss is a vacuum only if history reminds us.
120: The Earth seeps into music. What do the earliest 
musics teach us about Earth?
Think of electrified sound now. 
121: Just as clouds swirl in, so can small things swiftly 
gather in my soul to fast moving system. Bright salva-
tion of the day, groundless and optimistic as the sun. 
Monday, May 3, 2010
Earth thought 122 of 365: Plants unfurl, push, pod their 
way through the soil down and up. Wasps cycle out from 
winter into the open. Cats cry in heat. 
123: Like life, I am taking a break from thinking today.
124: I want to support the watershed in our neighbor-
hood by building a rain-water catch. Ecology begins 
beyond property. 
125: Emotional and social maturity are important for 
happiness in old age; not physical health, money, success 
or social status (Vaillant 2003). What about ecological 
connection — sentiment and know-how about the land 
in which we live?
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126: I sat on the floor with students last night, revising 
their semester-long work. Harried and laughing, once 
near tears, they tumbled out of the system with no time 
to lose. And we are like that, we post-students, with our 
home improvements and loan improvements, our tasks, 
competition, and dinners. We tumble out of life with 
barely time to lose. The Earth’s lost in all this. So it is 
really on us, really our thing, to build in time to think 
about the Earth. If we don’t put the Earth into our school 
systems, students will cascade beyond it. And so, too, 
with the big people, we so-called adults, who are sup-
posed to be responsible for our generation.
127: Goodnight, Thylacine. Goodnight Holocene. Good-
night ghosts of the Earth.
128: It isn’t aggression underneath the carbon-heavy 
skies; it’s obliviousness. Insulated by metal and concrete, 
we revolve aimlessly inside a million aims.
We lack a political “we.”
129: The view on top of the house is different than the 
view from the sidewalk.
130: I worked outdoors all day. The next morning, I 
paused over the vitamin bottle with its capsules of chem-
ical sun.
131: Last summer, I saw the strata that were once alive 
where I now live. Here was once under water — ocean 
with strange, shelled life. These overlays are compel-
ling in a way advertisements are not. They do not seduce 
desire but are coolish fact.
They say, “The world doesn’t spin around you. You are 
becoming, and many of your desires are mistakes.” 
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Monday, May 10, 2010
Earth thought 132 of 365: On days when my loved ones 
hurt, I am made of storms. 
133: 1980, 1990, 2000. Most multinational corporations 
have been as alive to their environment as partygoers 
puking with laughter into the toilet bowl.
134: Why hasn’t the insurance industry funded wide-
spread, environmental activism?
135: It’s important to adapt humanity, who we take our-
selves to be — our self-projection.
136: The issues that interest me most about Earth ethics 
concern how Earth’s size, duration and intricacy pose a 
complex problem that exceeds us.
137: The macro-perspectives of geological time and plan-
etary ecology make it hard to keep in view, simultane-
ously, human perspectives. I look at a book bag I bought 
alongside my father — from Strand Books. On it, profiles 
of all different sorts of people. The warmth of that mem-
ory, which goes back to when I was young. The thought 
that every one of those faces has similar memories. From 
within each of our worlds, our loves are so intense, and it 
would be inhuman to forget them.
I should write a book that contrasts these two perspec-
tives — and shows how they can coexist in a human life.
138: For the last three nights, the temperature has 
dipped below freezing. Three weeks ago, April saw the 
hottest day on record for my city. 
Cycling of extremes.
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Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Earth thought 139 of 365: The Bangladeshi worker on the 
lift for the sixth straight day of work at a dozen hours 
per day joining bolts between girders in Dubai’s new sky-
scrapers: I would not fault blindness to the environment. 
Yet he knows that we are shifting the planet. He sees it 
through the immense strain and exploitation, the scale 
of it. He is not invested in denying it.
Is it the privileged who are most often in denial?
140: I watched French cinema last week (Melville 1956; 
Gleize 2002). Each film showed a keen awareness of 
chance, and luck, of the way we collide or intertwine in 
happenings. 
We are so fundamentally abstract. Who are “we” here?
141: End of semester grading with its misshapen papers, 
academic dishonesty, appeals, emails, phone calls, run-
ning out pens, sore necks, weak eyes, lack of exercise, 
distraught students, angry messages, fine-grain policy, 
stress, and deadlines: we insist that we are learning, but 
the system isn’t. 
142: I am again as weather cycling an extreme.
143: When papers lie on top of papers, clothes hung 
there, a chair shifted to fit and the fine sift of dust lights 
up beneath a window, natural order returns.
144: Where the outside is inside and seasonal time is my 
clock, I live with rock patterns in my heart and the rise 
and fall of species. 
145: I can’t imagine the aesthetics of loss that a mass 
extinction deserves. What is a museum of lost life that 
isn’t a museum of natural history?
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146: There is utopia in a million year old form of life. 
Look at it, how it has weathered and been weathered.
147: The moral person might say that we have responsi-
bility to, not for, future generations.
But the truth is that we are responsible for them.
Thursday, May 27, 2010
Earth thought 148 of 365: If I teach myself to live more 
freely with uncertainty, the complexity of the world 
opens up. 
149: Earth is neither healthy nor unhealthy, and so with 
the environment. I am healthy. You are healthy. Those 
animals are unhealthy. (Frierson 2002)
Environments are relative. So we are deciding on life 
much of the time with our environment-changing power.
150: My society has no conventional oath by which I can 
publically commit myself to stewarding the environ-
ment. Nor are there many practices to steward me in 
contributing to the public good in this way.
151: Seeing cars backed up willy-nilly as they return 
from Chesapeake Bay.
152: Blindly the horseshoe crabs clutch the future — iri-
descent trail of eggs on the sand near the waterline. 
153: Our current era has spanned sixty five million years 
since the fifth mass extinction. Homo sapiens has yet to 
age anywhere near a million, much less a quarter of a 
million, even a tenth. 
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Still, we have become a geological era in a sliver of 
time. Unlike a meteor strike or a chain of volcanic erup-
tions, we have ranged, constructed, settled and multi-
plied as we’ve made nature into a mechanics. This fifty 
thousand year moment is called “intelligence.”
It is unclear whether it is sapient.
154: Is there a name for the hope that comes with action? 
Is it the hope in doing something, not nothing?
155: Arendt (2006) thought that evil in mass society has 
become “banal” — essentially organized thoughtlessness. 
Jackall (2009) showed how thoughtlessness is orga-
nized in business-as-usual corporate capitalism. 
The BP oil spill disrupting much of the Gulf of 
Mexico’s ecology is a result of organized corporate 
thoughtlessness. 
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Earth thought 156 of 365: Can you wrap your head 
around all that — the fisherfolk, coastlines, ocean bot-
toms, life that would migrate through, breeding and 
hatching grounds, the birds depending on the ocean 
life . . . ? 
And now I’m trying to imagine human culture, the 
communities and visitors who depend on Gulf life, our 
rituals, sense of beauty, meaning.
157: Life forms are not the only things to go extinct. Forms 
of life do too. The first is biological — the second cultural. 
Our rites are often woven around life forms. So the eco-
logical processes extinguishing life forms atrophy forms 
of life.
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158: Last night, I saw a Western set in 1868 (Van Acken 
2006) and a film about Beijing’s internal, global, fron-
tier (Jia 2004). In those 136 years powered first by colo-
nialism, the frontier offered up electricity, cars, air-
planes, computers, and industrial processes about which 
I can only guess. Population rocketed spaceward on a 
chart. 
159: Humanity should become ahead of itself, not simply 
after its effects. 
160: People talk about environmental “aesthetics.” But 
the aesthetic approach is passive — about how a subject 
views the world (Harries 1998). We should talk instead 
about ethos. 
An ethos is a way of life in which things make good 
sense. It is more than what we now call “ethics.” It 
includes beauty and truth. 
An ecological ethos is active, because it is a way of liv-
ing, not simply a way of perceiving. 
The place of aesthetics is within ethos: to reveal the 
morally invisible — other forms of life and the lost we.
Sunday, June 6, 2010
Earth thought 161 of 365: Machines are not elemental 
until they fall apart. But love is elemental, mechanical 
when it falls apart.
162: Life is organized only in so far as it emerges from 
disorganization, pressing against it, succumbing to it. 
Organs are temporary solutions to dissolution. But I 
must take geological time.
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163: Recently, the Alaotra grebe of Madagascar was 
declared extinct — another bird species, an increasing 
number. The causes are predictable — incursion into 
Alaotra habitats, invasive species brought by our reshuf-
fling life around the planet. 
Should we call globalization “mass extinction?” From 
the perspective of much life on this planet, we are their 
extinction. From our own, “we are the world” (Jackson 
and Ritchie 1985).
164: Ethos, sometimes translated as character, is the root 
of ethics. And what of the ethics of root? (Why draw on a 
plant to teach us origins?)
165: Human rights were ill conceived at their root. The 
Earth’s the origin and breaker of states. What would 
rights be if they were conceptualized from our ground?
Saturday, June 12, 2010
Earth thought 166/365: The root of education implies 
leading forth. To what? 
From what?
167/365: Defenders of BP spout off — crude speech from 
their mouths.
168/365: The child’s face in light. 
169/365: I’m speaking of being ecological as if it were an 
ideal, rather than a fact. To be ecological is to act in light 
of our context in the world of life, rather than being 
oblivious to it.
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170/365: “We, as gardeners, cultivate our land, our shel-
ter[,] by taking care of the land for those to come after 
us — not being wasteful, but watchful — in what, how 
and why we care for our plot of land, whether we live in 
the country or [in] the city. We are ‘gardeners,’ if we are 
aware to take care of the ‘land,’ wherever we live.” 
—(Aunt) Evelyn Palik (née Bendik).
Aunt Eleanor’s first needlepoint, Avon, Ohio, 2007.
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171/365: Rain in Bangladesh ~a one minute play~
Isaiah (age 5): “What’s a fact?”
Jeremy (age 40): “It’s something absolutely true. 
Like, outside now it is sunny.”
Isaiah: “Not in Bangladesh.”
Monday, June 14, 2010
172/365: Oikeiosis (Laertius 1925, 7.85) — the drive to 
maintain a good enough life. Oikos, or home, is at its 
root, just as with “ecology.” An impulse to home, to form 
the conditions for living in a way that meets the deep 
needs — the stability and growing — of the being. A non-
capitalist sense of self-interest.
173/365: Rain falls on good and evil alike (Matthew 5:44–
45). It is unconditional.
Zevi, Syracuse, New York, 2012.
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Tuesday, June 15, 2010
174/365: Pageant of Extinct Species, the Theater of Dis-
placed Islanders, Graffiti of a Sunken Planet.
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
175/365: “It makes you feel good.” This five-year-old rid-
ing a merry-go-round: a complex cyclical movement 
where the world amazes the body —
Monday, June 21, 2010 
176/365: The Thylacine came into being through a long, 
evolutionary process within geological time. In a shud-
dering of that time, it died. From our impact. 
177/365: The summer day says we should become a festi-
val. But I think of BP oil spreading throughout the cold 
blackness of the Gulf. 
178/365: I am fixing my house, because I own it and 
because my life appears with it, for a time.
179/365: No one owns the Gulf. But how could BP’s life 
not appear with it for a time?
180/365: A corporation is lifeless, unless it builds time 
into its accounting and procedures. 
Friday, June 25, 2010
181 of 365: Setting the time for accounting is as signifi-
cant as what is evaluated — the time of eras versus the 
quarterly return. 
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HALFWAY: Leaving the door ajar, we heard them all night 
long communicating around the pond. I had dreams, 
many dreams, hopping about, energetic and calm at 
once. The amphibians, deservedly sacred, are among the 
most endangered. They are the memory of the mobility 
between land and water.
183/365: What have I learned so far doing this exercise? 
That I like forming over time in my own speciation pro-
cess. What kind of life should I live? 
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
184 of 365: Looked through my wild books yesterday —
my books from when I was young. In my drawing: the 
squirming, honest, determined grasp of life. 
185/365: I put the flooring down, plank by plank on top 
of the sub-floor, itself raised on small spaces that let the 
air circulate out moisture: playroom.
186/365: It is summer to feel so, forever! I have accom-
plished something for the next generation.
Earth thought 187 of 365: Reading. In Republic (Plato 
1992, 330d–e), Cephalus leads the discussion to justice by 
explaining how old age makes the conscience more acute 
lest we wake at night in terror thinking of the afterlife. 
My life will seep into soil — and what is left after? 
188 of 365: The environment may be one place where, 
roughly, virtue and happiness align (pace Kant 1965). The 
habit in my body of attending to this or that detail of liv-
ing well in my environment is conducive to health and 
vitality.
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Friday, July 2, 2010
189: Socrates’ argument for equal opportunities for 
women (Plato 1992) — this first feminist critique in phi-
losophy — how impossible it seemed thousands of years 
ago. Similarly, it seems impossible now that humankind 
could become anthroponomic. 
1–9–0: Children imitate well the things their adults do. 
More so — they are consistent and precise in discovering 
where principles they’ve learned should be applied but 
are not. They lead us if we give them an ideal implausible 
to us.
Earth thought 191 of 365: A person relating to nature is 
among the most educational things, since it is our rela-
tionship to Earth that is at issue. 
Tuesday, July 6, 2010
Earth thought 192 of 365: On the opposite page is a 
photo of the dock at Crumhorn Mountain Boy Scout 
Camp, now called Camp Henderson, near Milford, N.Y. I 
was a waterfront instructor here in the summers of 1985 
and 1986 when I was fifteen and sixteen. My sixth grade 
teacher, Jim Davidson, was waterfront director and got 
me involved. When I look at the photo — better, am by or 
on this lake- whole lessons surface.
193 of 365: Pick a smooth, well-weighted one and angle it 
well. Skip — skip — skip — skip — skip — across the water.
Earth thought 194 of 365: I can avoid exhausting behav-
ior. But as exhaust hits the environment, I can’t. 90 
degrees Fahrenheit and rising.
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Earth thought 195 of 365: There were profits possible 
to squeeze outside regulation and weak links in design 
which no one took the time to double-check: BP. 
Sunday, July 11, 2010
Earth thought 196 of 365: Colder winters, hotter sum-
mers. To think of adaptation as insulation. 
197: O planetary citizen, how can you advocate for the 
unrecognized and the useless? I am wondering whether 
there are values that touch us from each remoteness.
198: A still patch on the lake, rocking slightly in 
rhythm: let me open up the sky.
Crumborn Mountain waterfront dock, July 2010.
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199: Have I been reading slowly? Cool after heat — after 
sticky, nerve-frayed nights. I read with my body.
200: A fisherwoman takes on BP. How her environment 
will be affected, how its plenitude can be protected.
Sunday, July 18, 2010
Earth thought 201 of 365: I took a flight to California 
this year. Drank imported wine. These mattered, because 
people live in poverty. Environmentally, were my actions 
negligible apart from their patterns?
202: The car-driving engineer designed a more efficient 
car. The animal scientist framed slaughterhouses to 
involve less fear (Grandin and Johnson 2006).
203: Philosophy, predicated off of a personal turn, calls 
for positioning in one’s life most of all. Dialogues (Plato 
1992), aphorisms (Nietzsche 2001), remarks (Wittgen-
stein 1990). But what of the body “in” Earth (Abram 
2010)?
204: Philosophy without the body is out of place. Ecto-
pian, not ecotopian. 
205: Philosophy without the commons is also ectopic. We 
share Earth. BP is a consequence of ectopic management.
206: What is property when it is entrusted and not 
fungible?
207: My uncle Bill the farmer plowed around the Killdeer 
nest.
IN	WONDROUS	HUNGER	 219
Sunday, July 25, 2010
Earth thought 208 of 365: “I have lost my origin. / And I 
don’t want to find it again” (Björk 2009). Ectopian.
209: A lone Missoni dress in the desert wears a manne-
quin inside.
210: In my midnight (Nolan 2010), the waters flood in, 
making our half measures obsolete.
211: Their homes are clapboard next to the unimagin-
ably rich. The global economy draws countrysides into 
cities sprawling for miles on end, powering through the 
grooves of depletion left by colonialism.
212: The lives of others, of fish and bird, of sponge and 
mollusk are the deep-sea consciousness of the Gulf of 
Mexico.
213: I am dissipating the noise in my mind so that I can 
read while hearing the wood doves outside my home. 
214: The founding fathers of the United States Constitu-
tion did not foresee a world where term limits and lob-
bies would thwart long-range planning. They didn’t lis-
ten to the Onondaga Nation. 
Sunday, August 1, 2010
215 —  Quarterly returns torque the institution to the 
present. Look at the decision-making of BP. 
216 —  Institutions have no “fabric.” They have to be 
contained and designed to self-contain. They fight for 
resources.
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217 —  How do institutions shape character? The pile of 
reports on her desk beyond what she can thoughtfully 
field —
218 —  When thoughtful people produce thoughtless 
results, look at the institution. 
219 —  Everything has its system in our fantasy of system. 
220 —  Taking decades to see whether our experiments 
unintentionally harm is not capitalist. It is democratic.
221 —  How do neighborhoods share ethos? By adjust-
ing life together and passing along things that work. A 
democracy without neighborhoods is ectopian.
Sunday, August 8, 2010
222 —  The single actor inside the large disorder. Per-
sonal environmentalism instead of democracy. A bird 
learns to fly by banging into windows.
223 —  
1. Rotating slowly across the water’s surface, a machine 
harvests lake plants for nearby farms to use.
2. Someone on a boat watches the reflection of the 
ridgeline become calm near dark.
Water harvesters
224 —  Government announcement: the Gulf oil spill 
is dissipating, absorbed, remediated to a great extent. 
The long-range effects on Gulf ecosystems appear to be 
bearable. 
Yet we are largely ignorant of what the long-range 
effects might be (Revkin 2010a) and the long-term 
effects of past spills have been extensive, much greater 
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than expected to both non-human ecology and human 
economy. 
Why does the U.S. government have a bad record of 
environmental reporting (Holland 2010)?
225 —  “Dispersed oil is still oil. It’s just [oil] in a differ-
ent form” (Michael J. Blum, Tulane University, quoted in 
Fahrenthold, 2010).
Earth thought 226 of 365 —  The metropolis is more eco-
logical than a sprawled town. Choice of density.
Earth thought 227 of 365: Now imagine: across the street, 
a migration corridor, roof woods!
Earth thought 228 of 365: There are many different 
things to be said for relationships and their depth. 
Sunday, August 15, 2010
Earth thought 229 of 365: One day in the future, I hike 
along the coast. There are cool shafts of light in the 
forest, moss smell in humid air, sound of slow waves 
of leaves absorbing quick, mostly quiet movements of 
animals.
Time made the forest a relief.
And sand spins around our memory of silence. The 
other way, the way in which cosmos and our identities 
blend in the dune.
Trust crossing back and forth between the human and 
non-human.
Now on the shore on the water
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Earth thought 230 of 365: As I walk, plants grow unno-
ticeably, the small spider hops and stops. An ever-intent 
bee.
As I run, a squirrel scrambles up a tree, deer pushing 
off ahead of dogs and people, the ever-intent bee.
Earth thought 231 of 365: Instead of having portraits of 
extinct species, should we have portraits of lost terrains 
and, inside them, species?
Earth thought 232 of 365: Drivers. Soundless metal riv-
ers, glass, and music. Outside, polluting.
233 of 365: Vapor in the air. Sprinklers. Children running.
234::365: The color of the August sun at sunfall. Plato 
(1992) likened it to the Good. A rare ecotopian trace in 
this first utopian.
Earth thought 235 of 365: I understood tonight why my 
Ohio cousins, growing up, would always take showers 
before bed. By day’s end, a layer of stickiness coats my 
body.
I have moved from Syracuse to Cleveland.
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Detroit Road, Cleveland, Ohio, October 2010.
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Monday, August 16, 2010
Earth thought 236: In Pakistan, floods (BBC 2010). Hor-
rible landscapes of water.
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
Earth thought 237 of 365: An environmentalism worth 
its name is an ethos. It demands a connection with our 
Earth origins that settles in the emotions of the chest.
Sunday, August 22, 2010
Earth thought 238 of 365: The environmentalists call it 
anthropocentrism and claim that the circle of moral con-
cern is arbitrarily circumscribed around humans. The 
humanitarians call it autonomy and claim that beings 
without it — all non-humans, so they say — are not the 
primary focus of morality. 
Both get humanity wrong. It is humane to care about 
other life forms (Bendik-Keymer 2006). Our freedom 
to relate makes us free to see that not only autonomy 
matters. 
There is so much misanthropy in environmentalism 
and so much panic in humanitarians.
Earth thought 239 of 365: The mice and the wasps in the 
summer. They continue on, doing no harm to their world 
with which they have evolved. They are symbiotic, carry-
ing pollen, aerating soil, turning over life like worms or 
fungus farming underground insects. 
And we who have the power to disrupt these tight-knit 
multi-age cycles, these bundles of processing life, where 
are we in this home that has been our origin? Why are 
we dislocated like a top spinning along concrete? 
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240:: The time of the office is fragmented. Who has time 
to dwell on things that fall outside the office’s immedi-
ate and proximate goals (Jackall 2009)? 
Leave it up to the public to do the long-term thinking. 
But civic time is fragmented by a flex economy, circling 
between multiple jobs and child care (Sennett 1998).
As the office fragments, so does civic time.
Earth thought 241: Could we draw environmentalism 
from ourselves, rather than inculcating it?
Earth thought 242: The main reason why environmental-
ism does not develop within the good sense of people in 
contemporary capitalism is that we do not identify with 
a long enough time scale.
That, and more importantly how we are divided from 
each other.
Wednesday, August 25, 2010 
mid-week
Earth thought 243 of 365: Lizards are going extinct at 
an elevated rate due to climate change They scuttle for 
shade rather than overheat and then lose valuable time 
once used for feeding. Many migrate to cooler climes —
but then they compete with the species already there. 
Climate change is happening too quickly for their adap-
tive evolution. Their temporary system’s thrown out by 
a planet moving too quickly beyond it, and their genetic 
lines die out after so many millions of years of evolution. 
They suffer, but do not feel, time.
244: The impractical ones — they run after private wealth, 
personal ambition, suppressing vague fears that would 
fully erupt only in a group acting collectively. On they go 
in their private spheres — homo economicus.
226	 WE	ARE	A	STORM
245: Homo sapiens only now for the first time can be 
aware of its long-term and widespread ecological effects. 
Can we use our technology to think like a planet? 
The homo sapiens of 12,000 years ago was a long-term 
ecological mess. Consider the extinction of megafauna 
in what we now call North America — deep, indigenous 
speciecide due to hunting with long-range weapons. 
Then agriculture a couple thousand years later. And now 
the industrial world acts as if the Earth is not our home. 
It simply overshoots Holocene Earth. 
Can we develop a technology of planetary reach and 
time? This would include institutional design — and 
democracy.
Yes, but this also smacks of avoidance: of colonialism, 
of global capitalism, of today’s oligarchic “democracy.”
Sunday, August 29, 2010
246 of 365: The sailboat lets the biosphere be, but not the 
combustion engine (Braungart and McDonaugh 2002). 
I thought of these things tonight, driving home. My 
car, out of whack, a poorly designed artifact in a poorly 
designed society where we do not have true, collective 
choice.
247 of 365: A hawk glides above the ridgeline for min-
utes on minutes.
248 of 365: The industrial approach to our feelings isn’t 
fitting to ourselves. The self-help tune-up with workbook 
and office seminar, even the haste with which we attack 
ourselves, betray industrial design: push and package. 
249 of 365: A child builds naturally. It is how he under-
stands causality, not how to ignore it.
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Sunday, September 5, 2010
Earth thought 250 of 365: National borders keep us from 
protecting societies and ecosystems from pollution, 
while seeds and water are increasingly commodified by 
transnational corporations. We should become citizens of 
Earth and push our States toward anthroponomy.
Earth thought 251 of 365: I’ve been having flashes 
recently of . . . I don’t know the word. I suddenly feel that 
everything I or others do on this planet is temporary. 
The entire history of life is a point with no one to record 
or to watch it. Rushing headlong forward, startlingly the 
way it is, instead of a desperate nostalgia, I feel freed to 
try again or anew at things that matter to me, and I feel 
responsible for my point in time. 
The meaning is intrinsic, since any hold beyond the 
point is fantasy. And so my love for this point of life on 
Earth, for handing it down — that, too, is intrinsic. It is 
more meaningful to have been a point in time this way, 
to have been an unrecognized, unrecorded, headed-to-
dust attender to a geological instant in an even older 
cosmos.
252 of 365: Paradoxically, we could use a can-do attitude 
like that once found in Dubai, most un-ecological of cit-
ies. That city deranged with speculation and construc-
tion, whose use of energy and emission of waste has been 
the largest per capita in the world — that city felt change 
in the air. And now our entire civilization must change 
to become ecological.
In the deserts outside Dubai, the sand sifts in eddies 
through the air, smooth and beautiful, and the qaf tree 
dots the crown and level of the land, tough in its persis-
tent adaptation. This wealth remains unseen. 
The wealth of collective action also stays unseen.
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253 of 365: Yes, I save the human over the snake, but the 
basic idea is that we should co-inhabit. Industrial theo-
rists obsess over the trade-offs and miss the goal: cre-
ative solutions that are altogether decent.
254 of 365: Pre-occupied grown-ups, try growing up: act 
collectively.
255: I am lost in the wild when I cannot reach medical 
care for my child. Also when I reach inarticulate silence. 
I am lost in civilization when I forget I am alive or feel 
unfree, when I have no distance on civilization.
256 of 365: Upstairs, wound-up neighbors walking on 
floorboards over this apartment where I now live during 
the workweek, sound of cars on Lee Rd. Cold seeping in. 
Fall, not yet — soon. 
Friday, September 10, 2010  
justice in
257 of 365: Emerge out of oblivion inside the makeshift 
habits of adults, the future unimaginable? 
258: Life isn’t something you just waste! It deserves a 
chance just as we deserve a chance. There should be a 
good reason to kill it off, and we should want to be aware 
of having acted so as to kill it off. 
Our society seems invisibly wanton. We’re producing 
widespread extinction without thinking about or dis-
cussing it, without meaning to.
Earth thought 259 of 365: Trust is a keeper, the alchemist 
of anxiety. Trustworthy, you activists of the next world.
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Earth thought 260 of 365: As Chin-Tai (Kim 2010) 
reminded me, trustworthiness is different than being 
trusted. Still, I believe in oikeiosis — once we include true, 
collective communication and some time.
Earth thought 261 of 365: Some portions of the world, 
around 1500 A.D., managed to brutally exploit the rest of 
the world, using that exploitation to drastically increase 
material development back home. 500 years later, those 
same parts of the world managed to make the descen-
dants of the exploited suffer even more. And they did 
so quite simply, by polluting. Climate change floods 
the helpless, not the gluttonous rich, and colonialism’s 
shadow stretches over the poorest faces still. Is it not 
enough to make you shake your fists at the sky? 
Saturday, September 11, 2010
262: “We can’t simply keep stacking boulders against 
the change that’s coming . . . ” (McKibben 2010). Yes, we 
can. They will have to cope, not us. — This is presentism, 
worse than racism and sexism combined, because it mag-
nifies powerlessness in the future.
Sunday, September 12, 2010  
relationships
263: To keep our humanity, we’ll need to find goodness 
in each other. So I am going to build a home beginning 
from my relationships.
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Lake Erie, May 2016.
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Friday, September 17, 2010 
264 of 365: Alien planet, full of dislocation, loss, dryness, 
dust, rain and floods. But it is still Earth, a continuous 
biochemical system, our origin and home.
Earth thought 265 of 365 (one hundred more to 
go): Democratic states today exist in a dis-integrated 
global patchwork with many holes of sovereignty and 
failed coordination. State alongside state alongside state 
with slight consistency between when it comes to envi-
ronmental policy.
And then the whims of “democratic” — just as easily 
oligarchic — preference opting for short-term interests 
as swayed by powerful media and politicians funded by 
private interests.
The widespread ignorance and apparent hedonism —
valuing material pleasures over invisible life forms or 
over fairness to generations a hundred years from now.
But authoritarianism is unjustifiable even on conse-
quential grounds. Top-down rule can be blind to perspec-
tive, focused on the things it thinks matter and abstract 
to the real concerns of people — indeed, it would almost 
certainly be if planetary. More importantly, authoritari-
anism is notoriously susceptible to corruption, checks 
and balances less so. 
I think what is needed is a dispersed and widely held 
method for stabilizing perspective and integrating invis-
ible values, checks on the systemic soft spots that subject 
the public to private interests. This is simply real democ-
racy. We would appear to need democratic contestation 
and sub- and transnational movements that challenge 
oligarchic politics to become moral (Benhabib 2004). 
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266. Lady Gaga’s meat (Gaga 2010) — her Missoni — is 
it more gluttonous than the typical restaurant menu? 
The eaters consume inconspicuously, whereas the dress 
hangs conspicuously.
267. The silk harvesting, dye vats, and electrical energy 
in a pulsing sewing factory, the transportation over sev-
eral continents (pollution rising to the upper reaches of 
the atmosphere and dissolving in the oceans); the pack-
aging of plastics, papers, and silks. 
. . .
A florescent-lit, white showroom with bright colored 
scarves in glorious patterns laid out on long, white plas-
tic podiums.
268. “Hey, you! You’re destroying all of our fun!” 
(The self-gratifiers are tired without even having had a 
storm within their chests.)
Saturday, September 18, 2010
269. Today, the media question is can you do me? This is a 
deflection in which you position someone to think we are 
out of reach from the beginning. 
Sunday, September 19, 2010  
particularity
270. The disaster books (McKibben 2010; Lovelock 2006) 
don’t do a good job of starting from our particularity, 
and so they promote hysteria. The steadying by a face.
(Elaine’s voice, Isaiah’s face, Mom and Dad and Ruth’s 
voices, seeing the Aunts, my good friends)
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Monday, September 27, 2010  
fragments — action
271. In German romanticism (1830), avant-garde modern-
ism (1925), minimalist music (1950), hip-hop, rap, and 
much late twentieth-century media and performance, 
the fragment scattered the atmosphere so that we could 
breathe in our limits (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988). 
The cracks showing: weather outside brings down the 
translucent ceiling where we thought we could be angels. 
The hot, dusty, humid, pouring, freezing, billowing sky 
pours in. Shards on the floor by your feet. Children have 
decided on the basement. 
272. When I am healthy, I am in my own ecosystem fit-
ting my limits. I am not running myself down. I weather 
into myself. 
273. The environmental crisis we now face is not one we 
can stop in our lifetimes; it is one we can start to address 
for future generations on the model of building a cathe-
dral (Saillant 2010). 
274. At the precise historical moment when we need 
to expand our sense of ecology to include the planet, 
research drives our sense of ecology down to the scale of 
genetics, there in the inside of cells (Whitehouse 2010). 
Instead of turning to the collective, “bioethics” goes back 
to the sub-individual!
275. Convert relational reality to mechanical potency for 
hedonic intent. Eco-tourism — in-grown fragmentation!
276. Eco-hedonism. I like to glide when I ride. And that 
means this: slowing up hills, quickening down them. The 
gas-users of America act as if we have no topography (my 
eco-friends and I, we’re righteously complicit)!
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277. Why not fund a corps of mechanic-teachers who 
give public efficiency classes in each community, teach-
ing people how to retrofit their homes to save money 
while teaching sustainability at the same time? 
Why not prime a corps of law instructors who show us 
how to collectively change our zoning?
Personal efficiency, not collective legislation? In-grown 
fragmentation.
278. The old image of sustainability as an ever-
overturning way of life is false, because the changing 
climate will change what is possible in life. Sustainabil-
ity itself had an un-geological sense of time. In-grown 
fragmentation!
Tuesday, September 28, 2010 
The Failure (1988–2012)
279. I want a movie seen from the perspective of a cli-
mate refugee in 2050. It should depict the history of the 
Failure (1988–2012) when everyone in the know knew 
about climate change — the politicians, the journalists, 
the academics — and (most) sneezed.
The Failure would be part of every child’s vocabulary. 
The Rockies will be barren in this film, eaten out by 
beetle infestations and washed through with soil erosion. 
Many states will have imploded as Sudan has under 
the pressure of desertification. 
The refugee will rely on the kindness of strangers. 
Everyone will be stressed and angry at the selfishness 
of the Failure. 
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Wednesday, September 29, 2010 
presentism
280. Presentism is bias toward the present to the detri-
ment of the future. It is an organizational situation. Due 
in part to our presentism, we are forcing the climate 
toward a less hospitable planet. Shortage of resources 
and environmental risk are oppressive. So presentism is 
complicit in oppression. It is a new kind of oppression, 
one that is unintentional but clearly negligent.
Friday, October 1, 2010
281. The time frame of twenty-one centuries sits as a 
convention, a bubble in my mind. But geological time 
should be the default context. Ten years ago, I thought 
the millennium was the mark. The Museum of the Earth 
has affected my imagination.
282. Ode to a global flow. The cotton from [?], dyes from 
[?], buttons from [?] made from plastics from [?] —
stitched into Zara’s Spring line outside Dhaka, Bangla-
desh; shipped to Spain [?] and redistributed to Dubai 
where it’s sold in Mall of the Emirates to a U.S. woman 
who travels back to New York, then to Cleveland, and 
lives in Shaker Square, wearing the suit downtown on 
the commuter rail and walking around Public Square 
into her office building, up to the twenty-seventh floor, 
corner office, overlooking Lake Erie. 
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Saturday, October 2, 2010 
third-generation climate ethics
Two eight three. First-generation climate ethics focused 
on whether there is a climate problem, what caused it, 
who is responsible, and how to apportion blame. The sec-
ond generation focuses on the adaptability of our form 
of life — our social and political systems, technology 
and economics, our ethos. Third-generation climate eth-
ics is straight civics. Trans- and subnational democratic 
contestation!
Sunday, October 3, 2010
Two eight four. Here is this beautiful planet whose Holo-
cene order we are destroying. 
Climate civics is trans- and subnational democratic 
contestation!
Monday, October 4, 2010
Two eight five. You climb around it, fall your head let 
upside down, hair above to the ground, leg locked, a cold 
and sturdy bar. The giddy high like sea-rise barriers. 
Out into the surrounding world, search of eddies. Self-
organizing. Of broken ecologies of. A jungle gym —
like a good fragment
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Thursday, October 14, 2010 
post-industrial society
286/365: The State University of New York at Albany 
cancels most of its modern language programs (Jaschik 
2010), breaking tenure, and I think about climate change. 
The university whose motto is “the world within reach” 
just did that. 
Old Southern Ohio coal-mining country, May 2016.
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287/365: People had to adjust to urbanization following 
the Industrial Revolution. What will we have to adjust to 
in a post-industrial age? Too easy.
288/365: On a quick-speeding plume, rolling over the 
land, enveloping trees, houses, fields, fences, cars, roads, 
mailboxes, ditches, porches . . . our industrial, democrati-
cally poor civilization meets Holocene Earth’s limits. 
Bedrock personal time has liquefied. 
The core vaporized
Time is now urgent, a tremor on its face, an eddy blow-
ing away the vapor
I no longer have all the time in the world; nor do we. 
The seasons change, change their form — not just 
rotating.
Hylomorphs no longer count on the re-assuring, re-
appearing Same.
289/365: Where the biosphere is mimicked, not shifted. 
To achieve a post-industrial society will require a kind 
of self-consciousness and innovation that the human 
species has rarely shown. To achieve harmony with the 
biosphere’s cycles in a given geological era — we have 
hardly been able to do that in all our time as a spe-
cies (Ridley 1998), and especially in industrial society. 
And now the cycles are shifting, the bundles coming 
loose. 
But one thing in our way is corporate oligarchy. We 
are missing the wealth of true, democratic collectives.
290/365: I looked for a time yesterday at kids playing in a 
playground. It seemed to me that ethics isn’t about argu-
ment, then, but about really looking. What am I doing 
here?
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291/365: Goal: post-industrial society — dismantled oligar-
chy — confronting the colonial past.
292/365: Imaginary lunch-napkin notes. 
#1 (while they went outside for a smoke, leaving me at the 
table)
Patterns of behavior in which we are locked by incen-
tives and disincentives and in which the actors that build 
our world are lodged, even trapped (Jackall 2009)
#2 (by myself later that week)
The deconstruction of an industrial economy — energy 
patterns, patterns of production, accountability schemes, 
laws, guiding metaphors . . .
293/365: I frequently feel the need to gather my time 
together, my interests, the meaning of the places I’ve 
lived, the jobs I’ve done, and — more importantly — the 
meaning of my relationships. 
If I am split — shaved off, and vulnerable — I settle 
back into myself through the processing which is done as 
if I were an observer to myself, loving but also detached.
. . .
I cling to the fragmentation until I am as much a wit-
ness to my life as anyone else, albeit someone else who 
has some kindness.
. . .
294/365: “Industry” with its word family — industrious. 
But the Industrial Revolution with its specific form of 
production. There could be other forms of production 
that would be more civilized (Braungart and McDonough 
2002). 
The virtues of industrialism can be vices too.
Presentism, human-caused planetary change — the 
Industrial Revolution at its limit undermining itself 
through technology that is in the hands of the few over 
the many, here and in the far future.
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295/365: Hear “industry” straight to the backlife, the 
frontlife.
Backlife: extraction, colonialism
Frontlife: waste, misregulated capitalism
Saturday, October 16, 2010 
Here’s to focus on materials, the gut-bare fantasy.
296/365: Manuel Castells (2000) called the Information 
Age “post-industrial.” But how is information technol-
ogy produced and what powers it? The heavy metals and 
rare earths are extracted. The electricity comes from fos-
sil fuel with its emissions. The powerful still exploit the 
vulnerable in the name of profit. The Information Age is 
simply late-industrialism.
297.365: Alekandr Sokurov’s Russian Ark (2002) — a sin-
gle, continuous shot of 96 minutes, panning and flow-
ing through a historical dream set at the Hermitage in 
St. Petersburg (these Earth thoughts feel also like such 
a shot). This is the nineteenth century; it is nationalist, 
colonialist. The ark of the twenty-first century is plan-
etary, filmed in a dismantled refinery in 2090. Who dis-
mantled it?
Sunday, October 24, 2010 
promissory justice
298.365. The Earth’s given us a chance to live. Does that 
demand anything of us? 
299.365. How can a chance generate obligations to live 
up to it? It would be the meaning the chance provides 
that contained the grounds of obligation. What is the 
meaning?
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300.365. Suppose that being alive were the chance of a 
relationship, as when I inherit my parents.
But some parents are bad. Life is deservedly criticized 
when it involves tragedy or abuse (Neiman 2002).
Life is the scene of all our relationships. If any rela-
tionship is good, life is a condition on that possibil-
ity. But does the possibility of the good in relationships 
outweigh the possibility of tragedy and abuse, especially 
when the good in relationships makes tragedy and abuse 
truly hurt?
301.365. To make any sense of the idea that the chance of 
being alive demands something of us, then, we need the 
notion of an unsurmountable good in a mere possibility. I 
call this an unqualified good.
302.365. There is an unqualified good in being alive. It is 
the chance to see the good. It is unqualifiedly good to dis-
cern goodness — or even to have the possibility of doing 
so.
So the chance Earth has given us to live demands that 
we mind the good.
. . .
Is this not a reductio ad absurdum of the so-called “lib-
eral” view that we have no obligation to do anything with 
ourselves as long as we’re not hurting one another? We 
have an obligation to discern and attest to the good. It 
comes from the fact of being alive given to us by our 
original home, Earth.
303.365. Hamlet (Shakespeare 2003) read as the crisis of 
authority. He doesn’t see the obligation in being alive, an 
obligation that goes away only when we can no longer 
see the good. He makes being into a groundless choice. 
This is immoral.
Hamlet does not display authority’s crisis — our fasci-
nation with him does.
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304.365: The rot of obligation goes deeper. 
1. Citizenship is a dying art so that we have lost impor-
tant knowledge about how to work out what is good. 
2. Many institutions organize irresponsibility so that 
we have trouble maintaining what is good collectively.
3. We have developed practices of short-term think-
ing so that we are not disposed to consider what is really 
good for others in the future.
305.365: How can we have a relationship with an imper-
sonal system of life? Cultures and labors close to the 
land or water tend to develop a relationship with these 
zones of life out of long, sedimented time interacting 
with them and their climate. 
Listen, the system of life filters down into someone. 
Sunday, October 31, 2010 
the use of time
306.365: Let me suppose that the idea of a relationship 
with an impersonal system of life, personalized by our 
analogical thinking, our identification and blurring as 
the system settles in, is not unhelpful (Bendik-Keymer 
2006). It allows us to have a home. Still, this only helps; it 
does not suffice. An impersonal system expects nothing 
of me. I do, rather, of myself. 
307.365: In today’s corporate-style-managed militar-
ies, soldiers, too, are often treated like the Earth under 
industrialism — squeezed to produce effective results, 
trained, equipped, even drugged or biotechnologically 
modified. They are used up and left over, polluted by the 
process. 
308.365: I was shocked tonight to see that the same 
depersonalization allowing corporations such as BP to 
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turn ecosystems into numbers is there in my govern-
ment’s discharging of combat veterans (French et al., 
2010). 
Did you kill anyone? 
Were you wounded?
Have you ever had thoughts of suicide?
[check]
Thank you. That will be all.
309.365: Branches across glass, back and forth.
310.365: The first use of time is to be able to make 
decisions.
311.365: Jumbled and thrown together — and apart —
our personal histories (and our personal history). The 
sound textured leaves along the hills. I leave.
312.365: Each day I write is significant to me, inside lim-
its and aware.
Sunday, November 7, 2010 
keeping our heads
313.365: What would a planetary curriculum for adap-
tation to climate change be, where the scale would be 
found not only in the content but also in the form? What 
kind of politics would it need to actually show?
314.365: On this election day, I can think of nothing 
worse for our relation to the environment than the death 
of facts. 
315.365: A self-portrait in the upstairs bathroom mirror of 
the Scheinfeld’s home (Scheinfeld et al. 2008). Imagine it is 
weathered by time, rain water, mold, ice.
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316.365: / Urban farming grocery list / 
Organic ghosts:
—to be alive to significance
—to have relational responses (to not turn away from 
you or myself)
—to not fit in, to
Be awkward and ending (!!!) even when
[They {production machines}] refuse to end. <They 
really do, they refuse to give up!>
317.365: State of the world. They deregulated our future so 
that they could gratify themselves now; sacrificed young 
people, families, whole ecosystems to a war based on lies. 
Their friends used loopholes around the globe to pollute 
and use up the Holocene Earth.
. . .
Meanwhile, I read some contemporary literature that 
gives one the sweetness in the infinity of life, as if every-
thing were funny, or at least almost — ironic and light. 
It’s not that I am bitter and insist on critique. It’s that 
the angles dizzy me.
318.365: Visiting University of Chicago, the first thing I 
did was to enter Rockefeller Chapel. 
At center was the intelligent flame of charity — one, 
stained-glass window high, high up in the arch above the 
altar.
. . .
The epiphenomena of the quarterly return. Fractal dance of 
identities and desire amounting to an individual life. 
. . .
I do not usually pray, being technically a-theist. But I 
thought about the next thousand years, an emptiness in 
my mind that was only a bare wish.
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Not quite a self-portrait, November 2012.
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319.365: To let alone reasons, and to not let reasons be alone, 
so that: we aren’t trying to make life more orderly than it is, 
denying its buzz and blur 
[organic ghost wall sticker/urban farmer saying]
Sunday, November 14, 2010 
the death of facts
320.365: I think reasoning takes many forms; it isn’t 
monolithic. For instance, reasoning can be theoretical, 
practical, or relational. There are many kinds of reason-
ing processes. Each has a different logic: involves dif-
ferent goals, forms of knowledge, sensibilities. Usually, 
when intellectuals rail against reason, they have forgotten 
practical and especially relational reason. 
Look and see: how to fix something from experience, 
trust the body’s capacity; know when to hold and be held. 
Sense is sense. The sensible thing is to acknowledge it 
in its different forms.
So the environmentalist (Abram 2010) who chastises 
reason with intuition, experience, practice, poetry, reli-
gion, spirit, touch, dream, wildness, compassion, life, 
materiality, etc. — unintentionally contributes to an out 
of focus, rational culture. He gives reason to only one 
form of awareness, when it has many. 
Think about the fact that there are many ways your 
life makes sense.
321.365: I knew a program once that, although in a 
school, openly contributed to the death of facts. It called 
itself “progressive,” but was complicit in conservatism 
through its view of what is rational. The program, which 
was in philosophy, cultivated sentimentalism. It dis-
counted objectivity and eschewed argument in favor of 
voice. It didn’t matter if a position were well argued so 
long as it felt right. But authenticity depends ultimately 
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on veracity to get a grip. This was my first introduction 
to how intellectuals can hate themselves by undermining 
the conditions of reason and, so, of responsibility. When 
you give up on objectivity, you give up on facts. And 
when we give up on facts, we hand over social reality to 
the most powerful and to self-gratification.
322.365: On March 25, 2009, Congressman Schimkus 
(R-IL) testified before the House Subcommittee on 
Energy and Environment. In this brief testimony, he 
appears to have taken biblical quotes out of context to 
justify his view that cataclysmic climate change can’t 
Amir & Dzena’s wedding, New York City, May 2015.
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happen — “God” being providential (Doster 2009). I 
believe this to be the most tragic video clip I’ve seen all 
year, due to its banality.
You have to remember that the oligarchic power-
brokers and beneficiaries of our current, global economy 
perpetuate a kind of exploitation against future peo-
ple. Future generations are people too and deserve fair 
opportunities. Things as they are, however, the wealthy 
and their brokers take advantage of their position in 
time to use things up. And Congressman Schimkus runs 
interference with his bible.
323.365: I have obligations to a specific child, Isaiah. This 
fact is a despair-stopper. 
My obligations demand that I do my best to protect 
future generations from my generation’s corrupt orga-
nization and its lack of collective will. It doesn’t matter 
how I feel about this. If my feelings get in the way, then I 
must disregard them.
324.365: Imagine that you see a tanker out on Pugent 
Sound. My friend, Judy, shared somesuch photo:
Here is our world now, industrialism afloat — con-
trolled by a corporation. 
The fact of the matter?
325.365: “The summer day says we should become a fes-
tival.” And so does the winter day in late Fall. How do 
days do that — not achievements, customs, even friends —
bare weather? 
The sun, crisp in its unseasonly season surprises the 
remnants of trees and the rolling circumference of time.
326.365: I’m going to take my time with facts — politicize 
them. But that doesn’t mean I will distort them. It means 
the opposite. I’ll insist on their objectivity. I’ll point out 
the political framing that caused them to be; will signal 
what clouds them being seen.
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Sunday, November 21, 2010 
morally invisible
327: Climate change’s ghosts opening barren water. This 
is what ocean acidification means.
328: If the essence of humanity is freedom (della Miran-
dola 1996), must we care what happens to ocean? Only 
in so far as what happens to ocean bears on other free beings 
(Kant 1998) — future generations, for instance.
I think this gets the problem backward. Free people 
should be responsible people, and responsible people 
shouldn’t be thoughtless with what matters and is mean-
ingful. So if I am going to be free, I should care what 
happens to ocean.
I don’t need to start with other people’s rights to see 
that what we are doing is not worthy of freedom. I can 
begin with what it means to be a responsible person.
329. A year ago next month, my nation’s democracy —
along with several other nations — managed to imperil 
future generations of the planet by not producing cli-
mate policy at Copenhagen (Morton 2009). Shall we dis-
cuss a crime against humanity?
It is hard to give democracy the hundreds of years it 
needs. But, then, is that democracy?
330. Do species matter in and of themselves? — Yes, but; 
no, but . . . Do wild processes (Rolston 1985)? — Which? —
Isn’t everything ocean near life (abiotic condition; toxin 
voids for speciation-to-come)? 
Then do individual ocean lives demand our respect? — No, 
except . . . — And those that feel pain (do fish feel pain)? — It 
depends. — Why should our depending matter more than our 
independing? — That isn’t even a word. — But it’s a concept.
What is intrinsically valuable? — Isn’t relational value 
relative to our ends? — What of our ends? — The death of a 
species is the life of another. 
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. . .
Or relational process, understood between us and 
ocean: each thing story, each decision complex, as it is 
between people. No, this isn’t a method. It’s a sensibil-
ity — a way to hold reasoning so that it makes sense to us. 
. . .
331. Yesterday, I drove the thruway slowly, passing no 
one. I was inside my ocean, eddies in rain splashed down 
and wicked off the window in refracted taillights. 
. . .
The main thing that interests me is the commitment 
to be thoughtful. Slow our reasoning down and think 
about a generous space. Start with we: sharing all the 
ways the ocean matters & our stories with it.
332. I am sitting with an entrusted five-year-old having 
pizza after a long bike ride through the secret field, the 
hidden station, through the mud, the wind. 
One: I tell myself to forget those things that I have 
been writing daily.
Two: I tell myself to remember this moment so that I 
can understand why we should care about these things 
that I have been writing about daily.
333. Hard-working, industrious we — and churning 
underwater the morally invisible.
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The secret site behind LeMoyne College, Syracuse, New York, 
November 2010.
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Sunday, November 28, 2010 
knowing vs. acknowledging
Earth thought 334 of 365: I have been thinking of high 
school lately, the assumptions of my world growing up. I 
grew up in Reaganite America and was a punk at a time 
when being so meant getting bullied. I tried to be politi-
cal: “This school is filled with apartheid!” on my back. I 
was lucky to attend one of the better public high schools 
in the United States — New Hartford High in New Hart-
ford, N.Y., near Utica. My parents were open-minded. I 
gravitated toward biology, history and English — with 
natural strength in math. So I was well placed to learn 
and to be schooled about our planet from a challenging 
perspective — and to challenge perspective.
But I grew up with the fantasy of infinity around me. I 
was an actor — we humans were actors- on a stage in the 
bright and open life of the world. Earth was a condition, 
not a limit. 
I didn’t think of our inhibited, atomized action in a 
trade-off with future generations. 
The future seemed always to get better.
I didn’t think we were pushing planetary boundaries.
335: Imagine an ethics book in which not a single thor-
ough argument is given. The entire exercise is not criti-
cal thinking yet.
336: Bright day and around us electric lights. 
337: What feeling about our politics now is thanksgiving?
338: Gratitude outpouring, and when it comes, it comes 
flowing out like shit.
339: “What sane reason could there be for moving away 
from this paradise? I think I may have felt a glimmer of 
madness, with no concept for the feeling” (Cavell 2010; 
July 7, 2003).
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340: The story of a structure changing. Thanksgiving day, 
2010. Tokisdotis — Isaiah’s name today — has changed his 
structure. A hurricane went through it. Tokisdotis: Fixing the 
structure here. 
Aunt Ruth watching, sitting 
Tokisdotis: Once the hurricane comes through the struc-
ture, we build it. And the name for that is rebuilding it. 
And that’s what we’re doing. 
So the process here is rebuilding it, but the things in 
this structure are just very messed up. . . . Because you 
never know when a hurricane might hit; so you never 
know when the structure will get destroyed; so I’m try-
ing to fix this. Mainly just trying to make it better; so we 
took it apart and put it back together, but it is a very long 
process. We’re trying to get this straight here.
Thursday, December 2, 2010 
we
Earth thought 341 of 365: Must there be an absolute dif-
ference between our generation, the past generations —
and humankind across distant, future generations? 
The form of the human passes away, only not on my 
time scale.
Why can’t “we” be a decision, a commitment to being 
as fair a part of a bio-geological process called “the 
human” as possible? 
The best in the human is the process that includes the 
entire species, and beyond.
342: The major difference between our “technosphere” 
and “biosphere” is moral — a matter of responsibility 
for our environment. Whenever we live in a biosphere, 
we make it into a technosphere. That’s what we do. The 
real question is whether we are responsible in it. This is 
a political question.
254	 WE	ARE	A	STORM
Ethics Table notebook, Cleveland, Ohio, 2011.
Planttruck, Syracuse, New York, 2010.
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Lee Rd., Cleveland Heights, Ohio, 2010.
Museum of Natural History, New York City, 2011.
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343: On June 6th, I wondered whether human rights drive 
environmental destruction. If human rights include the 
rights of future generations, does most of the objection 
fade? The objection would hold only as a criticism of the 
discourse of human rights within their first institution-
alization in 1947–1948. It wouldn’t undermine their idea.
(1) A right to an environment that doesn’t kill us or 
make us ill
(2) A right to an environment in which our conscience 
is not “outraged” (United Nations 1948, preamble)
The first provides protection against pollution and its 
effects.
The second protects non-human life, since conscience 
implies being thoughtful with life, not wanton with it. 
Then human rights — as idea — seem able to resist 
environmental destruction and no longer drive it by 
driving the demands of “development.”
But the pressure exerted by billions is to streamline 
the Earth’s functions and the use of non-human life so 
that the rights of the present and the future can be met. 
Climate change would then be protected against — also 
toxicity caused by pollution, and so overfishing, over-
lumbering, resource depletion in general- but every-
thing else, much of the Earth’s unused outpouring of 
life, would “rightfully” become subject to the human-
development machine.
Is that right?
344: The activist is a site that speaks to us, not for us. 
How do we find the actual sense of politics in our guts 
and in our bones? 
How can we participate in actual distribution of power, 
not over things, but as a process of ordering our shared 
world together?
IN	WONDROUS	HUNGER	 257
Sunday, December 5, 2010 
map key
Earth thought 345 of 365: To respect another involves 
sensing him, being able to connect with him — to con-
nect enough that one sees, for instance, that it’s best to 
disconnect for a time out of respect. It involves what I 
call “relational reason.” This rationally ordered pro-
cess demands more of us than simply conceptualizing 
what respects another’s will. It demands that we respect 
another’s being. How else would we even know his will? 
But we can’t relate to far future generations in this 
manner. There’s no possibility of intimacy. They are the 
great blank, although one day we will be their pity, con-
tempt, or inchoate heroes.
346: A child’s structure — wild in many directions, left 
hanging
A series of lived connections, provisional and there for 
a time
A structure by which to integrate the momentary com-
plexity of . . .
347: Let’s take a walk around. One. Thought should be 
searching. Two. Vital. Three. Sufficient for the day.
Monday, December 6, 2010
348. Things look different in daily junk. Getting the kid 
to school, fixing plumbing, working on good communica-
tion with the loved one — not big, abstract stuff. 
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Tuesday, December 7, 2010
349. The making personal of knowledge — that to my 
mind is philosophy. It is also poetry. The connection would 
be obvious if philosophy recognized the personal.
Poetry knows it is a form of knowing. We know, for 
instance, that we are home.
Night, Shaker Heights, Ohio, Winter 2016.
IN	WONDROUS	HUNGER	 259
Wednesday, December 8, 2010 
over time (the conditions of judgment)
350. I shuffle myself constantly like a deck of cards. Com-
muting is wearing me out. I just want to be home.
Sunday, December 12, 2010 
life in uncertainty
351. Few people have lived long, hard hours in the 
antagonistic, self-interested, vain, and collective mind of 
science —
the survived nature of strongly supported scientific 
hypotheses and of powerfully effective models.
Few people also have internalized the virtues of the 
altruistic, objective, scientist who isn’t self-absorbed.
Both suggest (as science does) the greater sense of 
uncertainty.
352. Virtue involves judgment about putting oneself in 
situations that won’t undermine one’s judgment or will 
support it (cf. Kamtekar 2004, 487). The virtuous person 
sets herself up to act well.
Call this a “virtuous constitution.”
353. This morning, surprisingly, climate talks progressed. 
At Cancun, compromise and conciliation filled the 
air among all the major air polluters — China, U.S.A., 
India — Japan also in agreement (Revkin 2010b). . . .
I’d be unreasonable not to be wary of my own relief. 
They act self-interestedly.
The politicians are elected; they are elected this morn-
ing or the next.
Where’s the law? 
But who makes it?




354. There are so many forms of philosophy the academy 
hardly touches. 
But the healthy body was encouraged in the Ἀκαδήμεια.
About the body doing philosophy? — The profession is 
uncertain.
Thursday, December 16, 2010 
it is actually, only, art
355. What an amazing
year. 
This exercise has pulled around with 
time 
and been an umbilical 
scar.
356. Philosophy the lost art (that’s how it feels) —
Hereby, I add my weed between the sidewalk cracks of 
industrial theory. Don’t smoke it.
357. Non-academics turn to “philosophers” expecting 
traces of discernment and the ancient schools. And what 
we show them is a discipline crouched around a fantasy 
of research science when it cannot ever be science, since 
it is actually, only, art.
358. The practice of philosophy, done in a community 
of “friends” (genuinely cared-about people) is supposed 
to seek wisdom. However, industrial theory does not. It 
is organized by the formalism of a way of writing and 
talking that must be mastered by highly focused feats of 
intelligence centered on distinctions and developments 
of positions for their own sake. Very little checking back 
in with our orientation toward wisdom is done, if it ever 
is at all — and it rarely is. 
This has costs.
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Friday, December 17, 2010
359. I’ve come two-legged to this party.
Some say love’s a way of seeing, but 
love see —
saws, see.
Saturday, December 18, 2010
360. Lake Cazenovia, a Saturday morning with Tokisdotis 
playing in the snow.
Sunday, December 19, 2010 
361. I was thinking yesterday of how these thoughts cir-
cled around the sun as they circled around a year. 
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
362. Some greater whole when you fill in for me, for I am 
trying. 
363. In Respiro (Crialese 2002), set on a small Italian 
speaking island between France and Italy, people use 
the environment in a way that displays a closeness to 
its workings and hence an awareness of its shifts. They 
cope with the surging sea around them on the dry rocks 
of the place and reveal an unsentimental sense of fellow-
ship with non-human life. It allows them to use that life, 
revealing familiarity with life and its patterns. The peo-
ple’s lives are suffused with the tossing air and sea, roll-
ing in cycles. 
262	 WE	ARE	A	STORM
Thursday, December 23, 2010
364. For a time it seemed I was in a place where I could 
be useful and where discussion was needed. So I tried. I 
am proud of that. 
The Ecological Life’s concept of a thought of the Earth 
shaped this year’s daily practice here (2006, lecture 9). 
I was anxious, moving, without an industrial the-
ory and ambivalent about doing any. I wanted to do 
philosophy.
This sprawling text might be called The Sky inside the 
City — the original title I wanted for The Ecological Life, 
but which my editor said it was too literary. Why is that 
bad?
(That title came from Alex Shakar’s first novel, City in 
Love: The New York Metamorphoses [1996], the story in the 
Museum of Natural History.)
Perhaps all I’ve left to do for now is to group these 
thoughts with the poetics of extinction I projected back 
into my graduate school studio at 53rd & Kimbark:
the sky filled with glacier light —
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Earth thought 365 of 365: Rules of engagement —
1. Write a reflection daily for a year.
2. Aim my “sternum-mind” toward “Earth” as a bundle of 
ecological concerns — what don’t I feel resolved about? 
What isn’t clear?
3. Compose the reflection on the day, and do not edit it 
once the day is done until many years later. 
4. Share the Earth thoughts when I feel like it with those 
who would seem to want to read them. (I hope that you 
enjoyed them.)
5. Be open — what Bernard Williams (2003) called 
“sincere.” 
6. Write to change my own mind. Write gymnastically. 






Delivered with slides almost exactly as written,  
March 12, 2009, at Case Western Reserve University.
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The point of this talk is not to school you in the practice 
of ethics, but to raise questions about the practice of eth-
ics. There is a standard picture of the practice of ethics 
that goes like this: 
Ethical theory is done in a classroom. It is divided into nor-
mative theory, meta-ethics, and descriptive ethics. Students 
learn to see how the ethics in their society and community 
works; they learn how to discover true ethical beliefs and 
sometimes discover them during class. Through meta-ethics, 
they understand what it is to have an ethical belief. Then —
and here comes the practice part — they go out and practice 
ethics.
In this picture, the domain of ethics is the domain of 
everyday life, and academic life has the role of provid-
ing the theory of everyday life, in this case, the theory of 
ethics. The point, then, is to apply what you learn in the 
classroom. The school is the think-tank for your world.
Of course, the expression “ethics” is equivocal, and can 
be a field of study, rather than the domain of what we 
should do and how we should live. In the first picture, we 
focused on a meaning of the word1 “ethics” that comes 
up when we speak of someone being ethical or unethical. 
When we do speak of someone being ethical, we mean 
that her ethics are solid: she is, for instance, a good per-
son, does the right thing, and so on. Here, ethics are not 
primary theoretical, but are already practical. That is 
why, in fact, the theory of ethics in the academy could be 
seen as brushing up and polishing our ethics so that we 
1 I do not think there is a substantial difference in this context 
between calling “ethics” a “word” and calling it an “expression.” I 
believe all words—provided they are in use in a community—are 
expressions, but not all expressions are words. Words which are 
not expressions are dead, or meaningless, words. My thinking on 
this matter has been shaped by my reading of Wittgenstein’s Philo-
sophical Investigations (1995).
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can return to everyday life to practice it better, that is, to 
be more ethical.
However, “ethics” also means a field of study, what we 
are engaged in here, and where a professor of ethics has 
her academic home. In this light, “the practice of eth-
ics” refers to what we do when we study being ethical. It 
refers to the academic practice of a field of knowledge. 
To ask, here, about the practice of ethics is to ask how 
we study ethics as a field of knowledge, our methods, the 
assumptions of our investigations, what we do in the 
classroom — that is, our pedagogy. For this sense of the 
word “ethics”, there is also a standard picture. It looks 
like this:
The practice of ethics just is ethical theory, whether descrip-
tive, normative or meta-ethical. There are various ways to 
practice ethical theory, but all of them must be responsible 
to the demands of good theory. For instance, all of them 
must attempt to be objective, clear, and attentive to the 
problems of life. Moreover, all of them should involve close 
and analytical reading and analytical writing of some sort.
Here, we have the practice of Ethics, the field of study, 
rather than the practice of being ethical. And, indeed, 
this is what my talk is about — the field of study — or I 
would have titled it “the practice of being ethical.”
How should we practice the field of study called “Eth-
ics”? That is, how should we study being ethical? In par-
ticular, should we study being ethical? Is the verb “to 
study” the right verb to express the relation we want to 
have between being ethical and our work to understand 
it? Should it even be “understanding” that schooling in 
ethics puts to the fore? What does it mean to “study”?
This group of questions around the infinitive “to study” 
is not arbitrary. As it turns out the idea of studying eth-
ics is assumed in both standard pictures I have presented. 
That is, whether you understood the title of this talk to 
speak to the practice of being ethical or understood it to 
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mean the practice of the field of study Ethics, the stan-
dard picture of either in modern universities assumes 
that, in school, you study being ethical. And I want to 
question whether that assumption should be held. 
Should we study being ethical?
Now this question struck me as odd when I raised it. 
Schools are places of study. What else would one do with 
any object of interest in education? You study it. Schol-
arship is vast, multi-generational, and has led to unde-
niable progress in our human condition. There must be 
good reasons why we study what we want to understand, 
rather than say, dance about it. Or, to be more precise, 
the institution “school” is set up to study objects of 
learning. If you want to learn about an object differently, 
say, by dancing about it, you don’t go to school, but to a 
community gathering. It’s not so much that the only way 
to learn is to study but that schools are one of many ways 
to learn, and they are set up for studying. To question 
Eva with Dhaka Project kids, 2008.
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whether we should study being ethical is to question the 
institution of the school.
Socrates, though, showed us that just because a belief 
is common sense does not entail that is it justified. Just 
because we — of course — study being ethical in school 
does not entail that we should. Moreover, Socrates 
showed us that, even if a common sense belief is justi-
fied, we seldom appreciate it fully until we question it. 
I interpret his claim — reported by Plato (1981, 38a) —
that “the unexamined life is not worth living” as almost 
a tautology. Worth is given to things by weighing them. 
They may matter in themselves, but until we weigh them, 
they are not worth anything. Now to weigh something 
is to consider its importance. And the way we consider 
something’s importance is to examine its significance. 
So a life that is unexamined is not a worthwhile life. It 
may matter in itself, but without examination it is not 
worthwhile. That is, while its significance may strike us, 
the relative importance of the significance will escape us. 
Similarly, even if we should study being ethical in school, 
we cannot expect going to school for that purpose to be 
worthwhile until we question it.
Should we study ethics in school? Should we go to 
school to study being ethical? What is the difference 
between going to school to study being ethical and going 
to school to be more ethical? And, if what we want is to be 
more ethical, should we go to school for it? Before I take 
my best shot at these questions, which involve question-
ing both what school and studying are, I want to show a 
third picture of ethics. This picture once was standard, 
certainly in antiquity, but some say up until the modern 
age and the rise of the modern university. It looks like 
this:
Ethics is a practice, whether you are stopping to think, or 
are being ethical. In fact, the division between being ethical 
and thinking about being ethical is specious if one under-
stands what it is to think about being ethical properly. That 
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is, properly conceived, reflection just is part of the practice 
of being ethical, and there is no other way to think about 
ethics properly than in a practice. The conclusion flows 
from the purpose of ethics, its point.
I attribute this view to Aristotle, the first great ethical 
theorist in the Western tradition, and the philosopher 
who seems to have initiated the disciplines of our uni-
versities more than any other philosopher, including 
Plato. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle reminds his lis-
teners (his book is a transcription by Nicomachus of his 
lectures):
The purpose of our examination is not to know what virtue 
is but to become good. (1999, 1103b28–29)
Aristotle can throw out such a succinct and simple 
reminder, because his audience understood the nature of 
ethics. The Greek word ethos meant character or way of 
life,2 and when people reflected on ethics, they intended 
to act a certain way. This kind of reflection can be con-
trasted with people reflecting on what Aristotle called 
“origins” and which are sometimes referred to as “prin-
ciples” (1139b19–36). These were the basis for scientific 
knowledge in Aristotle’s time. When reflecting on them, 
the point is not to act but to know.
The distinction here in philosophy of mind is between 
thought whose point is to know and thought whose point 
is to act. It is carried forward and explained most lucidly 
by Aristotle’s greatest medieval commentator, Thomas 
Aquinas — St. Thomas to Catholics. Aquinas distin-
guished the activity we know as theory from the activity 
we know as practice in terms of their points. For Aqui-
nas, what it is to engage in something depends on the 
point of doing it. On the one hand, the point of science —
and what we call “theory” — is to know something. But 
2  Thanks to Irene Liu for clarifying the Greek.
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on the other hand, the point of practical life is a deed, 
done. And ethics is a part of practical life, whether you’re 
thinking about it or acting out of habit. The way Aquinas 
firmed up this distinction was through his philosophy 
of mind. Theoretical reason aims at knowledge. Practical 
reason aims at an actual, finished deed. This was Aristo-
tle’s distinction, polished up.3 When we do Ethics, we use 
practical reason.
Now if we step back a moment and look at the common, 
contemporary division of the academic study of ethics in 
at least Anglophone universities, we find a distinction 
between descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and meta-
ethics. Descriptive ethics aims at describing how people 
take themselves to act ethically. It is sociological and 
anthropological. Psychology also studies it, and history 
can, too. Even literature can be said to be doing, at times, 
descriptive ethics, as when we meet the Parisian poor in 
Émile Zola’s L’assommoir. Descriptive ethics does theory in 
Aquinas’s sense.
Similarly, meta-ethics aims to understand the nature 
of ethical concepts. For instance, in contemporary eth-
ics, much attention is lavished on understanding what a 
reason is, then a reason for action, and even what nor-
mativity itself is, that property by which some belief 
strikes us as a reason to follow it. Meta-ethics does the-
ory, too, because it simply wants to know what this thing 
ethics is, as a scientist would want to understand what 
nature is, albeit using the empirical method. Some meta-
ethicists even use science to learn what ethical concepts 
are in their nature. For instance, empiricists like Jesse 
Prinz (2004) draw on neuroscience to explain our “gut 
perceptions.”
Normative ethics, however, does not do theory in Aqui-
nas’s sense. It falls under practical reason. The reason 
3  My reading of Aquinas is indebted to Candace Vogler, Reason-
ably Vicious (2002) and to Anthony Lisska’s work on Aquinas, e.g., 
his Aquinas’ Theory of Natural Law (1998).
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why is that the point of normative theory is to figure out 
what we should actually do. What is right, for real? What 
is true human goodness? How should we live? In other 
words, normative theory wants to determine our actions, 
not just to reflect on truths about the world. It’s action-
focused. Looking at the practice of Ethics from the 
standpoint of Aquinas’s distinction, then, it would seem 
that the question of what it is to learn ethics depends 
on whether we are engaged in, on the one hand, descrip-
tive or meta-ethics, or, on the other hand, normative 
ethics. The first two can rest content with knowing that 
people think something is ethical or with knowing that, 
for instance, a reason is normative because of its place in 
intentional action. The first two are after truths. But the 
third, normative ethics, can rest content only with living 
ethically. It’s after deeds.
This conclusion in itself is surprising and should be 
considered. But before we do, we should note that the 
distinction Aquinas allows us to introduce into the field 
of Ethics reveals an ambiguity in the idea of studying 
ethics. For we commonly say we are studying all three: 
descriptive, meta-, and normative ethics. But something 
imprecise is afoot when the activity with which we’re 
engaged — “studying” — has two incompatible ends! To 
study for the sake of knowing some true claim about the 
nature of things is not compatible with studying for the 
sake of accomplishing an actual deed. Think of it this way: 
if I think my point is to know some true claim about the 
nature of things (in this case, what kind of thing good-
ness is), but you think the point of what we’re doing is 
to actually do something good, we will be disappointed 
with each other. For I will stop doing what I’m doing 
when I have the truth, but you will expect me to go on 
and act truly. Thinking about the point of what we’re 
doing when we do mainstream Anglo-American Ethics 
shows us that “studying” is ambiguous. Something is not 
right here.
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Now, I’ve laid out a lot of questions, and I want to 
thank you for your patience with this investigation as I 
have. I want to come back and start answering some of 
them, but it is the nature of investigations like this one 
to take a long time to even lay out the field of questions. 
So I will ask you for a little more patience as I lay out 
one more consideration that strikes me as important.
I don’t know any better way to go into it than by 
bluntly quoting a passage from an ancient author who, 
in the passage, expresses a vision of ethics different than 
Aristotle’s, yet coherent with its assumptions about the 
point of ethics. The text is from the third century Roman 
philosopher Plotinus, who began his philosophical jour-
ney in Alexandria in what is today Egypt. In his collec-
tion of writings compiled as the Enneads, Plotinus writes:
Go back inside yourself and look: if you do not yet see your-
self as beautiful, then do as the sculptor does with a statue 
he wants to make beautiful; he chisels away one part, and 
levels off another, makes one spot smooth and another clear, 
until he shows forth a beautiful face on the statue. Like him, 
remove what is superfluous, straighten what is crooked, 
clean up what is dark and make it bright, and never stop 
sculpting your own statue, until the godlike splendor of 
virtue shines forth to you. . . . If you have become this, and 
seen it, and become pure and alone with yourself, with 
nothing now preventing you from becoming one in this way, 
and have nothing extraneous mixed within yourself, . . . if 
you see that this is what you have become, then you have 
become vision.4
4  Enneads I, 6, 9, 7–23, my emphasis. I take this passage and its 
translation from Pierre Hadot’s Plotinus, or the Simplicity of Vision 
(1993). The translation of the passage is by Michael Chase, who 
consulted both the French edition Hadot used in his book and the 
original Greek.
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What Plotinus so beautifully describes is nothing other 
than an ethical practice as Aristotle and his Greek con-
temporaries understood it, that is, a practice of habitua-
tion into a truer, better nature (the tradition even called 
this “second nature”). The image of sculpting a statue, 
so common among ancient philosophers, expresses the 
point well: you begin rough at the edges, but mindful-
ness can smooth you out until you become truer to the 
form of what is good. The first century Platonist and 
major essayist of the ancient world, Plutarch (1992a), 
uses this image even when describing how a true friend 
calls you out on your faults. A friend smoothes out the 
rough edges on you as a good sculptor would. For Plo-
tinus as for Plutarch, the sculpting aims to make you a 
better person; it aims to make you act well. Its point is 
not to know what the nature of ethics is, but “to become 
good.”
The commentator on Plotinus who led me to this pas-
sage, the French historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot, 
had an expression for this method of doing ethics, which, 
interestingly, was also his expression for the method by 
which the ancients did philosophy. He said Plotinus was 
commending a spiritual exercise, an askesis, the root of 
our word “ascetics” (Hadot 1993, 22). Hadot, an emeritus 
professor at the Collége de France in Paris, pointed out —
again and again (it was his life’s work) — that, for the 
ancients, philosophy was ethics, in the precise sense of a 
practical work on our habits to become a better person 
and to live a more ideal life. He pointed out that philoso-
phy was first and foremost a way of life.5 The very idea 
of reflecting on ethics was just a focused part of a wider 
ethics, the ethics of doing philosophy itself, wherein one 
habituated oneself slowly and over time to a way of life. 
Ethics, the topic, was a focused space in the middle of a 
wider ethical practice: a kind of group conscience sorting 
through how to make ourselves better when it comes to 
5  See his (2003) Philosophy as a Way of Life, passim.
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things like our character, practical judgment and so on. 
The whole thing, though — philosophy — was an ethics.
My point in bringing up this ancient picture of philos-
ophy is to point out that, from its perspective, even the 
distinction between theory and practice might not help 
us clarify what it is to study ethics philosophically. The 
reason why is that in this ancient perspective, even seek-
ing to know the nature of things should be done as part 
of a wider ethics, an ethics known as “Philosophy.” From 
such a perspective, if you understand philosophy as an 
ethics, even theoretical reflection on meta — or descrip-
tive ethics must be placed within the larger aim of living 
virtuously, as Plotinus says. Thus, if you do look inside 
the ancient classroom de-contextualized from the larger 
way of life of the philosophical school, you might be able 
to divide theoretical science from practical reflection. 
But if you zoom out and focus on the whole school, you 
see that it is from start to finish practical, that is, aimed 
at shaping people to live as good people. Theory, then, is 
only so good as its place in the human good.
Hadot implies this point when he explains what writ-
ing meant for the ancients. In one of his most helpful 
essays, called “Philosophy and Philosophical Discourse,” 
he explains how written and spoken philosophy — what 
he called “discourse” — was not primarily theoretical, but 
was at best secondarily theoretical. Rather, 
Discourse [was] a privileged means by which the philoso-
pher [could] act [on] himself and others. . . . It [was] always 
intended to produce an effect, to create a habitus within the 
soul, or to provoke a transformation of the self. (Hadot 2002, 
176)
So, you might be reading a papyrus scroll from Plato on 
the nature of language and talking about it with your 
schoolmates in an Epicurean common house in a mod-
est quarter of your ancient city. Outside, the sounds and 
smells of daily commerce would pass by your windows. 
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You might be seeking to understand what is language? 
What did Plato mean in this dialogue called the Craty-
lus? Yet at every and all times, you would be asking these 
questions only to make yourself a wiser person, a better 
person, more able to die a noble death as Socrates did, 
and to avoid the illusions of so much of human life. You 
would be steering yourself and others toward what truly 
makes life worth living. 
What strikes me about this last picture of both ethics 
and philosophy is that it also presents a different pic-
ture of what a school can be. Here, school appears not 
as a place of study for its own sake, but as preparation 
for living. This preparation is not pre-professional. It is 
ethical and civic. Study, here, opens up a deep apprecia-
tion of what life involves and helps us live less clogged 
by illusions. The classroom is a place of discourse and 
reflection, yet for the sake of developing wiser people. 
The entire school is a practice of ethics. But that does 
not mean it brainwashes people. Rather, the school as a 
Uttara, 2008.
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whole habituates people to seek wisdom, in open, ques-
tioning ways. And wisdom? Wisdom is supposed to shine 
through a life well lived, in mature human beings slowly 
shaping a glorious world.
What in this school would the practice of the field of 
Ethics be? Since ethics — for this ancient picture — is 
reflective and searching habituation into wisdom, to 
reflect on ethics inside the school just would be to 
reflect on the nature of the entire school itself, on phi-
losophy itself as the search to discover wisdom and to 
make ourselves become its “vision.” For this ancient pic-
ture, the practice of Ethics — the field of study — is like 
a conscience inside the entire institution reflecting on 
the entire institution’s path toward wisdom in all its 
dimensions — scientific, social, extra-curricular, finan-
cial, etc. — and, more importantly, it is a reflection on 
and awareness always of what the entire school should 
amount to: living life well. For this ancient picture of 
philosophy as ethics, the field of study Ethics would be 
Meta-philosophy or what we now call Philosophy of Edu-
cation, and its ultimate aim would be to discover how 
school can lead us to grow wise all through our lives.
* * *
O.K. With these four pictures of the practice of ethics in 
place, I can now turn to sorting out some answers to the 
question, what is the practice of ethics? I want to underline 
that, although the ancient picture of ethics as a philo-
sophical school is lovely, there is no reason to assume 
it is desirable for us, simply because it is ancient and 
in that sense original. We should avoid the error John 
Dewey pointed out in Democracy and Education (1916), 
the error of thinking that schooling for one kind of soci-
ety fits schooling for another kind. After all, we live in a 
highly complex society with a variegated and vast divi-
sion of labor interconnecting almost the entire world. 
Within this social form — modern society embedded 
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within globalization — it might seem odd for an entire 
school to do ethics in one form or another, and it might 
seem pretentious for the field Ethics to be the conscience 
of the school. We are no longer in a commune, much less 
a monastery, but in a research university.
I wish to put the ancient picture on hold and return 
to contemporary Ethics. One thing that seems indisput-
able to me is Aquinas’s Aristotelian distinction between 
the point of science and the point of ethics. If you are 
trying to know, the act of knowing aims at truths. But if 
you are trying to be ethical, the act of ethical reflection 
aims at deeds. Knowing a truth is achieved when a belief 
is justified and true. But doing a deed is achieved when 
you finish the act, for instance, clearing off the coun-
ter. No one can change the belief’s truth — it is not vol-
untary. But you can always change your action and not 
clear off the counter. This distinction, as we saw, drives a 
wedge between descriptive and meta-ethics — on the one 
hand — and normative ethics — on the other. Descriptive 
and meta-ethics may have a point as theoretical prac-
tices, but they are pointless as ethical practices, because 
they do not aim at deeds. By contrast, normative ethics can 
be an ethical practice, because it aims at right living.
So we have one clear distinction. I believe we should 
consequently relegate descriptive ethics to sociology, 
anthropology and psychology, where it is more properly 
situated, and meta-ethics to meta-physics — the study 
of the nature of reality — where it at least won’t be con-
fused with doing ethics. In saying this, I do not mean 
that ethicists should stop either kind of study, nor that 
Philosophy departments should necessarily lose ties to 
the social sciences. On the contrary, I would agree with 
the late Bernard Williams that those interested in ethics 
should learn from the social sciences, a point he made 
a decade ago in Making Sense of Humanity (1998). And I 
would agree with many people writing today, but mem-
orably Iris Murdoch (1994), that metaphysics can be a 
guide to morals.
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I would disagree, though, that people studying meta-
ethics or descriptive ethics are doing ethics. Rather, they 
are learning about the things that go on in ethics, but 
not in an ethical way. By this last qualification “not in 
an ethical way,” I do not mean that meta-ethicists are 
rogues and sociologists villains, but simply and precisely 
that their point is not a deed. It is rather a truth.
The practice of Ethics, then, belongs to normative eth-
ics, and from now on when I speak of Ethics in the class-
room, I will be referring to normative ethics. The ques-
tion then is, does it make sense to say we should study 
Ethics? I am interested in our actual use of language; so I 
will not go into the etymology of “study” as if that would 
provide us with the key to its meaning. Rather, looking 
at contemporary language as the ordinary language phi-
losophers of the 1950s did, we can see immediately that 
there is an ambiguity within the verb “to study”, one 
found especially in the noun form of it, “studies.” On the 
one hand, the overwhelming amount of English defini-
tions of the verb point to studying being the pursuit of 
knowledge. Study, on this set of definitions, is a project of 
one sort or another aimed at obtaining knowledge. Here 
is the realm of investigation or analysis of some topic, of 
time taken to learn the truth about it. We can see already, 
then, that if Ethics demands practical reasoning, studying 
Ethics is not what we should do. On this first set of defi-
nitions, studying ethics would amount to seeking knowl-
edge, which isn’t the point of Ethics. The point of Ethics 
is to become good.
But there is a second sense of the verb “study” which 
shows up in its noun form. This sense is practical, as 
when we say, she did a study of light and shadow so as 
to learn how to draw. Or, Chopin played his Études — his 
Studies — as a way to demonstrate the art of the piano. 
These studies are practical: the point is to do them, 
and — in doing them — the further point is to train for 
something further you will do. If studying Ethics meant 
doing studies in this sense, it might at least make sense 
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to use the verb.6 We would then speak more naturally of 
studying Ethics — upper case “E” — by doing studies in 
ethics — lower case “e” — as when one does studies in 
drawing, music, or sculpture. This kind of ethics really 
would look like training, even if reflective and open-
ended in all sorts of ways, as painting or dance are. In so 
being, though, it would come very close to the askesis that 
Hadot described among the ancients, to what he trans-
lated as spiritual exercises. In other words, if you studied 
Ethics in the sense that I am compelled to accept here, 
you would be going to class to exercise your capacity to 
do good. The classroom would, in its essence, be closer to 
a gym than a reading room. Its library would be a wealth 
of moves served by texts.
The image is humorous, to stay the least — twenty 
to forty students and their teacher doing ethical push-
ups. No, wait, the ethical treadmill. And finally, a bit of 
ethical stretching before showering — in separate locker 
rooms — and going home. But of course Hadot didn’t 
mean exercise in that sense, not as the genus. Rather, 
for the ancients, gymnasium was a species of exercise —
physical exercise — under the genus of spiritual exer-
cise — the overall philosophical attempt to become a 
better person. If we are committed to studying Ethics, it 
seems we are committed to some species of that training.
The analogy with plastic arts and music is also instruc-
tive. To do Ethics as a series of studies would really 
seem to be to try to “become vision,” or — in the case of 
music — to “follow the voice of conscience.” What would 
it be like if, in studying Ethics, we were searching for the 
complex and intricate human song that resonates in our 
hearts when we truly are right with the world? It sounds 
6  For this and the preceding paragraph, I was helped by my 
iBook Oxford American Dictionary, Version 1.0.2 (2005). I para-
phrased the many definitions drawn on. I wish to thank Lauren 
Tillinghast for helping me conceptualize this practical form of 
studying.
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nice, and it is suggestive. Here, a different vision of the 
study of Ethics and a different vision of the classroom 
open up, one where service learning, community-based 
learning, and experiential learning are not simply nice 
additions to the curriculum, but are essential develop-
ments of what Ethics is, truer and better ways to do Eth-
ics than to only read a book. After all, if you want to do a 
study in ethics, you’ll need to help out at times, be part 
of a community, and learn from experience. You can’t do 
a study by just reasoning. You have to try something in 
the world.
Once we learn what studying Ethics must mean, the 
vast proliferation of self-help manuals that clogs our 
bookstores doesn’t look like ignorance as much as it 
looks like inchoate reason. The Philosophy section won’t 
give us Ethics, actual practice in living better, at least 
typically. But self-help books try to. Whatever their sim-
plifications, they at least have the point of Ethics right.
Also, once we grasp what an ethical study is, the 
return to church which some academics decry as a sign 
of American anti-intellectualism seems only encouraged 
by a vision of school that does not aim to make people 
better. Church is an option when school does not give 
people the chance to exercise their ethical needs. Schools 
that do not do ethical studies deny a basic developmental 
dimension of being human: the desire to become mature 
by becoming someone who has character. We have to 
remember that the idea of a study in ethics is leading us 
to see all this.
Once we see what Ethics is, and once we sort out the 
only kind of studying that fits Ethics, we face the philos-
ophy of education. Here is a new vision of school, at least 
when it comes to Ethics classrooms. The ethical school 
is a new kind of school. It is a school in which there are 
certain spaces and certain times when you experiment 
with becoming a better person or with doing good. Books, 
writing, and all the media of the world rally around a 
task fitted to you, as you try to figure out what you will 
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do in this world, and not in terms simply of your profes-
sion, but on your terms as a grown-up human being, liv-
ing your whole human life with all its many dimensions 
and all its many relationships in communities within 
societies. 
It should be no surprise, then, that the scholar of 
ancient philosophy Martha Nussbaum (1997) called this 
new school’s goal cultivating humanity. She meant culti-
vating an all-around and life-long aptitude for taking 
in the human good. She correctly saw that, ironically, 
the new school is old school. Through her grounding in 
ancient philosophy where ethics is practical (as it must 
be) and school is ethical (aiming to help you live well, 
not simply to know a lot or to make a rich living), she 
advocated what the tradition originally saw as the point 
of the liberal arts — the making of active, reflective citi-
zens. New school? Old school? It doesn’t matter. Culti-
vating humanity is neither anachronistic, nor nostalgic, 
but intuitively grasps the point of ethics. If you practice 
ethics — the field or the school entire — you cultivate 
humanity. It is a whole lot more than reading books.
* * *
I want to end this talk by elaborating on one idea I 
have for doing Ethics. I had originally wanted to devote 
the entire talk to this idea, but I found myself wading 
through the preceding conceptual difficulties first, and 
they seemed both important and easily as fascinating as 
my idea is to me. I would also like to add that, although 
I earlier sketched the vision of school found among the 
ancients, where ethics subsumes the entire school in 
training for the philosophical life, and although I just 
now ended my last section with Martha Nussbaum’s idea 
of liberal arts education, I have only committed myself 
at this point to what goes on in an Ethics classroom. I’ve 
given no argument for why we should see Ethics as the 
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key to school. All I’ve reasoned out is what doing Ethics —
capital “E” — should entail, and I’ve positioned my con-
clusions within the philosophical tradition and some of 
the larger ideas to which it might, but has not yet shown 
to be, related. I have no idea if it is. Right now, I’m still 
focused on a simple, old Ethics classroom.
What should go on in, or through, that classroom? 
[Pause.] What kind of studies, understanding them 
similar to musical or sculpting studies? Will reading 
and writing, for example, be diminished? My idea for 
studying Ethics implies a resounding “No!” On the con-
trary, I believe reading and writing will be improved, 
once their point is in line with the nature of the subject 
matter to which they are subjected. Everything comes 
down to remembering the point of ethics. The ancients 
read and wrote — as Hadot showed us. Their writing was 
meant to “create a habit in the soul” or “a transforma-
tion of the self.” Similarly, you might say ethical read-
ing and writing should be meant to make people better 
people or to help people become, or do, good. Happily, 
this is interesting to students, especially when the class-
room is not shrouded in judgment as ethical life often 
seems, but is open and bright to exploring why really 
something is good, or not, and what alternatives might 
be. In such a climate, reading and writing — working on 
and from our interest in our own development — stand 
a good chance of being both motivating and useful in 
the eyes of the learner. This, at least, has been my expe-
rience. A writing assignment joining complex scholarly 
reflection with personal interest can be an amazing 
thing.
All this clears the ground for my main idea about 
doing Ethics, capital “E.” I believe that a new school for 
Ethics awaits in embedding Ethics within international 
exchange. There are many reasons for my view, which I 
will only be able to enumerate here without the kind of 
explanation I would like to give. First, however, let me 
explain my idea.
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I do not claim that the idea is original. In fact, you can 
find it in book V of Rousseau’s Émile (1978), when Émile 
is sent off by his tutor to travel the world and learn true, 
active citizenship as a citizen of the world.7 The idea is 
simply mine in the sense that I have been gravitating to 
it inside my soul and based on my experience. It is mine 
only in that I belong to it. In love, “you are mine,” means 
“I am yours,” and it is no different in philosophy.
The idea is to study ethics by studying abroad for at 
least six months and by weaving the study abroad into 
an equal flux of foreign exchange students invited back 
home. Certainly, studying abroad is not new at all. I did 
it twice as a high schooler, once in college, and decided 
I would just teach abroad for a good part of my 30s. But 
remember that we have arrived at a sense of “study” that 
departs from what is usually meant by the expression 
“study abroad.” Studying abroad does not usually imply 
practicing virtue and training to become good. But it 
could.
Now, I am not talking about all studies abroad, but sim-
ply about doing Ethics by studying abroad, a special and 
deliberate program. It is ethics that compels us to adopt 
the minoritarian sense of “study” and imagine practicing 
virtue and training to become good. I believe that study-
ing ethics abroad in that sense has many advantages, 
which I will enumerate here as a way of closing my talk.
The first is that studying Ethics abroad will be condu-
cive to open-mindedness. To study Ethics philosophically 
involves starting with questions: how do I become good? 
What is virtue? Questions like these. In the context of a 
foreign culture, these questions take on vivid and genu-
ine interest. After all, you are surrounded by a living and 
7  Rousseau is hostile to cosmopolitans in book I. However, his 
development of Émile’s common humanity in book IV and his 
advocacy of comparative politics through Émile’s travels strike me 
as forms of cosmopolitan citizenship. And, indeed, nationalism 
does not assert itself ever in Émile.
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often different interpretation not only of answers you 
expect to see but of the questions themselves. When, for 
instance, Arabic speakers discuss conscience, the ques-
tion I asked as a college student at Yale in the 1990s 
takes on a surprisingly new focus. I asked “What does 
it mean to have a conscience?” — a question that took 
me all the way through graduate school at University of 
Chicago and issued in my dissertation. I was looking for 
an answer about how to follow an inner call, and which 
call to follow, and why it might matter at all, and where 
objectivity might lie. But in Arabic, conscience is ضمير 
(dhameer), a word that implies immediately one’s rela-
tionships with other people — not simply as a duty that 
conscience relays, but as the voice of conscience itself. It 
is as if conscience is an opening through which the real-
ity of other people impresses itself on the soul. If I had 
studied Ethics abroad as an undergraduate and gone to 
an Arabic speaking country, I would have been able to 
ask my question still, but the object of it would have been 
entirely different. A surprising and wonderful discovery.
Thus, when I say that studying Ethics abroad will be 
conducive to open-mindedness, I am taking seriously 
the point of philosophy’s involvement in Ethics, its way 
of asking questions first, of carefully considering ideas 
and positions. Training to become good abroad does 
not imply proselytizing, imperialistic condescension, or 
missionary zeal. It implies, rather, having one’s lessons 
immediately around one, and having to reconsider many 
of the things one considers good, thereby examining what 
really is good. The foreign culture acts as a Socratic fire, 
if only one lights a match by asking a simple question.
I see that time is running out. So I will be able only 
to mention two more reasons. I believe studying Ethics 
abroad is advantageous in that it teaches mostly through 
know-how and knowing people. In other words, it does not 
center around what in epistemology we call “knowing-
that,” propositional knowledge. There is a debate in 
epistemology about whether all knowledge is at bottom 
propositional knowledge, a set of beliefs. For reasons I 
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can’t go into here, I believe that it is not. Rather, I believe 
that we know also by knowing how to do things. At the 
very least, brain science has shown this to be true, such 
that amnesiacs who can’t retain learned beliefs can still 
develop practical know-how.8 Further, I do not believe 
knowing people is a kind of knowing how to do things 
or a kind of propositional knowledge. At a conceptual 
level, Emmanuel Lévinas demonstrated this point well in 
his extensive phenomenology of human meeting, and in 
doing so he drew on an assertion made earlier by Mar-
tin Buber. Also, at the level of our brains, it would seem 
sociopaths show us that one can know that something 
is true and know how to do something but still not be 
able to know people in any soulful way. Finally, some 
languages make a distinction between knowing how to 
do things and knowing people — as the French language 
does between savoir and connaître (although blurring the 
distinction between knowing people and knowing truths 
in the latter verb). I believe, then, that if we want to be 
knowledgeable in the fullest sense, we need at least three 
kinds of knowledge.9
Now, it should be no surprise that being ethical 
involves know-how. After all, the point of ethics is to be 
doing something. Nor should it be a surprise that being 
ethical involves knowing people. Ethics is primarily a 
8  I drew these conclusions from the unpublished work of David 
Bzdak, then a finishing graduate student at Syracuse University 
(now a professor at Onondaga Community College), and in particu-
lar from his talk “On amnesia and knowing-how” (2009). The con-
clusion about knowing people is my own.
9  After this talk, I developed two published papers on relational 
reason—the reason involved in knowing people as people. See my 
“The Moral and the Ethical: What Conscience Teaches Us about 
Morality” (2013a) and “Do you have a conscience?” (2012). I have 
no doubt that relational reason will figure centrally in my future 
work, as it has already figured in talks on the capabilities of other 
species, in meta-philosophical reflections, and even in published 
work about human responsibility for mass extinction. And of 
course this book is a study in relational reason, for which I thank 
your time and care in reading.
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social phenomenon. Put bluntly, you can have all the 
true ethical beliefs in the world, but if you are a futz or 
a sociopath, you’re not going to do much good — in the 
first case — or be ethical — in the second. Studying Eth-
ics, then, should involve know-how and knowing people.
I believe study abroad would forefront both of these 
kinds of knowledge. A good part of most study abroad is 
human connection, surmounting the hurdles that loss of 
home, meeting of foreigners, and language and custom 
bring. Similarly, in the new places where one lives, liv-
ing abroad challenges one to learn how to do things one 
had taken for granted — going to the store, being polite, 
figuring out bureaucracy. Much of this know-how also 
relies on knowing people. Certainly, one does not need to 
go abroad to learn how to do good things or to learn how 
to know people in solidarity and common humanity, but 
it certainly helps.
The final advantage of studying Ethics abroad for 
which I have time today is best relayed by a story. Last 
Spring, I took a group of students from American Uni-
versity of Sharjah’s Department of International Studies 
to Dhaka, Bangladesh. We went to volunteer for ten days 
at The Dhaka Project, a combination school, family cen-
ter, and job-training program serving the poorest of Dha-
ka’s children and their families.10 Children from shanties 
bordering the rivers where public land exists are invited 
out from the foul waters where people bathe, wash, and 
defecate, from crowded thatch and detritus rooms hous-
ing up to a dozen people. These children and their fam-
ilies are invited to exchange their living quarters for a 
solid brick hut that will not catch fire from cooking fires 
and will house four people in a room. In return, the par-
ents contract to send their children to school clean every 
day in a clean uniform and to not make their children 
work the countless child labor jobs around Dhaka. Not 
surprisingly, there is more demand than supply, and the 
10  See Namitha (2008).
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waiting list for the project is long. Not surprisingly, too, 
the children love to go to school, with their whole hearts 
and their whole minds and their whole, bright souls.
The students who went with me had for the most part 
grown up in the United Arab Emirates. There is more 
room in the bathrooms of the some of the restaurants 
they might frequent in one of Dubai’s luxury malls than 
there was in three or four of the shanties put together. 
The students were overwhelmed, but, being Muslim, also 
immediately tuned into what Muslims take as their God-
given duty to serve the poor, their fellow brothers and 
sisters on Earth. 
I don’t think those students will easily forget the 
trip, and certainly not the inner trip we made to visit 
a mother from the Project who had ended up in the 
burn ward, one of Dhaka’s thousands of yearly victims 
of cooking fires. There in the city’s best public hospital 
right next to the country’s best university, hundreds of 
patients languished in hallways, overflowing the burn 
wards. An entire ward filled with hundreds of infants 
and young children filled the air with constant cries. 
Face after face was swollen and disfigured with blisters. 
Over half of the people there would die, due to absence 
of medication and unsanitary conditions.
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The burn ward, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2008.
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The photo I have put up here is from one woman 
whose legs were burned. She was uncommonly positive. 
Her husband, from Dhaka’s lower middle class, was with 
her. But he had lost his job due to tending her. The flow-
ers in her hand came from some of the Muslim students 
I was with, and they sent back a fan and medication to 
help in that corridor. This woman was lucky, but there 
were so many more around her suffering without hope 
and in all likelihood just days from dying.
The economist, the public health official, the doctor, 
research scientist and the engineer who might relieve 




Preface “a” was spun from fragments of a review of 
Pierre Hadot’s What Is Ancient Philosophy? written for Phil-
osophical Practice (Bendik-Keymer 2008). Thanks to that 
journal for permission to use fragments of my review. 
Lauren Tillinghast, then the book-review editor, helped 
me think through the concepts of a practical study as well 
as that of relational reason. Lauren helped me come up 
with some of the concepts that I most use today.
“The ideas start in the kitchen” first arose as a paral-
lel inquiry to students at American University of Shar-
jah working on a self-portraiture project of their own 
in 2006–2007. It was first written in spells: April 3–May 
13, 2007 in Sharjah, U.A.E., and June 20–July 3, 2007 in 
Modesto, California.
In 2005, students remarked in office hours that they 
had not found a space outside of class to talk intellec-
tually in the way that they wanted. So began the extra-
curricular conversation circle of 2005–2006 on the steps 
of the main building Tuesday evenings. The conversa-
tions from those steps inspired me in Spring 2006 to 
propose a class addressing them — Modern Identity. Stu-
dents in the U.A.E. wanted at that time to work out the 
contradictions and potentials of “being modern.” The 
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class I constructed to stage their questions ended with 
“identity portfolios,” hybrid response papers to core mod-
ern ideas — abstraction, liberty, equality — alongside 
self-portraits engaging with these ideas. The power of 
these portfolios synthesizing and opposing the personal 
with the systematic led me to mention them over email 
to Breena Holland when I was staying at the Cité Univer-
sitaire in the summer of 2006. She suggested I contact 
Theodore Zeldin and his Oxford Muse Project. Mr. Zeldin 
was enthusiastic and agreed to work with a group of my 
students from Sharjah. These were: Hesam Ziaei, Steph-
anie Mahmoud, Sidra Shahid, Alia Al-Sabi, Ayla Qadeer. 
In some ways, this book is the end of my parallel pro-
cess with them and with the image of a humanist that 
Mr. Zeldin allowed me to glimpse for a brief, important 
moment in my mid-30s. This book could be seen as my 
“modernity portrait.”
I want to thank the late Richard Gassan, who was 
killed by a negligent driver in the U.A.E. while biking —
his desert love. Richard was one of the few faculty to 
participate almost every week in the conversation circle 
of 2005–2006. He was loved by his students, and he was 
a friend. He would have read this book and busted my 
balls. “The ideas start in the kitchen” is dedicated to him.
“I don’t want to be thoughtless” first appeared in a 
much more normal format (although not that normal), 
as “Species extinction and the vice of thoughtlessness: 
the importance of spiritual exercises for learning vir-
tue” in a special issue of the Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics, guest edited by P. Cafaro and R. 
Sandler, Winter 2010. That article grew from a paper 
I presented at Human Flourishing and Restoration in an 
Age of Global Warming, a workshop at Clemson Univer-
sity, September 2008, co-organized by Allen Thompson, 
Breena Holland, and myself. It has been greatly changed 
here.
“Orchard in the mind” is an expression from Sidra Sha-
hid, one of the students from Sharjah: “the orchard in 
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the mind beneath the mind.” Sidra is working on her 
Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia after 
earning two masters degrees — one in gender studies 
and another in philosophy. She read Seutonius and Spi-
noza by herself at a library in Kuwait growing up.
Intermixed into the scientific jumble of the neighbor 
are some important yet still poorly understood things 
about mass extinction. For a grasp of them, I thank 
members of the Colgate Mass Extinction workshop I co-
organized with Paul Pinet, especially Bill Erwin of the 
Smithsonian Museum and my colleague Christopher 
Haufe.
Finally, I want to thank Steve Vogel for emphasizing 
the value of collective, human work. You can hear my 
engagement with his Thinking like a Mall in parts of the 
discernment exercise. Steve’s work was also influential 
to me as I revised “We are a storm in wondrous hunger.” 
I can’t hear we in that study without hearing his empha-
sis on the loss of we in our alienated political economy. It 
was surprising to me, who agreed with his position from 
my college days on, to see how my thinking could drift 
away from the simple politicization of the environment 
as a collective achievement of us. Steve’s work is a much-
needed corrective to neo-liberalism now, including in 
environmental philosophy.
“I was in the open then” first developed in New Word 
Order, a workshop on revision taught by Nate Pritts at 
the Downtown Writer’s Center at the YMCA, Syracuse, 
NY. I presented an early form of it as “53rd & Kimbark: 
a poetics of extinction” at the conference Geoaesthetics in 
the Anthropocene at Sallisbury University, with thanks to 
James Hatley. I want to thank Nate for helping me reart-
iculate poetry after more than a decade of professional 
philosophical denial of it.
There are too many people in the poem to thank prop-
erly. I hope that they recognize themselves and remem-
ber the time we shared. But I want to thank especially 
Lars Helge Strand — who makes an appearance or 
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two — Dima Ghoneim, who was in some sense behind 
the texto poem, Antoine Lacronique, Mari-Ann Kucha-
rek, Flannery Hysjulien, Janine Schiavi, Megan Craig, 
Stephen M. Rich, Christopher Boerboom, Rick Furtak, 
Elaine M. Wolf, Amir Berbic, Zlatan Filipovic, the late 
Shoaib Nabi Ahmad, and Roderick Grant — all of whom 
influenced poems. Finally, my stay in France would not 
have been possible without the LeFebure and the Facq 
families especially and without the support of the Rotary 
Clubs of Rouen and of Utica, New York.
“I want to meet you as a person” is modified substan-
tially from “Kierkegaard as an Enlightenment thinker,” 
originally a talk for a conference on Kierkegaard’s jour-
nals organized by Gordon Marino at St. Olaf College. I 
decided I did not want my scholarship to go in that 
direction and never gave the talk. 
In many ways, the subject of that essay, which is cen-
tral to this book, comes from conversations with Anne-
Christine Habbard. One day in early 1991, she read me 
Kant’s “What is enlightenment?” out loud while I was 
in the bathtub. As with so many preoccupations in my 
intellectual history, the conversations I had with Chris-
tine cored central ideas in my mind, or even soul. After 
all, my dissertation at Chicago — Conscience and Human-
ity — was in many ways an attempt to conceptualize what 
I’d learned from her, and perhaps to hold on to a dif-
ferent experience of philosophy than what I suffered at 
Chicago.
 “I carried my teeth in my heart” is a modified line 
from a poem I wrote in Nate Pritts’ seminar that was 
subsequently published in a triptych for H_ngm_n #12, 
2010. The poem is called “Ethos,” and a different part is 
a longer version of “I can be philosophical . . . ” 
The earliest material of the entire poem series pub-
lished here is from 1989, a fragment of an unpub-
lished poem written in my dorm room at Yale College. 
There is a substantially reworked fragment of “A Night 
Tale,” The Yale Literary Magazine, Fall 1990, and the 
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entirety — without the title — of “Section urbaine”, The 
Yale Literary Magazine, Fall 1992. 
“We are a storm in wondrous hunger” first appeared as 
a blog called 365 Earth Thoughts between 2009 and 2010. 
I explain further its relationship to The Ecological Life in 
aphorism 364. The many people who commented on the 
process as it unfolded — in line with one of the rules of 
the askesis — are cited properly in the bibliography and 
in-text cited in the actual study. As I’ve mentioned, too, 
Steve Vogel’s work was on my mind during the revi-
sion, as was Andrée Boisselle’s attention to indigenous 
experience.
There are too many people to thank for the study, 
which took place over a year. Mostly, I want to thank 
Isaiah.
“The practice of ethics” is the talk given as credited. 
Thanks to the Case Western Reserve University Depart-
ment of Philosophy, especially Colin McLarty. It draws 
on a trip to the Dhaka Project, Bangladesh, by students 
from A.U.S. Thanks to Nour Merza, Eva Fernandes, the 
students and local staff of the Dhaka Project (April 2008), 
and to the anonymous woman in the burn ward who 
allowed me to take her picture. 
In most cases, photos were taken by me using a vari-
ety of cameras from a SONY Cyber-shot digital camera 
(2006–2008) to a Blackberry Bold cell phone camera 
(2008–2010). At least one photo in “The ideas start in 
the kitchen” was taken on a Nikon FG 35mm film cam-
era. Thanks to Amir and Isak Berbic for discussing the 
format of images and to Zlatan Filipovic for advice on 
the Cyber-shot. More recent photos were taken by me on 
an iPhone 5S and modified using basic Instagram filters 
and refinement tools.
Thanks go to those who read the first draft of the proj-
ect, The Book of Becoming: John Levy Barnard, Sara Marie 
Blakely, Lynne Huffer, Elaine Hullihen, Dan & San-
dra Scheinfeld, Alex Shakar, Arielle Zibrak, and Rachel 
Zucker. 
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For compiling many first drafts of the book to be 
sent to readers, I want to especially thank Renee 
Holland-Golphin.
My students from the Rancière seminar at Hamilton 
College, Spring 2014, led me to do a partial revision and 
to extrapolate my criticism of Plato’s Ἀκαδήμεια. Thanks 
to Mercy Corredor, Sean Fujimori, Jackson Graves, Grant 
Meglis, Chip Sinton, Jesse Voremberg, and Kim Wang. 
This book would not have come to take this form without 
our luminous and unforgettable seminar, for which I am 
still grateful.
Thanks go to Shannon Lee Dawdy, who encouraged 
me to put this book out until a publisher discovered it, 
and to Sarah Gridley, who co-led a seminar-across-two-
seminars-in-correspondence called The Literary Mind: 
a Challenge to Philosophy (mine) and Poetry as Philosophy 
(hers).
For reading the penultimate draft of this project, I 
wish to thank Esther Ann Bendik, Kaitlyn Marie Conners, 
Ryan Johnson — who also deserves thanks for recom-
mending Punctum to me — Sean Martin, Susan Neiman, 
and Amy Seymour. For reading the last draft, I wish to 
thank Andrée Boisselle, whose understanding of decolo-
nization taught me something. For weighing in on titles 
at the eleventh hour, I want to thank a whole bunch of 
folks.
Thanks to James R. McSweeney and to Colleen M. Coak-
ley for helping me understand some of the central rela-
tionships behind this book. The same goes to Stephen M. 




Punctum did a bang up job. It is the kind of publish-
ing platform and collective we need now. I am proud to 
have published with them and urge established scholars 
to join its babbling up. Thanks go to Chris Piuma for 
constituting this book in print and for his patience with 
my process; Arthur and Jules Russell for Shaker Square 
Farmer’s Market title talk; and Eileen Joy for walking the 
talk. Again: theirs is the kind of publishing philosophy 
we need in the world now.
*
The dedication
Solar Calendar began to come together during a divorce. 
But as I compiled, rewrote, and integrated this book, see-
ing it grow alongside me, I became aware of how much 
of it is indebted to my time in Rouen, France as a Rotary 
exchange student in 1988–89, befriending, reading and 
philosophizing outside the classroom. To the entire 
Lacronique family — thank you for welcoming me into 
Paris. Malka Espaignet, wherever you are, thank you for 
being a teacher who saw and believed in my possibility. 
On n’est pas sérieux quand on a dix-sept ans, et qu’on a des til-
leuls verts sur la promenade.
East Hill School, Ithaca, New York, with my mother, May 2009.
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How a book works only by forgetting it. If I remember a book 
to conceive of my personal decisions, then I act under its 
fantasy as it guides my action. This is the danger allego-
rized by Dante between Francesca da Rimini and Paolo 
Malatesta. I do not want that, and so I let the day be the 
most vibrant thing of all.  Only forgotten things can truly 
be transformed.
On a walk through Barcelona, end of the school year, 
May 2007.
SOLAR CALENDAR
AND OTHER WAYS OF MARKING TIME  
JEREMY BENDIK-KEYMER
Imagine the kind of philosophy book you might have wished for 
when you were growing up. Seeking a reader who would live with her 
own questions and walk around town with her thoughts, this book 
would not have a single  thesis but would work through multiple 
problems and be an experience, born out of life-experience. Solar 
Calendar contains a family portrait, a parody-essay, a time-capsule 
poem, an exploded essay, a poetic record of an act, and an aphorism 
journal for a year. They protest that philosophy is a daily practice of 
thoughtful relationships and turn the book into the texture of a person.
This “book of becoming” weaves together poetry, photo album, 
exploded essay (including tears and scotch tape), philosophical 
commentary, memoir, and aphoristic journal.The breathtaking  
result is a philosophical askesis for our time: polyphonic,  
democratic, practical, and urgent. 
     —Lynne Huffer, author of Mad for Foucault
It is rare to come across a book that does what it says. 
     —Shannon Lee Dawdy, author of Patina: a Profane Archeology
How to be philosophical, how to be good and ethical and inter–
connected. How to be responsible, how to be free. Solar Calendar  
is a truly holistic work suffused with intelligence, honesty, 
beauty, and care.
     —Alex Shakar, author of Luminarium
Solar Calendar opens up temporal vortices through which we 
can consider the contrasting frames of human, geological, and 
even cosmic time.  I have never read anything like it.  Though 
the scope of its concerns is vast, it is a work equally fitted to the 
scale of a human reader.
     —John Levi Barnard, Department of English, College of Wooster
The philosophy is not a wooden game of chess.
     —Elaine Hullihen, conceptual, performance, and body artist
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